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Abstract
This report estimates the impact that high levels of enrollment in the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) have had on economic trends in rural
counties since the program’s inception in 1985 until today. The results of a
growth model and quasi-experimental control group analysis indicate no
discernible impact by the CRP on aggregate county population trends.
Aggregate employment growth may have slowed in some high-CRP coun-
ties, but only temporarily. High levels of CRP enrollment appear to have
affected farm-related businesses over the long run, but growth in the number
of other nonfarm businesses moderated CRP’s impact on total employment.
If CRP contracts had ended in 2001, simulation models suggest that roughly
51 percent of CRP land would have returned to crop production, and that
spending on outdoor recreation would decrease by as much as $300 million
per year in rural areas. The resulting impacts on employment and income
vary widely among regions having similar CRP enrollments, depending
upon local economic conditions.
Keywords: Conservation Reserve Program, CRP, rural development, rural
employment, land retirement impacts, land-use changes, recreation spendingAcknowledgments
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By retiring over 34 million acres of cropland since 1986, the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) has substantially reduced soil erosion, enhanced
wildlife populations, and protected soil quality. But, despite its considerable
environmental and farm sector benefits, concerns continue that the program
may adversely affect nearby communities as farmland is retired and demand
for farm inputs and agricultural marketing services declines. This report
examines the economic trends accompanying changes in CRP enrollment
and finds that, in aggregate, the adverse economic impacts of the CRP are
generally small and fade over time.
High CRP enrollment was associated with a net loss of jobs in some rural
counties between 1986 and 1992, but this relationship did not persist
throughout the 1990s. Farm-related businesses, such as input suppliers and
grain elevators, continued contracting throughout the 1990s, but other busi-
ness expansions moderated the CRP’s impact on total employment. In
particular, the CRP may be responsible for as much as $300 million dollars
per year in increased outdoor recreational expenditures in rural areas.
We found no statistically significant evidence to support the commonly held
belief that CRP encourages rural outmigration. Once county characteristics,
such as population density, economic base, and distance to urban centers,
are taken into account, post-1985 population trends in rural counties are
largely unaffected by CRP enrollment. In addition, high levels of CRP
enrollment appear not to have affected beginning farm trends (although
whole-farm enrollment was negatively related with beginning farmer trends
and partial-farm enrollment was positively related). Nor does CRP participa-
tion seem to encourage absentee ownership.
In aggregate, the economies of rural counties, even those experiencing long-
term population and employment declines, were able to adjust to CRP-
induced shifts in demand. But what would happen if CRP enrollments were
reduced or eliminated now that the program has been in operation for nearly
two decades? Supplementing this retrospective analysis, economywide
impacts of allowing CRP contracts to expire were also estimated. Based on
market conditions prevalent in 2000, we estimate that only about half of the
land enrolled in CRP would have immediately returned to crop production if
CRP contracts had expired in 2001. The remainder would have gone into
pasture or stayed in conservation uses. Land brought back into production
would increase demand for farm-related goods and services (farm inputs,
labor, marketing and transportation services, etc.), leading to job growth in
these industries. But reduced outdoor recreational spending would lead to
job losses in other industries. And, as income is redistributed away from
farm households to other sectors of the economy, shifting demand for
consumer goods and services could lead to other job changes as well.
iv
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tion would be very small, with positive and negative effects within particular
industries and regions largely canceling each other out. But, the potential
effects could be noticeable in areas of the country where CRP enrollment is
relatively high. CRP’s impact on local economies is sensitive to local condi-
tions. The value of alternative uses of CRP land, the value of the environ-
mental benefits attributable to land retirement, and the extent to which
goods and services are produced and provided locally all affect the CRP’s
local economic impacts. While regional output and jobs are estimated to
increase at least slightly, this is largely due to changes in the farm sector.
Nonfarm output and employment would decline in some regions if CRP
contracts expired, as would aggregate household income.
v
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The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was established by the Food
Security Act of 1985 (the 1985 Act) and began enrolling farmland in 1986.
Under this voluntary program, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
establishes contracts with agricultural producers and landowners to retire
highly erodible and environmentally sensitive cropland and pasture from
production for a period of 10-15 years.1 Enrolled land is planted to grasses,
trees, and other cover, thereby reducing erosion and water pollution,
providing other environmental benefits, and reducing the supply of agricul-
tural commodities. CRP rental payments give participants a stable source of
revenue and CRP’s impact on production increases the market price of
commodities for other crop farmers. The program’s benefits to the environ-
ment, CRP participants, and other crop farmers have made it a recurring
focus of subsequent farm program legislation. From its beginning, however,
the program’s potential effect on farm communities has been a concern.
As with other farmland retirement programs, enrollment in CRP can reduce
demand for farm inputs and agricultural marketing services. As land is taken
out of production, purchases of farm inputs such as seed, fertilizer, pesti-
cides, herbicides, farm machinery, and labor decline unless cultivation is
expanded by an equivalent amount elsewhere (either on new land or through
more intensive use of existing cropland). Furthermore, if local agricultural
production declines, there is less need for grain elevators, packing and
processing facilities, and related transportation and marketing services.
While CRP rental payments compensate participants for the losses they
incur from idling their land, CRP does not reimburse businesses for associ-
ated reductions in demand for farm inputs and services. As a result, if culti-
vation on nonenrolled land does not increase as CRP land is taken out of
production, parts of the local economies of rural counties can be adversely
affected. If alternative economic activities (such as hunting, fishing, and
outdoor recreation) do not develop as farmland is taken out of production,
farm-dependent communities with high CRP enrollment can experience
economywide slowdowns. For this reason, enrollment in CRP is normally
capped at 25 percent of each county’s cropland acreage. Whether the 25-
percent cap has been effective at limiting adverse community impacts
remains an open question. 
The CRP may have other unintended consequences as well. As CRP partici-
pants enroll more of their land, their financial dependence on farming
declines, allowing them to more easily retire from farming completely. Not
only do these “whole-farm” enrollments reduce demand for farm inputs and
services, but if the participant chooses to move elsewhere, the local
economy is also deprived of the CRP rental payments. There are concerns
that the CRP may have spurred a cycle of population decline in some
communities, with a drop in the farm population leading to a decline in
retail and government services, which encourages still others to leave the
community. As population declines, it becomes harder for local retailers to
survive and it becomes more expensive (per capita) for local governments to
maintain public services such as education, police protection, and infrastruc-
ture. While casual observation supports the notion that many of the commu-
nities most dependent on CRP rental payments as a source of income are
1 The primary focus of the CRP is to
retire cropland from production. A
limited amount of pasture has been
enrolled in the program as riparian
buffers for water-quality enhancement.
Currently, around 250,000 acres of
marginal pasture is enrolled in CRP,
amounting to less than 1 percent of
total enrollment.
1
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decline or merely a symptom.
By providing additional competition for agricultural land, the CRP may also
affect the ability of established farmers to expand their operations and of
beginning farmers to lease or purchase farmland. Since the program is
voluntary, CRP rental rates need to be sufficient to reimburse participants
for the losses they would otherwise incur from taking land out of produc-
tion. And, since environmentally sensitive land targeted by CRP is not
necessarily of marginal productivity, CRP can sometimes retire highly
productive land, leaving expanding operations and beginning farmers
competing for less productive land at rental rates that are higher than would
be the case in the program’s absence. In areas where CRP participation is
high, it has been hypothesized that beginning farmers may have a difficult
time becoming established and farm operations that depend heavily on
rented land may be disadvantaged.
Implicit in all of these concerns is the notion that CRP enrollment influ-
ences individual and market behavior. That is, CRP could depress local
economies if, in the absence of CRP, more local land would have been
farmed. CRP could affect local populations if, in the absence of CRP, more
farmers and local business owners would have retained residence. But, at
least in some cases, it is likely that a farmer’s behavioral choices were
largely unaffected by the decision to enroll in CRP. Then too, the range of
possible choices open to program participants changes with economic
circumstances, so the impacts of the CRP when the farm sector and the rural
economy are in recession are likely to be different from the program’s
impacts during an economic expansion. Blanket statements about CRP’s
impacts may not apply equally well to all communities or time periods, so
any analysis of CRP’s impacts is necessarily sensitive to prevailing market
conditions and a host of other factors.
This report examines concerns about CRP’s unintended consequences by
evaluating the program’s effects over the first 10-15 years of its life on
counties where CRP rental payments made up a relatively large share of
total household income, or where CRP enrollment comprised a relatively
high proportion of cropland. Since administration of the CRP has changed
over time, along with the economic choices facing potential enrollees and
their communities, this report also estimates the potential economic and
land-use effects that discontinuing the program would have in regions of the
country that were heavy participants as of 2000.
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The CRP was not the first farmland retirement program operated by the
Federal Government, nor was it the only land-diversion program operating
at the time of its enactment. In 1956, a Soil Bank Program was instituted to
retire farmland from production for 3-10 years, with conservation cover
maintained on the idled land. Primarily a supply control program (erodible
land was not targeted), the Soil Bank Program was phased out in favor of
idling a portion of a producer’s cropland base to establish commodity
support program eligibility. The last Soil Bank Program contracts expired in
the early 1970s, but annual paid land-diversion and Acreage Reduction
Program (ARP) requirements continued through 1995. As can be seen in
figure 2.1, diverted acres outnumbered CRP enrollment until 1990. While
land-diversion requirements varied from year to year, they affected the
supply of cropland available for production and may have had some of the
same effects as CRP enrollment.2
Unlike other land-diversion programs, which focused on supply control, the
primary goal of the CRP in the years immediately following its creation in
1985 was to reduce soil erosion on highly erodible cropland (Osborn et al.,
1995). But, given the financial crisis facing the farm sector at the time,
curbing production of farm commodities and providing income support for
CRP participants were also important program goals (Dicks, 1987; Martin et
al., 1988). Other objectives included protecting the Nation’s long-term
ability to produce food and fiber, reducing sedimentation, improving water
quality, and fostering wildlife habitat. Subsequent legislative and regulatory
actions altered the weight given these various objectives and spurred other
important changes in the way CRP contracts are awarded.
Enrollment in CRP increased rapidly once the program got underway (fig.
2.1). Nearly 34 million acres were enrolled between 1986 and 1989. In
exchange for retiring eligible land for 10-15 years, participants received an
2 Since CRP enrollments influenced
land-diversion requirements through
their impact on production decisions
and commodity prices, analyses of
CRP's impacts over 1986-1995 should
ideally reflect the impact that these
requirements had as well. Between
1982 and 1985, paid land diversion
and ARP averaged 37 million acres
annually—slightly more than the level
retired by CRP at its height.
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CRP enrollment and other diverted acreage, 1982-2002
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Source:  Farm Service Agency, CRP Summary Statistics and U.S. Land-Use Summary
New CRP contract acres
Total CRP acres
Diverted acresannual rental payment that averaged roughly $50/acre, and were reimbursed
for half of the cost of establishing permanent cover (usually grasses or trees). 
Farm operators and nonoperator landowners with highly erodible land could
apply during any signup period, indicating the field(s) or portions of fields
they wished to enroll and the annual rental payment they required. USDA
determined the maximum acceptable rental rate for each bid pool
(comprised of all the bids from multicounty areas with similar farm produc-
tion and land characteristics). Bids at or below this rate were accepted
(subject to a 25-percent county acreage cap) and those above the maximum
rental rate were rejected. While the maximum rental rate was not pre-
announced, bidders quickly estimated what it was likely to be for their area
and began offering rental rates close to the maximum (Shoemaker, 1989).3
The program’s early focus on erodible land, its award structure, and the
frequency of signup announcements made it reasonably easy for potential
bidders to determine their eligibility for, and their costs and benefits of
participating in, CRP. In essence, USDA was willing to enroll all eligible
land that farm operators and nonoperator landowners were willing to offer at
or below the area’s maximum rental rate (Plantinga et al., 2001; Smith,
1995). As a result, program participation grew rapidly and the farm sector
benefited from a stable source of Federal financial support, as can be seen in
figure 2.2. One of the major drawbacks to this approach was the program’s
inability to target all environmentally sensitive lands for retirement. The use
of an areawide maximum rental rate meant environmentally sensitive but
highly productive land was unlikely to be retired, and the government over-
paid for the least productive land being enrolled (Cooper and Osborn, 1998;
Daniels, 1988; GAO, 1989). As the program grew and pressure to quickly
enroll more acreage eased, program eligibility and bid acceptance rules
began to change.
With enactment of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of
1990 (the 1990 Act), eligibility for CRP was broadened to include more
environmentally sensitive land, but not necessarily highly erodible land. The
1990 Act extended eligibility to land in conservation priority areas (the
Chesapeake Bay, Long Island Sound, and Great Lakes watersheds) and
State water quality priority areas as well as generally smaller plots of land
3 Nonetheless, among eligible farmers
who chose not to participate in the
CRP, survey results indicate that non-
bidders tended to underestimate the
maximum rental rate applicable in
their area (Esseks and Kraft, 1988).
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Figure 2.2
CRP payments, total direct farm payments, and net farm income,
1982-2002
Payments ($ million)
Source:  Farm Service Agency, CRP Summary Statistics; Economic Research Service, 

















Income ($ million)adopting high-priority conservation practices (Barbarika, 2001). USDA also
began ranking bids based on the environmental benefits they offered (using
an environmental benefits index, or EBI), and set maximum allowable rental
rates based on a soil-specific estimate of the rent earned on comparable
local cropland. The EBI gave weight to water quality and other environ-
mental benefits in addition to soil erosion. When coupled with soil-specific
maximum rental rate, these changes enabled USDA to enroll environmen-
tally sensitive—but highly productive—land into the program. When
combined with limits on the number of acres that could be enrolled, the
result was a much more competitive but complex bidding process.4
During 1991-94, an additional 2.5 million acres were added to the CRP.
While this had little impact on the program as a whole, the revised eligi-
bility and bidding rules did have an influence on the type of land that was
added over this period. Relatively fewer accepted bids came from the Great
Plains as enrollment shifted eastward (Osborn and Heimlich, 1994).
Starting with signup 13 in 1995, the EBI score and soil-adjusted maximum
rental rates were announced to potential bidders ahead of time, making the
bidding process much more transparent. In addition, after passage of the
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act),
USDA added wildlife habitat to the EBI and provided other options for
farmers to participate in CRP. A continuous signup was initiated for acreage
devoted to specific conservation practices, such as filter strips, riparian
buffers, grassed waterways, field windbreaks, shelterbelts, living snow
fences, salt-tolerant vegetation, shallow-water areas for wildlife, and well-
head protection (Osborn, 1997). These practices involve relatively small
parcels of land but provide large environmental benefits (Smith, 1999).
Farm operators and nonoperator landowners adopting these practices can
enroll in the CRP at any time without competing in the EBI ranking
process. In return, they receive up to the maximum soil-adjusted rental rate
and may be eligible for special signup and other maintenance and practice
incentive payments.
In 1997, USDA also established the Conservation Reserve Enhancement
Program (CREP), a Federal-State partnership designed to encourage farm
conservation practices that meet specific State and National conservation
and environmental objectives (Smith, 2000). CREP participants receive
payments similar to those available to CRP continuous signup participants
as well as additional incentives. As of 2002, slightly over 2.1 million acres
had been enrolled under the continuous signup and CREP provisions,
receiving an average per-acre payment rate well over twice that for acres
enrolled through the general signup process (USDA, 2002).
Following the 1996 Act, contracts on acreage enrolled during the early years
of the program began expiring. Most contracts were for 10 years, but while
new regulations were being implemented and new signups established,
contract holders were allowed to extend their contracts for 1 year. In addi-
tion, to provide USDA with flexibility, selected CRP participants were
offered the choice of terminating their contracts early. As a result, signup
15, conducted in 1997, was the largest ever, with over 16 million acres
accepted into the program. The size of subsequent signups conducted in
1997-1999 was also reminiscent of the early years of the program, together
4 While the original legislation envi-
sioned the program retiring 40-45 mil-
lion acres, enrollment authority was
capped at 38 million acres in 1992 and
reduced to 36.4 million acres in 1996.
In 2002, CRP's enrollment authority
was increased to 39.2 million acres.
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keen and all bids were ranked on the basis of the environmental benefits
they offered and their cost. As a result, there was no guarantee that expiring
contract holders would be allowed to re-enroll their CRP acreage.5
While most expiring CRP contract holders who wished to remain in the
program were successful in doing so, some were not.6 Previous CRP contract
holders were facing the EBI ranking process for the first time, which now
placed equal weight on erosion control, water quality, and wildlife habitat.
Furthermore, because of expansion in program eligibility over the years, an
estimated 240 million acres of farmland had the environmental attributes
needed to qualify for post-1996 CRP signups, compared with roughly 100
million acres eligible for the program when it was implemented in 1986
(Osborn, 1997). While nearly all eligible bids requesting rental payments
below the maximum were accepted into the program in the 1980s, the relative
cost of each bid was now a factor in the selection process. As a result, the
distribution of CRP enrollment shifted somewhat during the 1990s, environ-
mental benefits (as measured by the EBI and subsequent analyses) increased,
and the per-acre cost of the program declined. This shift means that, to some
extent, the characteristics of enrolled acres and their impact on surrounding
communities may have changed over time. As a result of program shifts and
changing agricultural commodity market conditions, CRP’s community
impacts are likely to be time sensitive.
Figure 2.3 shows the change in the geographic distribution CRP enrollment
at the end of 2002 compared with enrollment at the end of 1990, prior to
adoption of the EBI and soil-specific rental rates. Of the nearly 34 million
acres enrolled in the program in 2002, 17 percent represented net additions
to county CRP acreage (shown as blue dots on the map). And of the nearly
33 million acres enrolled in 1990, a net 14 percent was dropped from the
5 The Agriculture, Rural Development,
Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act
of 1997 precluded the automatic
extension of expiring CRP contracts
beyond 1 year.
6 For example, during 1997, contracts
were due to expire on roughly 21 mil-
lion acres of CRP land. For signup 15,
conducted in March, a total of 23.3
million acres was bid, of which 16.1
million acres was accepted, including
nearly 12 million re-enrolled acres and
a little over 4 million new acres
(Osborn, 1997).  Roughly 55 percent
of all acres enrolled in CRP at the end
of 2001 was re-enrolled acreage
(Barbarika, 2001).
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Figure 2.3
Change in the geographic distribution of CRP acres between 1990 and 2002
Source:  CRP contracts file.
1 dot = 5,000 acres
removed between 1990
and 2002
1 dot = 5,000 acres
added between 1990
and 2002program by 2002, based on county aggregate enrollments (shown as black
dots).7 While there were roughly equal numbers of counties that gained and
lost CRP acreage due to such factors as program changes and shifting
market conditions, there was very little redistribution of acreage at the
regional level. Table 2.1 shows the number of counties gaining and losing
more than 5,000 enrolled acres during the 1990s among the ERS farm
resource regions (fig. 2.4). While the number of counties involved in shifts
of this size was considerable, the regional distribution of enrolled acres was
remarkably stable. Enrollment rose slightly in the Northern Great Plains and
declined in the Heartland (probably due to the lower rental rates requested
7There was a much higher percent-
age of turnover on specific parcels of
land, but from a community develop-
ment perspective it is the net change in
local enrollment that is likely to be
important, not whether parcel A or
parcel B is enrolled.
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Table 2.1—Regional shifts in CRP enrollment and payments, 1990-2002
Counties with more than 5,000
acres enrolled in CRP Distribution of total CRP
Total* Losing* Gaining* Acres Payments
Farm resource region 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990-2002 1990 2002 1990 2002
Number ———Percent——— ———Percent———
Heartland 364 20 21 19 18 28 32
Northern Crescent 91 9 26 4 4 4 5
Northern Great Plains 158 30 41 26 28 19 21
Prairie Gateway 256 31 23 30 30 28 23
Eastern Uplands 23 22 4 1 1 1 1
Southern Seaboard 113 25 13 5 4 4 3
Fruitful Rim 69 26 23 6 6 7 6
Basin and Range 56 23 20 5 5 5 5
Mississippi Portal 96 10 18 4 4 4 4
U.S. 1,226 23 23
*The first set of columns focus on counties that had more than 5,000 acres enrolled in the program at some point during 1990-2002 and the
percentage that either lost or gained more than 5,000 program acres during 1990-2002.The final set of columns focus on the regional distribu-
tion of total CRP acres and payments, including those in counties with 5,000 acres or less in CRP.
Source: ERS analysis of FSA CRP Contracts file. Regions are delineated in figure 2.4.by Plains bidders) and the Southern Seaboard (where many CRP acres
planted in trees were not offered for re-enrollment). However, the payment
distribution was more volatile due to changes in the way maximum rental
payments were determined and the way bids were evaluated. The Heartland
registered the largest increase in regional share of program receipts while
the Prairie Gateway registered the largest decline.
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Act) increased
the CRP’s enrollment authority to 39.2 million acres, while USDA continued
its policy of reserving roughly 4 million acres for continuous signups. Eligi-
bility requirements on cropland were tightened, but managed haying and
grazing restrictions and cover requirements on marginal pasture were eased. 
The 2002 Act also expanded CRP’s Farmable Wetland Pilot Program, estab-
lished by the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administra-
tion, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001. Enrollment of wetland
and associated buffers is now authorized in all States through the continuous
signup process, subject to a 100,000-acre limit for each State and an overall
limit of 1 million acres. As of August 2003, 86,000 acres of farmable
wetland had been enrolled in the program, out of a total of 34 million CRP
acres (USDA, 2003).
Characteristics of Farm Operators
Participating in the CRP
Based on USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS),
roughly 279,000 (or 13 percent) of all farm operators had acres enrolled in
CRP during 2001, the most recent year for which data is available (see box,
“Farm Operators and CRP Participants” for a comparison of ARMS with
other sources of data used in this report). Since enrollment of eligible land
in the CRP is voluntary, participation is a function of the bid selection
process and the potential net benefits from enrolling eligible land. The prin-
cipal benefit from the participant’s perspective is a guaranteed annual rental
payment for 10-15 years that can initially equal or exceed the land’s cash
rental value at the time of enrollment. Participants often cite other advan-
tages, including reduction in soil erosion, increased wildlife hunting and
viewing opportunities, improved air and water quality, more scenic land-
scapes, and increased future income potential (Allen and Vandever, 2003).
The principal disadvantage is the extended length of time land use and rents
are “locked in” without inflation adjustments. Additional drawbacks include
the possible proliferation of weeds and pests, the potential fire hazard and
unkempt appearance of CRP cover, and conservation cover maintenance
requirements (Hodur et al., 2002). How these advantages and disadvantages
are weighed depends on the participant’s circumstances, expectations, and
goals. For example, farm operators wishing to transition out of farming,
either into retirement or to pursue off-farm opportunities, may find the CRP
appealing because it provides a steady source of income and requires rela-
tively little operator involvement, but allows the operator to retain owner-
ship of enrolled property. Such participants often want to enroll as much
land as they can to speed up the transition while maintaining ties to the
farm, perhaps as a homestead or an investment.
8
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find enrollment in the CRP appealing as a way of diversifying risk,
improving the productivity of adjacent fields (by reducing wind erosion, for
example), and satisfying conservation compliance requirements. Such
participants are likely to be much more selective about the amount and type
of land enrolled in the CRP. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of farm opera-
tors participating in the CRP by ERS farm typology.8 The majority of farm
operator participants can be characterized as either retirement or residential
farm operators. Retirement farms are operated by those who identify them-
selves as “retired.” Residential farms are operated by those who identify
something other than farming as their principal occupation. These two farm
categories also included a majority of CRP acres and received a majority of
the payments. Earlier research found that older, part-time farmers also made
up a sizeable percentage of initial CRP enrollees (Hatley et al., 1989).
While retired farm operators are disproportionately represented among CRP
enrollees, residential farm operators participate less than would be expected
9
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Farm Operators and CRP Participants
Eligible land can be enrolled in the CRP by the landowner or by a producer who
has control of the land, but the vast majority of CRP participants own their
enrolled land since few tenants have control of the land they rent for the entire 10-
year CRP contract period. In assessing the characteristics of CRP participants, we
rely on two sources of information: the 2001 ARMS survey and the Census of
Agriculture (used in the next section where county-level information is needed).
Both ARMS and the Census of Agriculture collect information from and about the
principal operator of any farm from which $1,000 or more of agricultural products
(crops and livestock) were sold or normally would have been sold during the year
under consideration. Data are not collected from nonoperator owners of farmland,
so information from either ARMS or the Census of Agriculture fails to cover all
CRP participants. The differing definitions of a farm and a CRP participant among
the various databases make precise calculations impossible, but a comparison of
FSA's CRP contracts file (covering all participants) and CRP data reported in
ARMS and the 1997 Census of Agriculture suggests that most CRP participants
are considered farm operators while nonoperator landowners are less frequent.
Farm operators can be landowners, tenants, or both.
For this report, information on the characteristics of CRP participants or farms in
general (e.g., young and short-tenure farmers) excludes nonoperator landlords.
However, when the CRP contract file is analyzed to evaluate the size and distri-
bution of program acres, all enrollees, including nonoperator landowners, are
included. While the CRP contracts file does not include the rich detail on farm
finances and operator characteristics found in the ARMS data, it does include all
enrollees and provides the county-level data needed to assess CRP's local socioe-
conomic impacts. Nonetheless, since ARMS and the CRP contracts file use very
different concepts of "farm" and "CRP enrollee," care needs to be taken when
moving from one data source to the other. For ARMS, a farm generally encom-
passes all of the land controlled by a farm operator.  For the CRP contracts file, a
farm is a tract of land used to determine eligibility for farm programs. One farm
operator can easily control more than one "CRP farm." One result is that FSA
reports nearly 100,000 additional "farms" participating in CRP when compared
with ARMS farm operator data, only a small portion of which can be attributed
to nonoperator landowners.
8 The ERS farm typology combines
farm characteristics, including operator
occupation and size of farm, to develop
homogeneous groups of farmers
(Hoppe et al., 1999). The different cat-
egories reflect an operator’s expecta-
tions and goals from farming, stage of
life, dependence on agriculture, and
size of operation. In addition to retire-
ment and residential farms mentioned
above, the typology categorizes small
farms (those with under $250,000 in
sales) as either limited-resource, farm-
ing occupation/low sales, or farming
occupation/high sales, depending on
level of sales and the primary occupa-
tion of the operator. Large ($250,000-
$499,999 in sales), very large (over
$500,000 in sales), and nonfamily
(corporate or cooperative) farms round
out the typology. given the distribution of all farms among the typology groups (not shown in
fig. 2.5). Nonetheless, it appears that both residential and retired farm opera-
tors have more acres enrolled than would be expected as these two groups,
on average, enroll a higher percentage of their eligible land in CRP than do
other types of farms. The desire to limit the number of hours spent working
on the farm may help explain why retired and residential farm operators
comprise most of CRP’s whole-farm enrollees. But figure 2.5 also shows
that CRP is used by a wide range of farm operators.9 Larger farms partici-
pate in the CRP at higher rates (not shown in fig. 2.5), but they enroll a
smaller proportion of their land. By definition, they are partial-farm
enrollees, often using CRP to maximize returns on farm assets.
From a community development perspective, it is useful to synthesize the
diversity of program participants into two groups—“whole-farm” enrollees
and “partial-farm” enrollees—even though these two groups each encom-
pass a wide range of farms. We use two definitions for “whole-farm
enrollee” in this report, but the one that comes closest to reflecting the farm
operator’s involvement in the agricultural sector includes farm operators
who had acres enrolled in the CRP and did not produce farm commodities
in 2001.10 Whole-farm enrollees may have received other government
program payments or had sales of agricultural commodities in 2001 by
selling inventories remaining from the previous year, but produced no farm
commodities in 2001. According to the ARMS data, about 7 percent of U.S.
farm operators (and over half of farm operators participating in the CRP) are
whole-farm enrollees using this definition (table 2.2). Other farm operators
use the CRP as part of an ongoing farm business. These “partial-farm”
enrollees are those with acres enrolled in the CRP and farm commodity
production in 2001; they account for another 6 percent of U.S. farms.
Enrolled acres are split roughly evenly between whole- and partial-farm
enrollees, but more than 60 percent of the acres operated by whole-farm
enrollees (and over 95 percent of their cropland) is in the CRP, compared
with only 12 percent of the acres operated by partial-farm enrollees (and 20 
9 Konyar and Osborn (1990) found
that young farmers were more likely to
participate in CRP, even though their
small number makes them less preva-
lent among participants.
10 The second definition of “whole-
farm enrollees” is based solely on the
percentage of cropland enrolled in
CRP. At best, it is a proxy for whether
the enrollee continues his or her
involvement in farming after enrolling
in the CRP. Using the FSA definition
of a farm, it is entirely possible that a
whole-farm enrollee could be an active
farmer on other tracts he owns or
rents, and so should be considered a
partial-farm enrollee. Likewise, a par-
tial-farm enrollee may not actively
farm the nonenrolled portion of his or
her farm, and so should be considered
a whole-farm enrollee.
Figure 2.5
Farm operator participation in CRP, by farm type, 2001
Percent
Source:  Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2001. All acres refers to the percentage 
of total farmland controlled by each farm category. The remaining bars refer to the percentage 
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Economic Research Service/USDApercent of their cropland).11 On average, whole-farm enrollees operate
smaller operations than nonenrollees (farms not enrolled in the CRP), while
partial-farm enrollees have substantially larger operations. Should their CRP
contracts end, most partial-farm enrollees appear positioned to convert their
CRP land to grain production or cattle grazing fairly easily should it make
economic sense to do so. In contrast, whole-farm enrollees are not engaged
in crop or livestock production, and thus are likely to be less equipped or
able to bring CRP acreage back into production themselves. Although
whole-farm acreage which is not planted to trees could be brought back into
production relatively quickly if it were rented or sold to other farm opera-
tors, given the number of residential farm operators within the whole-farm
group, it seems likely that some CRP enrollees would choose not to have
their land farmed intensively even in the absence of CRP.
Whole-farm enrollees are, on average, older than partial-farm and nonen-
rollees and are far less likely to report farming as their primary occupation.
The majority of whole-farm enrollees report off-farm work as their primary
occupation, and nearly 40 percent are retired. This is consistent with
patterns reported in figure 2.5. The average age of whole-farm enrollees
masks a pronounced difference between retired farm operators, averaging 70
years, and residential farm operators, averaging 49 years. The majority of
gross cash farm income generated by whole-farm enrollees is from govern-
ment payments, with CRP payments representing most of this (table 2.3).
Table 2.2—Characteristics of farm operators, by CRP participation, 2001
CRP enrollees Non- All
Item Whole-farm Partial-farm enrollees farms
Percent of farms 7 6 87 100
Acreage (per farm):
Operated 257 1,129 419 454
Owned 305 640 235 266
Rented in 14* 526 197 207
Rented out 62* 37 14 18
CRP acreage:
Per farm 159 138 0 19
Percent of total CRP acres 54 46 0 100
Percent of acres operated 62 12 0 4
Percent of cropland acres operated 96 20 0 10
Production specialty (percent of farms):
Cash grains 4** 46 15 17
Other crops (including CRP) 94 21 22 26
Livestock 2** 33 63 57
Beef cattle — 26 42 38
Farm operator:
Age (years) 61 56 54 55
Primary occupation (percent of farms):
Farming 4** 69 41 40
Retirement 38 9* 11 12
Nonfarm job 58 23 48 47
Single (*) and double asterisks (**) indicate a coefficient of variation between 25 and 50, and greater than 50, respectively.
Source: ERS analysis of the 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey. Whole-farm enrollees were defined as farm operators who had
acres enrolled in the CRP program and did not produce farm commodities in 2001. Partial-farm enrollees were defined as farm operators with
acres enrolled in the CRP and farm commodity production in 2001.
11 The non-CRP land left idle by
whole-farm enrollees includes pasture
and range land, cropland left fallow,
and parcels too small to be farmed
efficiently.
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enrollees, but still more than the national average.
Despite the difference in farm income among whole-farm, partial-farm, and
nonparticipating farm operators (net farm income of partial-farm enrollees
in 2001 was more than double that of nonenrollees and nearly five times
larger than that of whole-farm enrollees) total household income is much
the same. The average household income of the three groups ranged from
$64,000 to about $68,000 in 2001. The difference in farm income is offset
by a much higher level of off-farm income earned by the households of
whole-farm enrollees and non-enrollees.
While farm sector coverage and the definition of whole-farm enrollees
differ, an earlier study found similar patterns in the characteristics of CRP
participants. Relying on the USDA’s 1991 Farm Costs and Returns Survey
(FCRS), the forerunner to the ARMS survey used above, whole-farm
enrollees were found to be older than average, supplied little operator labor,
did not consider farming as their primary occupation, and received most of
their household income from off-farm sources. In contrast, partial-farm
enrollees were more likely to consider farming their primary occupation,
and received most of their household income from farming (Dodson and
McElroy, 1995). Thus, while the program has changed over the years, the
12
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Table 2.3—Financial characteristics of CRP farm operations, 2001
CRP enrollees Non- All
Item Whole-farm Partial-farm enrollees farms
Farm income statement ($ per farm):
Gross cash income 9,636 169,341 86,041 86,395
Livestock sales 0 55,099 32,454 31,785
Crop sales — 66,324 37,706 37,078
Government payments 7,215 28,533 5,655 7,229
CRP payments 6,535 5,126 0 758
Other farm-related income 2,400* 19,384 10,227 10,303
Cash expenses 4,653 124,377 70,446 69,605
Net cash farm income 4,982 44,964 15,596 16,790
Net farm income1 7,418 35,977 14,689 15,582
Farm balance sheet ($ per farm):
Assets 261,984 907,734 565,223 567,391
Liabilities 10,871* 127,435 59,645 60,811
Equity 251,114 780,299 505,578 506,580
Debt/asset ratio (percent) 4* 14 11 11
Return on equity (percent) 3.0 4.6 2.9 3.1
Farm household income ($ per hh):
Total household income 66,104 67,539 64,132 64,465
Farm business income2 3,307* 21,215 3,010* 4,205
Off-farm income 62,795 44,132 59,729 58,894
Earned sources 42,798* 25,846 44,603 43,286
Unearned sources 19,997 18,286 15,127 15,608
Notes: Whole-farm enrollees were defined as farm operators who had acres enrolled in the CRP program and did not produce farm commodi-
ties in 2001. Partial-farm enrollees were defined as farm operators with acres enrolled in the CRP and farm commodity production in 2001.
— indicates insufficient data for legal disclosure; single asterisks (*) indicates a coefficient of variation between 25 and 50.
1Net farm income is net cash farm income less costs for depreciation and non-cash benefits for hired workers, plus the value of the inventory
change in 2001 and any non-money income. Non-money income includes the value of farm products consumed on the farm and an imputed
rental value for the farm operator dwelling.
2Farm business income is that portion of farm income that is accrued by the farm household. Farm business income is net cash farm income
less costs for depreciation, wages paid to the farm operator, and farmland rental income.The total is then adjusted to reflect any other house-
holds that share in the farm business income.
Source: ERS analysis of the 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.marked differences between whole- and partial-farm enrollees seem to have
remained fairly constant. These two types of participants are likely to react
very differently to major changes in the CRP, and may affect their
surrounding communities differently. 
Geographic Dispersion of Whole-Farm Enrollees
What is not clear from the ARMS/FCRS data is the extent to which the mix
of whole- and partial-farm enrollees varies from one county to another.
Based on the CRP contracts file, it is possible to determine the proportion of
each participating farm’s cropland that is enrolled in the CRP. Unfortu-
nately, these data do not include information on farm finances, so an
acreage-based definition of whole-farm enrollees had to be developed. In
order to exclude as many partial-farm enrollees as possible from the
acreage-based definition of whole farms, we apply a cutoff of 95 percent or
more of cropland enrolled in CRP to designate whole-farm enrollees.12
Using this fairly strict definition of whole-farms, their prevalence in partici-
pating counties ranged from 0 to 100 percent of enrolled acres in both 1994
and 2002.13 In both years, whole-farm enrollments comprised more than
half of the CRP acres in 1 out of 5 counties that had more than 5,000 acres
enrolled in the program.
The advent of continuous signups and the other program changes that took
full effect in 1997 appear to have reduced the prevalence of whole-farm
enrollees somewhat. In 1994, 37 percent of enrollees had at least 95 percent
of their cropland in the program. By 2002, whole-farm enrollees accounted
for 28 percent of participants, but this smaller group still accounted for 40
percent of enrolled acres—essentially unchanged from its 1994 level. This is
because far more farms are participating in the program now, but at lower
levels. The number of participants (i.e., FSA farms with CRP enrollment)
increased by 23 percent from 1994 to 2002, while the average enrollment by
the typical participant fell from 44 to 31 percent of the farm’s cropland over
this period. By enrolling smaller plots of environmentally sensitive land, the
continuous signups and more competitive general signups characteristic of
the post-1997 era have broadened participation. But the generally lower bids
possible by re-enrolling large tracts of less productive land (and perhaps the
willingness of retired operators and absentee landowners to accept low
rental rates to stay in the program) have resulted in a fairly constant propor-
tion of whole-farm acres over the years.
Figure 2.6 shows the change in whole- and partial-farm participation in the
CRP program between 1994 and 2002, while figure 2.7 shows the mix of
program participants among farm resource regions that had high CRP
enrollment in both years. The Prairie Gateway currently has the largest
share of its CRP acreage coming from whole-farm enrollments. Between
1994 and 2002, the number of whole farms and whole-farm acres in the
Heartland dropped significantly (continuous signups have been heavily used
in this region). The only Midwestern region to experience a significant
increase in the number of whole-farm enrollees and whole-farm enrolled
acres between 1994 and 2002 was the Northern Great Plains, where both
increased by over 20 percent. The combination of low wheat prices, the lack
of alternative land uses, relatively low farm rental rates, and an aging farm
12 The CRP contracts data on farms
refer to the land unit the Farm Service
Agency (FSA) uses to track commodi-
ty program use and eligibility. They do
not correspond to the land controlled
by a farm operator (one farm operator
often controls several FSA “farms”),
and so are not strictly comparable with
the ARMS data discussed earlier.
None-theless, of the ARMS farm oper-
ators participating in the CRP, roughly
72 percent of the “whole-farm” partic-
ipants had at least 95 percent of their
cropland enrolled in the program while
only 9 percent of the partial-farm
enrollees met this cutoff. 
13 Acreage enrolled in the CRP 
during the first phase of the program
(1986-1995) reached its zenith in
1994, while 2002 represents the high-
water mark for the second phase of the
program, at the time of this study. 
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Northern Great Plains.
The relationship between whole-farm enrollment in CRP and local
economic development is not necessarily straightforward. In parts of the
Northern Great Plains, the lack of alternative sources of income might
encourage whole-farm enrollments if farming becomes too risky or unprof-
itable. On the other hand, whole-farm enrollees tend to rely much more
heavily on off-farm sources of income than other farmers. Thus, in some
communities, such as those close to urban centers, whole-farm enrollment
may reflect a vibrant local job market. In stagnant economies, whole-farm
enrollments might further dampen economic prospects as land that might
otherwise be farmed is left idle. In communities with tight labor markets,
whole-farm enrollments might boost the local economy as CRP payments
supplement participants’ disposable incomes, as long as CRP payment
14
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Figure 2.6
Growth in CRP farms, by type and region, 1994-2002












Source:  ERS analysis of the CRP Contracts file. Regions are delineated in figure 2-4. 
Figure 2.7
Whole-farm participation in CRP, 1994 and 2002
Whole farms are those with 95 percent or more of cropland enrolled in the CRP.
Percent of regional CRP total
Source:  ERS analysis of the CRP Contracts file. Regions are delineated in figure 2-4. 









U.S.recipients retain residence and continue working in the area. Of concern,
however, is the possibility that whole-farm enrollees may choose to relocate
in search of better employment opportunities or living conditions.
CRP Rental Payments and Absentee
Landowners
Using CRP contracts data on the location of CRP acres and where CRP
payments are delivered, we can roughly gauge the degree to which CRP
payments go to absentee landowners. Because of difficulties accounting for
all the adjustments made to CRP payments for such things as establishing
and maintaining ground cover, adopting favored conservation practices, and
emergency haying and grazing, this report does not attempt to follow
payment flows on specific CRP enrollments. Figure 2.8 presents informa-
tion from 2001 on the net flow of CRP payments into and out of each
county.14 Net payments equal the CRP rental payments mailed to a county’s
CRP enrollees minus the rental payments received on a county’s CRP land.
A positive figure indicates the county receives CRP payments (inflows) on
land enrolled elsewhere, while a negative figure indicates that CRP
payments are flowing out of the county (presumably to absentee
landowners). Of counties with at least 5,000 acres enrolled in CRP, 30
percent experienced net outflows of CRP payments exceeding $250,000
(averaging 37 percent of the funds earned on their CRP acreage). As would
be expected, most of these counties were located in the central United
States, where CRP enrollment is highest.
Table 2.4 details the interregional flow of CRP payments. While counties in
all regions experienced net inflows and outflows of CRP funds, three
regions experienced aggregate net outflows of CRP payments: the Northern
14 Since it is far easier to ascertain
where CRP payments were delivered
than it is to estimate each acre’s con-
tribution to this payment stream, the
total amount of payments is roughly 5
percent higher than the payment esti-
mates based on the location of CRP
acres. To get a clearer picture of which
areas gain (or lose) more than they
“contribute” to the program, figure 2.8
and table 2.4 use adjusted payment
streams which equalize net payment
inflows and outflows for the Nation as
a whole.
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Figure 2.8
Geographic distribution of net CRP payments, 2001
Source:  CRP contracts file.





> 250,000Great Plains, the Prairie Gateway, and the Mississippi Portal. Net outflows
there amounted to 10 percent or more of the CRP payments attributable to
enrolled acres within their territory. But, even in the Northern Great Plains
where outflows were highest, 85 percent of CRP rental payments stayed
within the region.
Most counties that benefited from net inflows of CRP payments were
located close to areas with CRP enrollment, and often contained CRP
enrolled acreage. There were also a number of metropolitan centers which
had no CRP enrollment in 2001, but which received a significant share of
CRP payments that year. While these included some popular retirement
locations and major cities, such as Chicago, San Francisco, and New York,
they also included regional trade centers throughout the country. What is not
clear is whether this pattern of payment flows is the result of CRP making
residential relocation easier, or whether it merely reflects the reality of
modern agriculture. That is, are net outflows of CRP payments, as measured
here, different from what would happen if the CRP land was being farmed?
Between 40 and 50 percent of the land being farmed in the United States is
farmed by someone other than the owner (table 2.2). While many nonoper-
ator landowners live fairly close to their farmland, others live hundreds of
miles away. Since the vast majority of CRP recipients identified themselves
as landowners in a recent nationwide survey (Allen and Vandever, 2003), the
geographic distribution of CRP payments may simply mirror the pre-
existing distribution of farmland ownership. One way to assess whether the
geographic distribution of CRP payments is unique is to compare it to the
distribution of farm commodity program payments.
Table 2.5 presents information on the distribution of cropland and CRP
payments by the degree of urbanization of the recipient’s payment location,
together with similar information for Federal commodity payments based on 
16
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Table 2.4—Interregional flow of CRP payments, 2001 
Net flow of payments Counties with net flows over $250,000
Percent of Percent of all counties*
Farm resource region $ millions base CRP Number Outflow Inflow
Heartland 26.9 5 173 14 18
Northern Crescent 17.2 19 32 2 6
Northern Great Plains -46.7 -15 96 38 16
Prairie Gateway -34.3 -10 140 24 12
Eastern Uplands 8.2 40 10 0 3
Southern Seaboard 1.7 3 29 3 4
Fruitful Rim 30.1 36 60 6 16
Basin and Range 2.5 45 36 11 10
Mississippi Portal -6.4 -10 28 12 6
U.S. 0 0 604 11 10
*Net flow of payments is the amount of CRP rental payments delivered to each region (or county) minus the estimated payments earned on that
region’s (or county’s) CRP enrollment. Base CRP refers to the estimated CRP payment generated by the region’s enrolled acres.The final two
columns report the percentage of all counties in the region that generate or receive CRP payments that have net outflows or net inflows exceed-
ing $250,000.
Source: ERS analysis of CRP Contracts file. Regions are delineated in figure 2.4.historic corn, cotton, and wheat production.15 While there are differences in
the geographic dispersion of payments for the various commodity programs,
the overall patterns are strikingly similar. Thus, the proportion of CRP
payments going to “absentee” participants appears to be no different than
that of other farm programs. Payment flows most probably reflect pre-
existing land ownership patterns and do not reflect much residential reloca-
tion by CRP participants.
Surveys of program participants and local officials suggest that the inci-
dence of absentee participation is far lower than the prevalence of whole-
farm enrollees, but may be roughly comparable to the proportion of net
payment flows. In a 1998 survey of North Dakota CRP enrollees, roughly
10 percent of the respondents were out-of-state landowners (Mortensen et
al., 1989). In a more recent survey, 13 percent of North Dakota respondents
lived outside the State (Hodur et al., 2002). These results are roughly
comparable to the estimated percentage of CRP fund outflows in 2001 (10.4
percent for the State as a whole), but are far lower than the 24 percent of
North Dakota farms and 31 percent of North Dakota CRP acres attributable
to whole-farm participants.16 Unfortunately, the limited geographic coverage
of such surveys makes any generalizations about the relationships between
absentee landlords and measures of whole-farm participants and net flows
of CRP payments questionable for other regions or different levels of geog-
raphy. Furthermore, based on simple regression models, no statistically
significant relationship was found between the proportion of whole-farm
enrollments and the relative size of CRP payment flows. While the lack of a
formal model explaining outflows and inflows of CRP rental payments
makes this finding tenuous at best, at a minimum it suggests that any rela-
tionship that exists between whole-farm enrollment and absentee owners is
likely to be complex.
In summary, the characteristics of CRP participants vary widely, as do the
reasons for their participation. Program participants can be divided into at
least two broad groups based on the extent to which CRP enrollment
displaces farming activity. Whole-farm enrollees are those who rely on CRP
payments to transition out of (or in rarer cases, into) farming. They are
generally older retired operators or younger “lifestyle” operators who
consider their primary occupation to be something other than farming.
16 Of course, whole-farm participants
could reside outside of the county but
within the State, so this observation
does not imply that local jurisdictions
aren’t affected simply because absen-
teeism based on State residence is low.
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15 Roughly 40 percent of the land
enrolled in CRP was previously plant-
ed in wheat, corn, or cotton. To the
extent that CRP payments go to
landowners while commodity program
payments go to farm operators, one
would expect a comparison of the 
geographic distribution of payments 
to show more CRP payments than
commodity payments going to urban
locales. This is not evident in table
2.5.
Table 2.5—Distribution of cropland, CRP, and select commodity pro-
gram payments, 2001
Urban influence 
at destination* Cropland CRP Corn Cotton Wheat
Percent ———Percent of total payments———
None 74 63 57 66 65
Low urban influence 7 9 11 9 9
Medium urban influence 8 9 11 8 9
Strong urban influence   11 19 21 18 17
* Urban influence at destination refers to the degree of urbanization in the location where the
program payment was delivered. Counties are classified into four categories based on urban
influence as measured by a gravity model that simultaneously accounts for population size and
proximity. Urban influence increases as population size and proximity increase (or distance
decreases).
Source: FSA Producer Payments Reporting System data.Partial-farm enrollees are those who use CRP payments to supplement their
farm income and get the best overall return on their farm assets while
improving the environmental performance of their operations. They are far
more likely to consider farming their principal occupation and typically
derive more of their household income from farming than do other farm
operators. While both forms of participation can reduce demand for farm
inputs and services, the differing motivations for participating in the CRP
may yield different community effects depending on the mix of whole- and
partial-farm enrollment. One of the questions we will address in the next
section is whether the community effects of CRP enrollment vary depending
on the dominant type of program participant.
Part of the concern over whole-farm enrollees is their ability to relocate.
Absentee CRP participants not only take land out of production, thereby
reducing demand for local inputs and services, but they also take their CRP
payments with them, potentially dampening demand for local consumer
goods and services. Since many of the communities with net outflows of
CRP payments are also losing population, it may be tempting to attribute
both of these trends to whole-farm enrollment. Nonetheless, there does not
appear to be a simple relationship between the prevalence of whole-farm
CRP enrollment and loss of CRP payments. And, it seems likely that the
geographic distribution of CRP payments, in large part, merely reflects the
preexisting distribution of landowners and operators. Therefore, it is clearly
unjustified to attribute decisions on residential location to participation in the
CRP. Nonetheless, the prevalence of absentee landowners influences the local
effect of all farm payment programs, so payment flows are included in our
analyses (although caution should be used when interpreting the results).
Environmental and Scenic Impacts of the CRP
When land is enrolled in the CRP, it is retired from agricultural production,
planted with approved ground cover, and managed with approved conserva-
tion practices. The current mechanism for selecting land offered for enroll-
ment evaluates the environmental benefits, thus ensuring that program
objectives are addressed and environmental benefits from taking land out of
production accrue to society. But, in addition to environmental impacts, the
land-use choices embedded in CRP offers may also affect local economies
by making the rural landscape more or less attractive to residents and
tourists. The relationship between natural amenities and rural development
is well established. Wirtz (2002) found that improved quality of life can
translate into population and economic growth. McGranahan (1999) and
Deller et al. (2001) found that population and employment growth in rural
areas are sensitive to the level of a community’s natural amenities, as are
business location decisions (Goe, 2002; Goetz and Rupasingha, 2002).
While natural amenities include many characteristics which are hard to
influence, such as mountains and climate, ground cover is one attribute of
natural amenities that CRP can affect. 
Figure 2.9 provides information on ground cover choices on CRP land in
2001 by farm production region. (Note that farm production regions are based
on State boundaries and are different from the farm resource regions
discussed previously.) By far the most common ground cover adopted by CRP
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nationwide. Since the bulk of CRP acres is in the Plains and Mountain
regions, where tree cover is seldom an economically viable option, the popu-
larity of more easily planted and managed forbs and grasses is not surprising.
Taking land out of production and establishing permanent ground cover
largely eliminates erosion originating from acres enrolled in the CRP.
Cleaner air and streams, together with the varied vistas that CRP cover can
offer, can improve the appeal of nearby communities. But one consequence
of relying so heavily on grasses is that most CRP acres can readily (if not
always cheaply) be converted back to crop production or grazing at the end
of the CRP contract. Whether they are or not depends upon development
options, the outlook for profitably farming the land, business transition
plans, and the landowner’s lifestyle preferences.
Trees account for only 8 percent of CRP ground cover nationwide, but are
the overwhelming choice for CRP enrollments in the Delta and Southeast.
The timber industry in these regions makes trees a potentially valuable cash
crop, albeit one with a very long rotation period.17 Land planted in trees is
far less likely to be converted back to farmland simply because the CRP
contract ends. And, research has shown that people generally find forested
landscapes more appealing than open spaces, at least up to a point. A recent
study found that rural communities in the Upper Great Plains were far more
likely to have experienced population growth in the 1990s if they had even a
modest amount of forested land (Wirtz, 2002). However, additional tree
cover in heavily forested areas may actually detract from the landscape’s
scenic beauty and discourage wildlife diversity.18
While most of the conservation practices encouraged by CRP involve
planting or maintaining grasses or trees, restoring wetlands and creating
Figure 2.9
CRP conservation cover in 2001, by farm production region
Source:  CRP contracts file.




17 In their evaluation of the communi-
ty impact of planting CRP acres to
trees, Broomhall and Johnson (1991)
assume that trees would be harvested
20-25 years after they were planted.
18 Research has found that most people
find park-like settings, with clumps of
trees, open traversable fields, and water
most appealing (Ulrich, 1986). With
the exception of farmers, most people
rank cropland fairly low in terms of its
landscape appeal (Kaplan et al., 1989).
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related activities account for only 5 percent of CRP enrolled acres nation-
wide, but are somewhat more prevalent in the Lake States and the Northern
Plains. Wetlands in and of themselves are not generally considered desirable
scenery (Gourlay and Slee, 1998), but they can enhance the appeal of
nearby communities through improved (and potentially lucrative) hunting,
fishing, and wildlife viewing opportunities for residents and visitors.
Table 2.6 provides information on the distribution of wildlife-related CRP
conservation practices together with estimates of the economic value of some
wildlife-related activities. Virtually all CRP-approved ground cover is likely to
support a wider array of wildlife than actively farmed land. Permanent cover
greatly improves the health of wildlife ecosystems by providing nesting cover,
wintering habitat, and plant and insect feeds for most indigenous wildlife
species. For example, the added CRP acres in the Northern Plains have signif-
icantly increased duck populations, which require dense vegetative cover
within 3 miles of wetland for successful nesting (Reynolds et al., 1994). But,
it seems likely that land enrolled in the CRP specifically to enhance wildlife
habitat may have wildlife-related benefits that exceed typical practices. In
2001, a total of 4.7 million acres was enrolled to provide permanent wildlife
habitat, shallow water area for wildlife, wildlife food plots, riparian buffers,
wetlands restoration, and rare and declining habitats (Barbarika, 2001). While
this may have had a measurable affect on wildlife populations, data limita-
tions make it difficult to reliably model the benefits of specific wildlife-related
practices. As a result, the value of unique program features providing wildlife
can seldom be estimated with accuracy. 
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Table 2.6—Selected wildlife-related practices and estimated annual
CRP benefits
Estimated annual
Farm Distribution of CRP nonmarket benefits from:
production enrollment Wildlife Pheasant Total wildlife benefits
region1 Total Wildlife viewing hunting Overall Per acre
Percent of total $ Million Dollars
Northeast 0.6 0.5 8 — 8 45
Lake States 7.8 16.3 113 19 132 52
Corn Belt 14.7 15.6 213 35 249 52
Northern Plains 26.2 44.5 33 30 63 7
Appalachia 2.8 1.0 36 — 36 41
Southeast 4.6 1.5 60 — 60 40
Delta 3.6 2.5 47 — 47 40
Southern Plains 15.4 1.2 135 — 135 27
Mountain 19.3 12.0 3 2 6 1
Pacific 5.1 4.9 1 — 1 1
U.S. 650 87 737 22
— indicates that the impact was not estimated.
1Regions are delineated in figure 2.9.The Pacific farm production region excludes Alaska and
Hawaii.
Source: Each region’s percentage of national acreage using conservation practices related to
wildlife habitat (establishing permanent wildlife habitat, shallow water area for wildlife, wildlife
food plots, riparian buffers, wetland restoration, and rare and declining habitats) is based on
2001 enrollment (Barbarika, 2001). Benefit estimates are derived from Feather et al. (1999),
adjusted for inflation to represent 2000 dollars and rounded to the nearest million dollars.20 While we don’t have good esti-
mates of the benefits attributable to
CRP’s impact on duck, quail, deer,
and other game species, older esti-
mates suggest that pheasant hunting
accounts for about one-fourth of the
small game hunting benefits attributa-
ble to the CRP (Ribaudo et al., 1990).
However, this ratio should be viewed
with caution since it is based on a
generalized wildlife response function
that was estimated before CRP was
fully implemented.
Based on available measures, selected wildlife-related benefits attributable
to CRP enrollments are estimated to be approximately $737 million per year
(table 2.6).19 This represents a lower-bound estimate of wildlife benefits
because it does not include improved hunting for many species and the
increased protection CRP land affords to threatened and endangered species,
for which good nationwide data do not exist.
Wildlife viewing represents roughly 88 percent of estimated wildlife benefits
presented here. Wildlife-viewing benefits are a function of the range of activi-
ties that are affected by CRP conservation practices and the number of people
that potentially benefit from improved viewing opportunities. Increases in
wildlife populations have improved the quality of activities focused on
wildlife viewing (e.g., bird watching and wildlife photography) as well as
many outdoor activities where wildlife viewing is not the central focus (e.g.,
picnicking, hiking, walks in the park, and relaxing in the backyard).
Estimated wildlife-viewing benefits, which accrue to society as a whole and
not just to landowners, are most significant in the Corn Belt and Southern
Plains. Each of these regions has a high proportion of total CRP enrollment
and is relatively populous. The importance of population in the benefits
calculations is made even clearer by examining estimated wildlife-viewing
benefits in the Lake States. This region has far fewer acres enrolled in the
CRP than the Northern Plains and Mountain regions, but has estimated
benefits exceeding $100 million each year from CRP-induced wildlife
viewing.
The estimated value of CRP-related changes in the quality of pheasant
hunting is reported for 13 States––Montana and the States in the Corn Belt,
Lake States, and Northern Plains regions (Hansen et al., 1999).20 These
benefits are relatively small since, unlike wildlife viewing, pheasant hunting
is a single activity associated with a single species. Nonetheless, for the area
studied, the value of CRP’s impact on pheasant hunting totals over $87
million annually. 
As important as wildlife-related benefits are from a community development
perspective, the primary focus of the CRP has historically been on reducing
soil erosion. Permanent cover has prevented nearly all wind, sheet, and rill
erosion on enrolled lands. Erosion of topsoil typically reduces productive
characteristics of the remaining soil––water-holding capacity, nutrient
concentration, etc.––so yields tend to fall. Increased input use can offset
some of the yield loss, but at additional cost to farm operators. Increases in
agricultural productivity attributable to CRP enrollments are referred to as
on-site benefits. They represent the discounted present value of the net yield
gains and the cost saving from decreased input use (alternatively, they repre-
sent the added costs farm operators would face in the absence of the CRP
program). Soil erosion directly affects the quantity of sediment in neigh-
boring lakes and streams and the concentration of air particulates. Increases
in sediment and dust increase economic burdens (the “off-site costs”) on
consumers, businesses, and government. Consumers must deal with addi-
tional costs and adverse health effects. Operating costs increase as busi-
nesses are forced to deal with the effects of water and air pollution (e.g.,
reduced lifespan of pumping equipment and increased water treatment
costs). Governments are faced with larger outlays to mitigate the impacts of
19 Measures of all the benefits attribut-
able to CRP’s impact on wildlife pop-
ulations are not available. The eco-
nomic values for the environmental
benefits presented in this section have
been adjusted for inflation to represent
2000 dollars. Dollar-per-acre wildlife
benefits, by region, are from Feather,
et al. (1999). Total wildlife benefits
within each region are the product of
the per-acre benefit estimate and the
number of CRP acres enrolled.
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benefits.
Soil erosion on all agricultural lands decreased nearly 40 percent between
1982 and 1997 (Claassen et al., 2001). While improved conservation meas-
ures adopted by the farm sector following the 1985 Act are responsible for
much of this decline, CRP had a significant impact as well. CRP reduced
wind erosion on cropland by over 13 percent and water erosion by nearly 7
percent from what it otherwise would have been in 1997 (table 2.7). The
program’s greater effect on wind erosion is due to the large portion of CRP
acres in drier areas of the country.
Nationwide, CRP is credited with reducing soil erosion by nearly 224
million tons a year, based on 1997 enrollments, with the largest reductions
occurring in the Southern Plains, Mountain States, and Corn Belt, where
CRP enrollments were highest.21 The Southern Plains and Mountain regions
benefit most from CRP’s impact on wind erosion––together accounting for
70 percent of CRP’s wind erosion impact. CRP acreage in both of these
regions is high and both areas have dry and windy growing conditions. On
the other hand, significant rainfall and a high concentration of row crops
have made agricultural lands in the Corn Belt especially sensitive to sheet
and rill erosion. As a result, the Corn Belt accounts for over 40 percent of
CRP’s impact on water erosion.
Reductions in lake and stream sediment have increased the quality of
fishing, boating, and other water-based recreation. While the benefits accrue
outside the normal market mechanism, they are nonetheless real. Improve-
ments in the quality of outdoor amenities can also have market impacts. For
example, improved fishing might increase sales of fishing equipment, cabin
rentals, boat purchases, and similar items. These market impacts are not
included in the measures of on- or off-site benefits presented here, but, as
discussed later, they can have a positive affect on local economies. 
21 CRP erosion reduction estimates
assume that conservation practices on
land enrolled in the CRP would be
similar to 1997 cropland practices in
the program’s absence and are consid-
erably smaller than erosion reduction
estimates based on comparisons of
erosion rates on CRP land before and
after CRP enrollment.
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Table 2.7—CRP’s impact on cropland soil erosion
Wind erosion Water erosion Total cropland erosion
Farm production CRP CRP CRP
region1 1997 impact2 1997 impact 1997 impact
Million tons per year
Northeast 0.2 — 48.9 -0.6 49.1 -0.6
Lake States 134.3 -10.4 97.9 -5.7 232.2 -16.1
Corn Belt 24.2 -0.6 452.3 -37.9 476.5 -38.6
Northern Plains 191.5 -23.2 104.4 -7.2 256.2 -30.4
Appalachia 0.4 — 137.5 -6.9 137.9 -6.9
Southeast — — 66.9 -6.1 66.9 -6.1
Delta — — 90.5 -9.2 90.5 -9.2
Southern Plains 267.8 -58.3 155.3 -9.4 462.7 -67.7
Mountain 196.3 -36.7 42.8 -3.9 239.1 -40.6
Pacific 41.5 -5.3 28.5 -2.0 70.0 -7.3
U.S.Total 856.3 -134.6 1,224.9 -89.0 2,081.1 -223.5
— indicates that the impact was less than 0.05.
1The farm production regions are delineated in figure 2.9. Note that the Pacific farm production
region excludes Alaska and Hawaii.
2The reduction in erosion attributable to CRP enrollment.These impacts have already been net-
ted out of the 1997 totals.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Table 2.8 summarizes the estimated economic value of CRP’s impact on soil
erosion. The on-site economic benefit of reduced soil erosion (increased soil
productivity) due to the CRP is approximately $122 million per year based
on the 1997 Natural Resources Inventory (NRI). The on-site economic
impacts of reduced soil erosion cover the combined effects of wind, sheet,
and rill erosion. Approximately 60 percent of the productivity benefits are
due to CRP’s impact on future yields; the remaining 40 percent results from
decreased input use when CRP acres are returned to production (Ribaudo et
al., 1990). Regional measures of productivity benefits reflect both the quan-
tity and quality of soil enrolled in the CRP.
Off-site benefits from reduced wind erosion stem from particulate-related
cost savings enjoyed by those living or working in areas downwind from
CRP land, particularly in the more arid regions of the country (Huszar and
Piper, 1986). Measures of all off-site benefits of reduced soil erosion are not
available. However, based on available measures, CRP reduces off-site costs
of soil erosion by approximately $378 million per year, and decreases
annual off-site damages from dust by approximately $61 million. These
benefits occur in the four western regions where measures of the costs of
particulate pollution have been developed. Impacts of wind erosion in other
regions are not expected to be as significant (Ribaudo et al., 1990).
Sheet and rill erosion increases sediment in surface waters throughout the
United States, imposing economic costs on many sectors of the economy
(Hansen and Claassen, 2001). By reducing water erosion, CRP reduces
these sediment-related costs by an estimated $317 million per year. This
estimate includes economic measures of sediment’s impact on municipal
water treatment facilities, marine and freshwater fisheries, navigation,
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Table 2.8—Annual economic benefits of CRP’s impact on soil erosion
Farm production On-site Off-site benefits3 Total benefits
region1 benefits2 Dust Sediment Total Overall Per  acre
$ Million per year Dollars
Northeast 1 — 8 8 8 44
Lake States 19 — 32 32 51 20
Corn Belt 39 — 136 136 175 37
Northern Plains 13 15 13 28 41 5
Appalachia 4 — 29 29 33 36
Southeast 3 — 23 23 26 17
Delta 4 — 40 40 44 37
Southern Plains 25 22 24 46 71 14
Mountain 11 18 6 25 36 6
Pacific 3 6 6 12 15 9
U.S. 122 61 317 378 500 15
— indicates that the impact was not estimated.
1Regions are delineated in figure 2.9.The Pacific farm production region excludes Alaska and
Hawaii.
2On-site benefits accrue to the owners and operators of CRP acreage (such as increased soil
productivity).
3Off-site benefits accrue in areas that are indirectly affected by CRP acreage (such as cleaner
water in a lake downstream of CRP acreage).
Note: All benefits estimates are adjusted for inflation to represent 2000 dollars and are rounded
to the nearest million dollars. Components may not sum to total due to rounding.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.flooding, industrial production, reservoirs, and water-based recreation.
Because measures of the other economic impacts of sediment have not been
developed, the results presented here can be viewed as lower-bound esti-
mates. These cost savings are most significant in the Corn Belt, which
accounts for over 40 percent of all sediment-related off-site benefits. 
The annual benefits of the CRP’s impact on wildlife and soil erosion
amount to roughly $38 per acre for the categories we have examined (fig.
2.10). But only about 10 percent of these benefits accrue to the enrollee as
on-site benefits. The remaining 90 percent accrues over a broader region. As
a result, communities near affected lakes and streams benefit from CRP’s
impact on sediment even though they may not be near the fields enrolled in
the program. For example, as CRP reduces soil erosion, downstream
communities can see catch rates and fishing incomes increase, water filtra-
tion costs decline, and sediment-related damage to cooling systems fall.
This potential “disconnect” between those who make land-use decisions and
those who reap the resulting environmental benefits (or incur the resulting
costs) is one of the primary justifications for operating a Federally financed
environmental program.22 But, in terms of measuring CRP’s economic
impacts, environmental benefits complicate our analyses in three ways.
First, environmental benefits are often realized as cost savings or quality-of-
life improvements rather than as more jobs or increased market activity—
the usual measures of economic progress.23 While CRP may succeed in
reducing erosion, sedimentation, and windblown particulates, the resulting
cost savings could reduce employment and income while increasing societal
well-being. In such a case, change in the number of jobs is a misleading
indicator of community well-being.
Second, as we have seen, the dollar value of the environmental benefits
generated by enrolling land in the CRP varies considerably from place to
place. To the extent that these benefits lead to market impacts, an acre of
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22 Beck et al. (1999) point out that the
“disconnect” between the distribution
of land conservation program benefits
and costs makes it difficult to finance
such programs at the local level.
23 Of course, environmental benefits
can improve job prospects even as
they improve the quality of life. See,
for example, Carlino and Mills (1987)
and Lewis, Hunt, and Plantinga (2002,
2003). However, job creation is not the
focus of environmental programs nor
is program success a function of job
generation.
Figure 2.10
Selected annual nonmarket environmental benefits from CRP
Regions are delineated in figure 2.9. The Pacific farm production region excludes Alaska and
Hawaii. Benefits are adjusted for inflation to represent 2000 dollars.
Dollars per acre
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Farm production regionCRP land in one region could have very different employment impacts than
an acre of CRP land enrolled elsewhere. 
Finally, the considerable environmental benefits enjoyed by a community
may be due to the CRP enrollment in neighboring places, making compar-
isons of local development trends among high- and low-CRP counties
misleading. 
As a result, while CRP’s environmental benefits affect the quality of life in
rural counties, which in turn can lead to demographic and economic change,
our analyses only capture these effects indirectly and imperfectly. We may
underestimate the size of the positive economic impacts and overestimate
the relative size of the negative economic impacts of CRP enrollment.
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Implementation
While the CRP is not a community development program, its effort to
reduce soil erosion and protect environmentally sensitive resources can
affect local economies and populations. By providing a stable source of
income to participants, it has been credited with allowing financially vulner-
able farm operators to remain on the farm when they might otherwise have
been forced to leave in search of other employment (Hodur et al., 2002;
Mortensen et al., 1990; Nowak et al., 1990). And, by improving wildlife
populations and helping to provide a cleaner and more scenically appealing
environment, CRP may have contributed to the quality of life in many rural
communities and helped support a growing tourist and recreation industry.
On the other hand, by retiring productive farmland, CRP may have reduced
demand for certain farm services, undermining the strength of local
economies in farm-dependent areas. And, by making it easier for farm oper-
ators to retire from farming, CRP may have facilitated population outmigra-
tion from farming communities. These same effects can be viewed
positively or negatively. For example, CRP may have allowed some isolated
rural communities to protect open spaces by slowing sprawl (Johnson and
Maxwell, 2001), while other communities might view this as an impediment
to much needed growth.24
Local adjustments to economic and social shocks are complex and difficult
to model. A community’s reaction to CRP-induced changes in land use,
purchasing patterns, and environmental quality will depend on the size and
nature of the local economy and its relationship to regional and national
markets, the quality of public and private community leadership, the adapt-
ability of the workforce, and the size of the changes, among other things.
Based on analyses of CRP’s impact on rural communities over the years, it
is clear that the size of the program relative to the local economy is criti-
cally important.25 During its 17 years of existence, CRP has retired land in
nearly 2,700 counties and has disbursed over $1.5 billion per year, on
average, in direct payments. In the majority of cases, CRP enrollment is too
small relative to the local resource base to have much of an effect on local
communities. Program impacts should be easiest to detect among communi-
ties that were most dependent on the land enrolled in the CRP. 
Two measures of CRP’s local importance are used in this section (see box,
“Measuring the Local Importance of CRP”). The first is the proportion of
the area’s total cropland enrolled in the CRP. This acreage-based measure is
used to evaluate CRP’s effect on beginning farmers—a group that is likely
to be sensitive to CRP-induced changes in land-use patterns. The second is
the size of an area’s CRP rental payments relative to local income. This
payments-based measure is used to evaluate CRP’s effect on population and
employment trends. The rental-payments-to-income ratio combines informa-
tion on the value of the land being retired and the importance of the associ-
ated farming activity to the local economy. The higher the ratio, the larger
the potential effect of CRP on surrounding communities.
25 Nearly every published analysis of
CRP’s community impacts focuses on
areas of the country with high CRP
enrollment. Analyses which report
results for more than one area general-
ly find that CRP’s impacts varied with
agriculture’s importance to the local
economy as well as the level of CRP
enrollment (Hines et al., 1991; Hyberg
et al., 1991; Martin et al., 1988; Otto
and Smith, 1996; and Standaert and
Smith, 1989).
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24 But, as Parks and Schorr (1997)
make clear, CRP is of limited value in
slowing urban sprawl in fast-growing
metropolitan areas where the value of
land for development dwarfs its value
for agricultural production.27
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The measure of CRP's local importance adopted by the 1985 Act is
the proportion of each county's total cropland enrolled in CRP. This
is a reasonable metric when the primary concern is CRP's effect on
farms and farm-related industries. Because we don't want our
measure of cropland to be influenced by CRP, we use county crop-
land from the 1982 Census of Agriculture (4 years before CRP was
implemented) as the denominator. The numerator is the average
CRP enrollment within each county from 1991 to 1993. After 1990,
the annual mean proportion of cropland enrolled in CRP among
counties with acreage in the program varied little around the 1991-
1993 average of 6.6 percent.
If the primary concern is with broader measures of community
well-being, such as the change in county population, then CRP
acreage relative to cropland may not be totally relevant. If farming
is a minor source of economic activity, high CRP enrollment rela-
tive to cropland may have little effect on the local economy. A
more direct measure is the local economic importance of
resources retired by the CRP. The denominator is total household
income received by county residents in 1985, adjusted for infla-
tion. The numerator is the average annual CRP rental payment
earned on the county's enrolled acres from 1991 to 1993. The
annual mean payment-to-income ratio among participating coun-
ties was remarkably stable during the early 1990s at about 0.75
percent. The two measures of CRP's local importance are posi-
tively correlated, but they measure different aspects of the
program's importance.
Since the focus of this section is on areas most likely to be affected
by cropland retirement, only counties in which farm employment
comprised more than 5 percent of jobs in 1980 are considered.
Furthermore, only counties in the contiguous 48 States that had an
urban population of less than 20,000 in 1980 are analyzed.1
Alaska and Hawaii are unique enough to warrant exclusion, and
more populated and economically diverse areas are unlikely to be
measurably affected by CRP enrollment. The resulting universe is
comprised of 1,481 counties located throughout the country, but
concentrated most heavily in the Plains. These counties accounted
for 79 percent of land enrolled in the CRP in both 1990 and 2002.
While the selection criteria provide a reasonably homogeneous
group of observations for econometric analysis, the resulting
counties still exhibit enormous variation in socioeconomic factors.
This variability, coupled with the complexity of the economic
growth process, invites erroneous estimates due to misspecified
models. One approach involves the use of quasi-experimental, or
matched-pair, control group analysis (Bohm and Lind, 1993; Reed
and Rogers, 2003). Intuitively, if high-CRP (treatment) counties
were compared with otherwise identical low-CRP (control) coun-
ties, differences in economic performance between the two groups
would demonstrate the effects of high CRP enrollment. In reality,
the matches are imperfect.2
However, the strong association between matched treatment and
control counties simplifies statistical modeling by comparing
growth processes in similar environments. By minimizing the
effects of other growth factors, the effects of high-CRP enrollment
should be easier to identify.
To apply this approach, the measures of CRP's local importance
were used to identify high-CRP counties which had more than
5,000 acres enrolled in the CRP at some point between 1986 and
1995. Using the acreage-based metric, high-CRP counties had a
ratio of CRP enrollment to cropland that exceeded 20 percent.
There were 194 high-CRP counties based on 1991-93 enrollments.
Using the payments-based metric, high-CRP counties had a ratio of
CRP rental payments to total household income that exceeded 2.75
percent. There were 195 high-CRP counties based on 1991-93
rental payments. Fifty-six percent of high-CRP counties were clas-
sified as such by both measures.
Each high-CRP county was matched as closely as possible to a
similar county which had a low CRP enrollment and payment ratio.
Potential matches were restricted to study group counties which
were not themselves high-CRP (based on either enrollment or rental
payments) at any time during the program's history and which had
CRP use measures that were less than 50 percent of the high-CRP
county being matched.3 Unique matches were selected which mini-
mized the "Mahalanobis distances" between the high-CRP counties
and all possible combinations of eligible low-CRP counties. The
Mahalanobis distance measures the similarity between observations
based on a set of key characteristics-the smaller the distance, the
more similar the matching, based on the characteristics being exam-
ined.4Matches were based on county characteristics associated with
population, employment, and beginning farmer trends. The aim is to
find matched pairs of counties which were very similar before CRP
enrollment began, and then compare their development as land is
enrolled in the CRP.
For counties with high enrollment to cropland ratios, suitable
matches were based on pre-1984 measures of the structure and
type of farming in each county; the age, ownership, and off-farm
work characteristics of farm operators in each county; and
nonfarm characteristics that are related to farm structure, such as
the county's population growth, racial mix, employment rate, and
manufacturing base. For counties with high rental payments to
income ratios, matches were based on pre-1984 measures of popu-
lation growth, population density, commuting patterns, racial mix,
mining employment, and the importance of Federal farm
commodity program payments. In addition, contemporaneous
measures of land in forest and the presence of natural amenities
were included because historical data were not available.
Measuring the Local Importance of CRP
1Farm employment includes members of the farm operator's family
employed on the farm as well as hired farm workers, and is from the
1980 Census of Population. An urban population cutoff of 20,000 (to
focus on less-diversified economies) was chosen to coincide with the
urban adjacency (or Beale) codes created by ERS. 
2Ideally, counties should be similar in every respect except for the
amount of CRP-eligible land, with low-CRP counties classified as such
because land was ineligible based on environmental sensitivity criteria.
Unfortunately, it seems likely that at least some low-CRP counties are
such because eligible lands were too productive or too valuable for non-
farm uses to make enrollment in the CRP attractive. To the extent that
considerations other than program eligibility led low-CRP counties to enroll
fewer acres, our matched-pair comparisons will overstate the impact that
CRP enrollment has on socioeconomic trends. 
3Paired t-tests indicate that the mean values of CRP enrollment/cropland
and CRP rental payment/income in high-CRP counties and their matches
differ by more than two standard deviations, with a 99-percent level of con-
fidence. 
4The Mahalanobis distance metric takes the form d2(XT,XC) = (XT-XC)′
Σ-1(XT-XC), where X is the vector of selection variables, T is the treatment
(i.e. high-CRP) county, C is a possible control county, d is the Mahalanobis
distance between the two vectors, and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix
of possible control counties (Isserman and Rephann, 1995).In an effort to focus on areas that might be measurably affected by the CRP,
we analyze two groups of counties: (1) nonmetropolitan counties with at
least 5 percent of their workforce employed on the farm, and (2) counties
considered “high-CRP” based on one of the ratios discussed earlier together
with matching “control” counties having relatively low CRP ratios.26 Figure
3.1 maps the 1,481 counties examined in this section as well as the high-
CRP counties, as defined using 1991-1993 average enrolled acreage and
rental payments.27 While some of the effects of retiring agricultural land
may be evident quickly, other effects may not be apparent for some time. To
capture both short and longrun effects, a series of econometric models is
estimated for different time periods to determine if and when local socio-
economic trends were influenced by CRP enrollment. The detailed regres-
sion results presented in this section are from the matched sample, which
highlights differences between high- and low-CRP counties.
The CRP was initiated during a difficult period for farmers and farming
communities. The farm sector was suffering its worst financial crisis since
the 1930s when the 1985 Act became law. While agricultural exports,
incomes, capital investments, and land values all surged in the 1970s, all of
these indicators of financial well-being plummeted during the 1980s. As
farmers went out of business, so did many community banks and local
merchants. By 1986, when the CRP first began enrolling land, the farm
financial crisis was still in full swing, with land values continuing their
decline for another year or two (Collender, 1999). As a result, care must be
taken to avoid blaming the CRP for the sectorwide problems of the 1980s or
crediting the program for the subsequent sectorwide recovery.
To the extent that whole- and partial-farm enrollees use the program in
different ways, the program’s impact on the broader community may differ.
26 Research has shown (and economic
logic suggests) that the relative size of
program impacts is likely to be great-
est within small geographic units
(Hamilton and Levins, 1998) and that
program impacts vary from communi-
ty to community within a local area
(Henderson et al., 1992). Nonetheless,
data limitations preclude examining
impacts within subcounty units, such
as towns and cities.
27 The program was nearly fully
implemented by 1993 and much of the
available data ends in 1997. Changes
in socioeconomic trends resulting from
CRP enrollment in 1993 should be
observed by 1997. Had a later period
been used to measure CRP’s impor-
tance, resulting socioeconomic
changes in counties with recent enroll-
ments might not be readily apparent in
the 1997 data.
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Figure 3.1
Counties studied to determine CRP’s community impacts
Source:  CRP contracts file.
Other study counties*
High - CRP enrollment
High - CRP payments
High - CRP enrollment
and payments
*Includes nonmetropolitan counties with fewer than 20,000
urban residents in 1980, and with more than 5 percent
employed in agriculture. “Control” counties were drawn
from this group.To allow for varying impacts, the regression analysis estimates whole- and
partial-farm enrollment effects separately.28 We also include the percentage
of CRP payment outflows as a proxy for absentee ownership of CRP land.
While we don’t consider this a characteristic of the program as much as an
indication of landownership patterns, these patterns can influence the impact
that CRP has on local communities (see the previous section). When either
the type of CRP enrollment or the flow of CRP funds is important to under-
standing CRP’s community impacts, these relationships are fully explored.
Population and Employment
To the extent that CRP enrollment represents a net reduction in the amount
of land being cultivated within a local market, demand for agricultural
inputs and marketing services would likely fall.29 At a minimum, this would
imply adjustments in the local labor market as resources shift from farm-
related activities to other pursuits. Assuming that resources were previously
being put to their most profitable use, land-retirement-induced adjustments
could dampen the local economy unless new, more profitable opportunities
arise. Furthermore, if institutional rigidities slow such adjustments, employ-
ment levels could decline even more than shifting demands would suggest.
And, since migration patterns are sensitive to employment opportunities,
pronounced shifts in a community’s economy could also affect its desir-
ability as a place to live and work, and ultimately its population level.
On the other hand, particularly during the early years of the program’s oper-
ation, CRP rental payments may have helped many financially stressed farm
operators stay on the farm. Whether as farmers, retirees, or nonfarm
employees, CRP payment recipients may have helped stabilize the
economies and populations of some farming communities simply by
remaining in the area. By helping stabilize local land markets at a time
when farmland values were falling, CRP enrollments may have helped
nonparticipating farmers retain their operations. Over time, as CRP fostered
increased populations and varieties of wildlife, a more diverse landscape,
and a cleaner environment, increased recreational activities may have
provided new job opportunities and increased the appeal of some farming
communities as places to live.
Do high levels of CRP enrollment systematically affect rural employment
and population trends in the short or the long run?30 One consideration with
any attempt to analyze the relationship between CRP participation and popu-
lation and employment trends is that CRP enrollment tends to be heaviest in
the Plains States, where many counties have a long history of population
decline. Changes in technology and sectorwide consolidation have reduced
the farm population in these counties, and their remoteness and low popula-
tion density have discouraged other employers from moving in. Of the 195
high-CRP payment counties analyzed in this section, nearly 3 out of every 4
lost population between 1970 and 1985 (before CRP was implemented).
Thus, CRP participation is not randomly distributed with respect to
economic and demographic trends. Figure 3.2 presents average long-term
trends in population and employment for high-CRP counties, their matched
pairs, all 1,481 study counties, and all counties in the 48 contiguous States.
28 While whole- and partial-farm
enrollments are highly correlated, the
simple correlation coefficient is 0.61
for our acreage-based measure and
0.75 for our payments-based measure.
Both of these coefficients are below the
level commonly assumed to cause seri-
ous multicollinearity problems with
estimated regression coefficients
(Studenmund, 1997). 
29 Enrolling land in the CRP does not
prevent other land from coming into
production. Indeed, if commodity
prices rise or agricultural input prices
fall due to CRP land retirement, eco-
nomic theory suggests that agricultural
markets should adjust by increasing
production, either by bringing addi-
tional land into production or by culti-
vating existing land more intensively.
This phenomenon is referred to as
“slippage” and would be expected to
weaken CRP’s economic impacts. 
30 When analyzing employment trends,
we examine changes in the number of
jobs rather than changes in the number
of employed persons. Throughout this
section, we use employment and jobs
interchangeably.
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population loss and anemic employment trends. Their problems accelerated
in the early 1980s, but farming communities nationwide were also experi-
encing population and employment problems. The policy issue is whether
high enrollment in the CRP has made local economic conditions worse or
better than they otherwise would have been. That is, counties with unusually
high levels of CRP enrollment do worse, on average, than other rural coun-
ties, but it is unclear whether CRP enrollment contributed to this situation or
merely reflects the greater appeal CRP has to eligible landowners in poorly
performing economies. 
County population and employment change are closely, but not directly,
linked, since commuting patterns change, people enter and exit the labor
force depending on the availability of jobs, and retirees migrate without
corresponding effects on employment. Nonetheless, employment and popu-
lation tend to rise and fall together and we use the same model to explain
variation in both population and employment trends. Four basic groups of
explanatory variables are used in the analysis: (1) prior-change measures of
both employment and population; (2) economic measures, which generally
relate more to employment change than population change; (3) quality of
life/amenity measures, which primarily affect population change; and (4)
demographic measures, which may affect both population and employment
change. These measures and the modeling techniques are discussed more
fully in Appendix A.
Figure 3.2 not only shows that high-CRP counties have been weak
economic performers for the past 30 years, but they have done worse, on
average, than the matching (low-CRP) counties. This reflects the limitations
of the matched-pairs approach when the counties of interest are unique. In
an effort to highlight counties that are most likely to be affected by the CRP,
30
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Figure 3.2
Average population and employment growth trends, 1969-2000
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U.S. total: 3,085 counties
Study group: 1,481 counties
Matching: 195 counties
High-CRP: 195 counties
Note: The CRP program started enrolling land in 1986, with enrollment reaching a stable level





































Percent change Percent change
Year CRP
implemented Year CRP
implementedwe have isolated a disproportionate number of counties having few residents
and small, relatively undiversified economies. Few counties with low CRP-
payment-to-income ratios exhibited such extreme characteristics. As a
result, the matching procedure reduces differences between high-CRP coun-
ties and the other counties studied, but it does not eliminate them. Regres-
sion analysis that analyzes patterns among all the study counties and
between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs is used to correct for
the differences in initial socioeconomic conditions.
The traditional growth model takes the form:
log (Ji,t / Ji,1985) = f(CRPi, Xi)
where Ji,t is the number of jobs in county i at time t greater than 1985, CRPi
is the local importance of CRP (i.e., the proportion of county cropland
enrolled or the ratio of CRP rental payments to income) in county i during
1991-1993, and Xi is a vector of county i’s pre-1985 socioeconomic and
amenity characteristics hypothesized to influence local job growth.
For the matched-pair analysis, the difference in job-growth trends between
high-CRP counties and their matches were estimated as a function of differ-
ences in explanatory variables between matched pairs of counties. That is:
(log (JTt) – log (JCt))i = f((CRPT – CRPC)i,( XT – XC)i)
where JTt is the ratio of jobs in high-CRP county i at time t relative to jobs in
1985, JCt is the identical ratio for jobs in the low-CRP county uniquely
matched with i, (CRPT – CRPC)i is the difference between CRP’s local impor-
tance in high-CRP county i (the treatment county) and its matching low-CRP
county (the control county), and (XT – XC)i is a vector of the differences
between each explanatory variable in high-CRP county i and its match. This
approach examined whether differences in development trends between high-
CRP counties and their matches could be accounted for by differences in pre-
CRP socioeconomic factors and CRP’s local importance.31 The rationale for
adopting this econometric approach is discussed in Appendix A.
Between the matched-pair and study data sets, the different measures of
CRP usage, and other variations as discussed in Appendix A, we have 20
different estimates of the relationship between CRP use and population and
employment trends. This approach allows us to assess the consistency of the
matched-pair estimations. Given that estimated coefficients can change from
one model to the next, consistent estimates provide some confidence that the
absence of statistical significance can be interpreted as “CRP has no effect,”
even though we do not know the probability of a Type II or false negative
error. Since the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, this
approach helps to corroborate the findings from the matched-pair analysis.
The results, reported in table 3.1, report the sign of the CRP coefficient with
respect to changes in population and employment over the short and long
run. To determine whether there is any evidence that a meaningful relation-
ship might exist, we report the number of times the coefficient is significant
at the 80-percent level of confidence—far lower than is typically used to
reject the null hypothesis. For those who want stronger proof that identified
31 When parameters are estimated
without a measure of CRP’s local
importance, the constant term meas-
ures the marginal effect on job growth
trends of being classified as a high-
CRP county. When CRP’s local impor-
tance is included as an explanatory
variable, the constant term is con-
strained to equal zero.
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coefficients at the 90 percent level is reported in parentheses.
The results of the 20 regressions are broadly consistent. They provide no
convincing evidence that CRP had a statistically significant negative effect
on county population changes in either the short or long run. In fact, the
results suggest that CRP may actually have been weakly associated with
gains (or reduced losses) in population between 1985 and 2000, since most
estimates suggest a positive relationship between CRP and population
change. However, the coefficients representing the effects of CRP on popu-
lation change were small and statistically insignificant at the 90-percent
level of confidence. Thus, our conclusion is that the CRP did not tend to
systematically reduce county population. This, of course, does not imply
that no county lost (or gained) population because of its enrollment in the
CRP. But high levels of enrollment in the CRP did not have a discernible
systematic effect on population trends in rural communities once other
factors were taken into account.
There is evidence that CRP was associated with job loss in the short run. All
coefficients were negative, and in 7 of 20 cases the coefficient was statisti-
cally significant at the 90-percent level of confidence. However, this nega-
tive relationship did not persist over the longer period. Apparently, if
negative effects existed, they were short-lived. Most models reported a posi-
tive relationship between CRP and employment growth over the long run.
Since there was little evidence of a shortrun loss in population associated
with CRP participation, it suggests that local economies were generally able
to adapt to any loss in jobs associated with the CRP.
Table 3.2 presents the key results of a series of regressions on differences
between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs. The first group of
results (i.e., the “constant term”) indicates that high-CRP counties had a
significantly lower rate of job growth between 1985 and 1992. The second
group of results shows whether differences in the size of the CRP payments-
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Table 3.1—Summary of CRP’s estimated population and employment
impacts
Sign of CRP coefficients:
Positive Negative
All Significant All Significant
Population change
1985-1992 (short term) 13 0 7 1 (0)
1985-2000 (long term) 17 4 (0) 3 0
Change in the number of jobs
1985-1992 (short term) 0 0 20 11 (7)
1985-2000 (long term) 19 5 (3) 1 0
Note: The data refer to the sign and statistical significance on the CRP regression coefficient in
20 different versions of the growth model. A series of traditional growth models, using all 1,481
study counties and a series of difference-in-difference models, using the 195 matched pairs,
allow the functional form and independent variables to vary. In each case, the dependent vari-
able is the log of the ratio of population or jobs at the end of the period relative to 1985 (when
matched pairs are analyzed, the dependent variable is the difference in the population or jobs
log-ratio in high- and low-CRP counties). Statistical significance is based on a 2-tailed t-test at
the .20 level with the number in parentheses significant at the .10 level.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.to-income ratio had a significant impact on county trends. Here the results
differ depending upon whether mining counties are included in the analysis
or not. With mining counties excluded, job growth between 1985 and 2000
was positively related to CRP use.32 The third group of results shows
whether differences in the proportion of cropland enrolled in the CRP are
related to differences in county trends. It appears that the relative size of
CRP enrollment had a consistent, statistically significant, negative effect on
job growth between 1985 and 1992, but little effect over the longer period.
In general, excluding mining counties produced stronger and more consis-
tent results. Therefore, the remainder of our analysis of changes in popula-
tion and employment trends excludes counties with over 5 percent employed
in mining in 1980.
The results of the analyses of changes in the number of jobs over 1985-1992
were somewhat puzzling. The consistent significant relationships involved
the CRP acreage/total cropland acreage measure and the simple difference
in employment change between the high CRP counties and their matches.
There was little evidence that a very high ratio of CRP payments to income
was associated with job loss in the short run, and the regression coefficient
was positive in the long run. One possible explanation is that CRP-related
job losses occurred in small agricultural services centers. Counties with the
highest CRP-payment-to-income ratios have very low populations, and are
almost exclusively involved in farming and lacking in nonfarm businesses.
However, counties with the highest proportions of land in CRP may still
include small towns that could be adversely affected by declining sales of
farm inputs and services.
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Table 3.2—CRP’s association with population and employment trends, 1985-2000
Matched pairs1 Matched pairs/no mining1
Beta Adj. R2 Beta Adj. R2
Constant term2
1985-1992 population change -0.0099 0.32 -0.0032 0.40
1985-2000 population change -0.0106 0.45 0.0198 0.48
1985-1992 employment change -0.0293** 0.27 -0.0309** 0.32
1985-2000 employment change 0.0037 0.35 -0.0184 0.29
CRP payments/income ratio3
1985-1992 population change 0.0011 0.39 0.0006 0.48
1985-2000 population change -0.0011 0.50 0.0017 0.53
1985-1992 employment change -0.0020 0.33 -0.0007 0.43
1985-2000 employment change 0.0014 0.38 0.0045* 0.37
CRP enrollment/county acreage ratio3
1985-1992 population change 0.0000 0.39 -0.0001 0.48
1985-2000 population change 0.0023 0.49 0.0006 0.55
1985-1992 employment change -0.0027* 0.34 -0.0028** 0.45
1985-2000 employment change 0.0009 0.38 0.0001 0.36
* and ** indicate the regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the .05 and .01 level of significance, respectively. Beta represents the
standardized regression coefficient for the CRP variable. Adjusted R2 indicates the portion of variation explained by the regression.
1See “Measuring the Local Importance of CRP” for a discussion of the matching process.There are a total of 195 high-CRP, low-CRP matched
pairs; when counties with more than 5 percent employed in mining in 1980 are excluded, this number drops to 190.
2The model explains the difference in population and employment trends in high- and low-CRP counties as a function of the difference in
socioeconomic variables between matched pairs of counties.The constant term is the equivalent of a dummy variable indicating membership in
the high-CRP group.
3When the difference-in-difference equations include a continuous variable measuring CRP usage, the constant is constrained to equal 0.
Source: ERS calculations using data from the 1980 Census of Population, the 1982 Census of Agriculture, the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
and FSA’s CRP Contracts file.
32 Mining employment was very
volatile during the study period with
employment increasing rapidly in
some areas and decreasing rapidly in
others. As a result, neither a continu-
ous variable measuring the proportion
of local jobs in mining nor a dummy
variable for mining counties was effec-
tive at capturing mining’s impact. To investigate this issue further, we focus on the matched-pair data set as
these counties all have relatively low population densities.33 We have no
direct measure of the presence of small agricultural centers in these coun-
ties, but more densely settled rural counties are likely to have one or more
small towns. By including a population density-CRP interaction term in the
regression, we can measure CRP’s differential impact on local communities
as county population density varies.
Statistically, we want to determine whether the relationship between the
CRP payment-to-income ratio and population or job trends changes as
population density varies. Because agricultural service centers may have
been losing out to larger centers during this period, we also include an inter-
action term (percent employed in agriculture multiplied by population
density) to reflect any tendency for population or employment loss to be
greater in more densely settled agricultural areas over the study period. The
results of these analyses (see appendix table A.4) indicate that CRP did not
systematically affect population trends in either low or moderate population
density counties, but the negative effect of CRP on the number of jobs in the
county was larger in more densely settled rural counties than in thinly
settled counties.
Figure 3.3 shows the estimated impact that CRP had on population and
employment change in our selection of moderate- and low-density rural
counties as the difference in the ratio of CRP payments to income between
low- and high-CRP counties increases from 0 to 4 percent. For low-density
counties (those with fewer than two persons per square mile), CRP appears
to have made little difference for population change in either the short or
long term. For higher density rural counties (those with more than nine
persons per square mile), the effect of a 4-percentage- point increase in the
ratio of CRP payments to income on county employment growth was signif-
icant in the short run, but effects dissipated over time as local economies
adjusted. We interpret these results to mean that CRP had its most negative
34
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Figure 3.3
CRP’s effect on population and job trends, by population density
Note:  Bars represent predicted changes in population and employment due to an increase in
the ratio of CRP payments to income. Predictions are determined by computing estimates with
the CRP-payments-to-income ratio set to zero in both low- and high-CRP counties, recomputing
estimates with the ratio set to 4 percent, and comparing the two estimates. Low- and moderate-
density counties have fewer than 2 and more than 9 persons per square mile, respectively.  














Source:  Economic Research Service, USDA.
33 This analysis was also replicated for
all counties remote from major cities
and lacking towns of 2,500 or more.
Analysis of these totally rural counties
provided generally consistent results
and for expositional ease will not be
presented.effects on jobs in counties with agricultural service centers, but that these
net effects were largely confined to the short term.
These results are consistent with Martin et al.’s (1988) projections that CRP
would negatively affect farm dependent communities in Oregon with small
subregional agricultural supply centers. They expected farm dependent
communities that were too small to support such centers (“low density” in
our terminology) to be either unaffected or positively affected by CRP
enrollments. Our results and the earlier forecasts by Martin et al. focus on
small isolated farming economies. Larger, more diversified economies are
less likely to be significantly affected by CRP’s impact on demand for farm-
related goods and services.
Thus far, we have tested for population and employment impacts as total
CRP payments vary. However, whole-farm enrollments may have a different
impact on population and employment than partial-farm enrollments. There
is also a concern that any positive impacts CRP might have on the local
economy would be weakened if CRP participants live elsewhere. To investi-
gate these issues, we divide CRP enrollment into its various components
and examine the relationship between these components and local popula-
tion and employment trends.
It is often suggested that whole-farm CRP participation might be associated
with lower county population growth. However, we found little evidence of
this when we repeated the general analyses of population change using
measures of both partial- and whole-farm participation. Coefficients for
whole-farm participation were more likely to be negative than coefficients
for partial-farm participation (particularly for population change between
1985 and 2000), but none of the whole-farm coefficients were statistically
significant. For both partial- and whole-farm participation, CRP tended to
have a negative association with employment change in the short term, but a
positive association in the longer term. Our conclusion is that whether
participation involved whole or partial farms has not made an important
difference in population and employment trends.
Using a similar approach to distinguish CRP payments going to local resi-
dents from CRP payments going to absentee landowners, we examine
whether CRP was more negatively related to population and employment
growth when payments went outside the county. In this case, there were
consistent if usually small differences (table 3.3). Where payments stayed
within the county, CRP participation was more likely to be associated with
growth. To the extent that payments went outside the county, CRP participa-
tion was more often associated with reductions in population and jobs. It is
difficult to separate cause from effect here. CRP payments are more apt to
contribute to local growth when the recipients are local. At the same time,
areas prone to population loss and with few job opportunities may tend to
have more absentee ownership. A third possibility is that absentee owner-
ship itself (independent of CRP participation) leads to slower economic
growth and outmigration. None of these explanations is completely satisfac-
tory, however. They suggest a dampening of growth that would persist or
even gain in importance in the long term. To the contrary, the negative rela-
tionship between outside payments and local growth, strong in 1985-1992,
largely disappeared in 1985-2000.
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enrollment have contributed to a decline in the population of nearby
communities, it is somewhat surprising that we could find no convincing
evidence linking the CRP to these declines.34 As with any statistical
analysis, it is possible that there are factors we did not account for that, if
included, would have shown that CRP had an effect (either positive or nega-
tive) on population trends in some rural counties. However, given the
breadth of factors incorporated into our models, this seems unlikely. A
second explanation may have more credence. Our analysis is conducted at
the county level (the smallest unit for which appropriate data are available),
whereas much of the anecdotal evidence being reported concerns cities and
towns. It is likely that the percentage of cropland enrolled in the CRP is
much higher within small geographic areas than it is for the associated
county as a whole. Therefore, individual towns may be affected as land is
taken out of production and jobs shift elsewhere within the county. 
High CRP participation was associated with lower net gains (or higher net
losses) in jobs, but this pattern was largely confined to more densely settled
rural counties—ones that typically have small agricultural centers—and did
not persist in the long run (1985-2000). Apparently, the economies in these
areas were able to generate alternative sources of employment over time. In
general, more densely settled rural areas have been less prone to population
and job loss than more thinly settled areas. CRP participation has not been a
factor in low-density areas that have had the greatest problems with popula-
tion loss.
34 For example, in “Montana Town’s
Boys Are Its Last Gasp of Hope,”
Blaine Harden of The Washington
Post, blamed CRP for depopulating
small farming communities. The
National Grain and Feed Association
makes a similar claim in its 2001
white paper on farm policy issues.
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Table 3.3—Summary of absentee CRP-landowner analyses
Sign of coefficients
Positive Negative Positive Negative
All Significant All Significant All Significant All Significant
CRP payments in county CRP payments out of county
Change in population
1985-1992 6 0 2 0 0 0 8 0
1985-2000 8 1 0 0 4 0 4 0
Change in number of jobs
1985-1992 4 0 4 1* 00 8 3
1985-2000 6 4 21 3 0 50
Total (out of 32) 24 5 8 2 70 2 5 3
*Numbers in bold indicate that at least one coefficient was significantly different from zero at the .10 level.
Note: Counties with over 5 percent employed in mining in 1980 were excluded.The data refer to the sign and statistical significance of the in-
county CRP payments and the out-of-county CRP payments regression coefficients in 8 different versions of the growth model, where the func-
tional form and the list of independent variables vary across models. In each case, the dependent variable is the log of ratio of population or
jobs at the end of the period relative to 1985 (when matched pairs are analyzed, the dependent variable is the difference in the population or
jobs log-ratio in high- and low-CRP counties). Statistical significance is based on a 2-tailed t-test at the .20 level.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Farm-Related Businesses
Our analyses of aggregate employment trends in high-CRP counties suggest
that CRP generally had a small impact on employment which dissipated
over time. Even so, the removal of a significant amount of cropland from
production is likely to have had a major effect on one segment of the local
economy—local farm-related businesses. Businesses supplying local farms
with inputs and marketing services—farm machinery and input suppliers,
grain elevators, and local trucking establishments, for instance—may have
faced cutbacks that were masked in our analyses of overall employment
change. There is ample literature arguing that the CRP reduces input use
and, by implication, would reduce employment in businesses serving crop
producers (Abel et al., 1994; Hyberg et al., 1991; Standaert and Smith,
1989; Taylor, 1988). And our analysis does show that CRP’s impact on jobs
appeared to be strongest in counties that were likely serving as local agricul-
tural service centers where farm-related employment would have been rela-
tively important.
Unfortunately, data limitations hindered our ability to assess CRP’s
industry-specific impacts. Confidentiality concerns make it difficult to
access data on jobs by industry in small local economies.35 The Census of
Population has limited industry detail and is only available every 10 years,
making it unsuitable for our purposes. Data for wage and salary workers are
available annually from three sources: County Business Patterns (CBP), the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Covered Employment and Wages (CEW) data,
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Information
System (REIS). For all three, however, publicly released data are incomplete
due to data suppression.36
The only county-level information available on detailed industries was CBP
data on the number of establishments with at least one employee.37 Since
the number of establishments may decline due to industry consolidation as
well as unfavorable business conditions, these data need to be treated
cautiously. In particular, it is inappropriate to interpret a decline in establish-
ments as necessarily indicating that employment declined. As firms consoli-
date into fewer establishments industry employment may not be affected.
But at any point in time, the pattern of business closures among counties is
likely to reflect, albeit imperfectly, differences in the business climate from
one county to the next. To set the analysis of farm-related establishments in
context, information on total nonfarm establishments and employment has
been included here as well.
Farm-related enterprises were defined as agricultural services, farm
suppliers, and most food processors relating to crops (see table A.4 in
Appendix A). Since they would likely be less affected by CRP, establish-
ments devoted exclusively to livestock, such as meat processors and veteri-
nary services, were excluded from our count of farm-related establishments.
In 1975, the first year for which data were available, on average there were
12 farm-related establishments serving high-CRP counties compared with
about 15 in the other study counties. However, farm-related establishments
constituted a larger proportion of all nonfarm establishments in high-CRP
counties (10 percent) than in other study counties (5 percent) because high-
CRP counties have less nonfarm activity. 
35 To protect confidentiality, industry
data on employment and wages are not
released for counties where the num-
ber of establishments is small or where
there is one dominant employer.
36 ERS has arranged to obtain unsup-
pressed CEW and REIS data for coun-
ties in States that give the Bureau of
Labor Statistics permission to share
the data (all but about 5 States have
done so for 2000 data). However, ERS
is only now receiving these data and
was unable to use them for this report.
37 In 1998, this data series switched
from the Standard Industry
Classification System to the North
American Industry Classification
System, so time-series comparisons
can be made only up to 1997.
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since 1975 (table 3.4). The rate of loss was somewhat higher during 1985-
1992 than either before or after. This period included some very difficult
years for agriculture as well as a national economic recession. According to
these data, the rate of loss of farm-related businesses was at least as great in
low-CRP and other study counties as in the high-CRP counties during this
period. But given their greater share of economic activity in high-CRP
counties, the loss of farm-related businesses may have had a greater impact
on employment in high-CRP counties.
From 1992-1997, the rate of loss in farm-related establishments was greater in
high-CRP counties than elsewhere. This trend is masked somewhat in the
overall trends because the total number of nonfarm establishments and the total
number of nonfarm jobs both increased over this 5-year period. Thus, while the
local economies in high-CRP regions are not strong by any measure, they have
been able to replace the loss of farm-related establishments over time. The
adjustment process may not have been easy for those involved, but the trends
suggest that CRP’s net impact was small given the consolidation trends
buffeting farm-related industries over the past 25 years or more.
In addition to its impact on demand for farm inputs and services, CRP can
affect population and employment through its impact on farming opportunities. 
Beginning Farmers
Within the context of rural community development, the ability of young and
beginning farmers to successfully acquire control of the assets needed to create
viable businesses is important in farm-dependent areas. The continuing rise in
the average age of farm operators suggests that young families may be unable
or unwilling to stay in (or migrate to) communities that are heavily dependent
on agriculture for jobs. The average age of farm operators increased one full
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Table 3.4—Changes in nonfarm establishments and jobs, 1975-1997
Establishment All study
type and period High-CRP1 Low-CRP counties
Annualized growth rate (percent)
Farm-related establishments
1975-1985 -0.7 -0.2 -0.6
1985-1992 -1.1 -1.5 -1.3
1992-1997 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1
All nonfarm establishments
1975-1985 0.7 1.2 2.0
1985-1992 -0.5 0.0 0.5
1992-1997 1.0 1.3 1.8
All nonfarm jobs
1975-1985 0.7 1.2 1.9
1985-1992 0.4 1.3 1.6
1992-1997 2.2 2.4 2.8
1997-2001 0.6 1.0 1.1
1High-CRP counties have an average CRP rental-payment-to-income ratio for 1991-93 exceed-
ing 2.75 percent. Of the 1,481 study counties, 195 were high-CRP by this definition. Low-CRP
counties were selected from the study counties because of their similarity to high-CRP coun-
ties, but with relatively low payments-to-income ratios.
Source: Establishment data are from County Business Patterns and excludes public sector
establishments. Job counts are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis REIS data file.year between 1992 and 1997 to 54.3 years. The rise in the average age of
farmers reflects both the paucity of young operators entering farming and the
aging-in-place of established farmers (Gale, 1993). From 1982 to 1997, the
number of principal farm operators under 35 years of age fell 58 percent, while
the number at least 65 years of age rose by over 25 percent.
Of course, beginning farmers don’t have to be young. For purposes of quali-
fying for USDA targeted farm loan programs, the Agricultural Credit
Improvement Act of 1992 defines a beginning farmer as an individual or
entity who has owned or operated a farm or ranch for not more than 10
years.38 While age and years of experience are highly correlated, beginning
farmers come from all age cohorts. And whether young or not, beginning
farmers can bring much needed vitality to farming communities. With few
employment alternatives, if farming cannot support a stable population,
many farming communities fear that depopulation is inevitable. Between
1982 and 1987, the proportion of farmers who had operated their farm for
less than 10 years declined from 38 to 32 percent before stabilizing at 30
percent in the 1990s. The higher proportion of “short-tenure” farm operators
when compared with young farmers may reflect the movement of older farm
operators from one farm to another in response to urban sprawl, intergenera-
tional transfers, the purchase of farms for retirement or as a lifestyle, and a
host of other reasons. These farm location changes may involve inter-county
migration in some instances, but in others they may simply reflect a reshuf-
fling of available farmland.
Because the quantity of land is essentially fixed, one hypothesis is that land
enrolled in the CRP reduces the supply of land available for agricultural
production, putting upward pressure on farmland rental rates and purchase
prices. This places beginning farmers, who may have limited financial
resources, at a competitive disadvantage for control of available farm
assets.39 On the other hand, during much of the period we examine, CRP
was enrolling less productive soils which may not have provided sufficient
economic returns to support a viable farm operation.40 When coupled with
county enrollment limits, the decline and eventual elimination of commodity
program land diversion requirements, and the ability to bring previously
uncultivated land into production, it may be that CRP’s impact on the avail-
ability of productive soils was too small to have much of an impact on local
farmland markets.
The competitive position of beginning farmers is likely to be particularly
sensitive to how land is enrolled in the CRP. Partial-farm enrollments are
more likely composed of small plots of land that would not have been avail-
able for lease or purchase in the program’s absence. These enrollments may
have no direct effect on the availability of farmland for rent and could actu-
ally benefit beginning farmers who have such land enrolled in the program.
Whole-farm enrollments, on the other hand, are more likely to involve tracts
large enough to support viable operations. We therefore examine the impact
of whole- and partial-farm enrollment on beginning farmers as well as
examining CRP’s overall impact.
As discussed earlier, our general approach is to examine the relationship
between the ratio of CRP enrollment to total cropland and beginning farmer
trends for various groups of counties. We have identified 194 “high-CRP”
38 The Census of Agriculture has not
explicitly requested information on
beginning farmer status. However, it has
requested information on the age of the
senior operator and the length of time
he/she has operated any part of his/her
current farm. We use under 35 years of
age (i.e., young) and under 10 years on
the current farm (i.e., short-tenure) as
proxies for beginning farmers.
39 An analysis of Montana farm opera-
tor opinions about whether the CRP
should be expanded showed that
young operators were less likely to
support expansion than were older
farm operators, other things being
equal (Saltiel, 1993).
40 Highly erodible land is found across
the productivity spectrum (Heimlich,
1989). However, the compensation
system used until 1990 discouraged
owners of more productive land from
enrolling in the CRP. 
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Figure 3.4 details beginning farmer trends for high- and low-CRP counties
and for the United States as a whole.41
On average, high-CRP counties have fewer farms than low-CRP counties
(presumably because of the former’s concentration in the Plains), so it is not
surprising that they also have fewer young and short-tenure farmers. On
average, all counties experienced declines in the number of beginning
farmers from 1982 to 1997, with low- and high-CRP counties following
very similar trends to the United States as a whole. 
A series of econometric models was estimated to determine the relationship
between CRP enrollment and trends in the numbers of young and short-
tenure farm operators. In addition to the ratio of acres enrolled in the CRP
to acres of cropland (with CRP enrollment first estimated in the aggregate
and then split into its whole- and partial-farm components), these models
included other independent variables measuring the county’s farm sector,
economic, and demographic characteristics. The latter two categories of
variables are identical to those in the population and employment models;
the farm sector variables are discussed more fully at the end of Appendix A.
Trends were measured over the years 1982-1997, spanning the years before
the program began to the latest year for which Census of Agriculture data is
available, as well as changes between each Census, (1982-87, 1987-92, and
1992-97). The principal results from a series of “difference-in-differences”
equations based on 194 matched pairs of counties are reported in table 3.5.
Looking at trends from 1982 to 1997, it appears that there is no statistically
significant relationship between the ratio of aggregate CRP enrollment to
cropland and changes in the number of beginning farmers. However, when
41 The 1,481 study counties are actual-
ly split among 3 groups: high-CRP
counties (where CRP enrollment
makes up more than 20 percent of
cropland), low-CRP counties (where
the CRP/cropland ratio is below 12.5
percent), and a middle group. For
expositional ease, we ignore the mid-
dle group since it includes counties
that are considered high-CRP based on
other measures of the program’s local
importance, such as the ratio of CRP
payments to income.
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Figure 3.4
Beginning farmer trends, 1982-1997
Average number of young
farm operators1
Source:  Census of Agriculture and CRP Contracts file.  Low-CRP counties have less than 12.5 
percent of their cropland enrolled in the CRP.  High-CRP counties have more than 20 percent of
their cropland enrolled in the CRP.
Number of farms Number of farms
Average number of short-
tenure farm operators2



















All U.S. counties Low-CRP counties High-CRP counties
1 Young farm operators are principal farm operators under 35 years of age.
2 Short-tenure operators have operated their current farm for less then 10 years.CRP participation is divided into whole- and partial-farm enrollment, a
striking pattern emerges. Beginning farmer trends are negatively associated
with whole-farm enrollments and positively associated with partial-farm
enrollments. Furthermore, when 1982-97 is broken into 5-year increments,
statistically significant coefficients are always negative for whole-farm
enrollments and are always positive for partial-farm enrollments. The
partial-farm effect is strong enough to make the coefficient for total CRP
enrollment positive in three of the four instances when statistically signifi-
cant results were found. The only exception was 1982-1987, when sector-
wide financial problems led to deteriorating beginning farmer trends.
But what is the root cause of these patterns? Does whole-farm enrollment
reduce the availability of farmland to the detriment of beginning farmers or
does the absence of beginning farmers encourage landowners who no longer
wish to farm their land to enroll as much land as possible in the CRP?
While we don’t have a definitive answer, the farm financial crisis of the
1980s likely had a particularly large impact on young and beginning farmers
in areas of the country with less productive soils. Since rental rates were
low in these areas and returns to farming were not particularly promising,
enrollment in the CRP program may have been unusually high. If so, high
CRP enrollment, particularly in the form of whole farms, was the result of
unfavorable farming conditions which also discouraged new entrants.
During the period when CRP enrollments were highest, higher CRP enroll-
ment, particularly when accomplished though partial-farm enrollments,
appears to slow the local decline in the number of beginning farmers based
on our comparison of high- and low-CRP counties. This could be because
partial-farm enrollment provided all participants, including beginning
farmers, with some much-needed financial assistance. On the other hand, if
local economic conditions and agricultural opportunities were encouraging,
demand for farmland by both established and beginning farmers would be
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Table 3.5—CRP’s association with young and short-tenure farm operator trends1
Aggregate CRP model Disaggregated CRP model
CRP/cropland Whole-farm Partial-farm
Dependent variable Beta R2 (adj.) Beta Beta R2 (adj.)
Young farmers’ growth rate
1982-1997 0.105 0.28 -0.217a 0.274** 0.30
1982-1987 -0.097 0.37 -0.384** 0.149a 0.39
1987-1992 0.098 0.12 0.073 -0.030 0.11
1992-1997 0.266** 0.23 0.051 0.226* 0.23
Short-tenure farmers’ growth rate
1982-1997 0.029 0.28 -0.386** 0.295** 0.30
1982-1987 -0.248** 0.35 -0.141 -0.145 0.35
1987-1992 0.229** 0.16 0.104 0.134 0.16
1992-1997 0.216** 0.21 -0.259* 0.467** 0.28
1Young farm operators are principal farm operators under 35 years of age. Short-tenure operators have operated their current farm for less then
10 years.
Note: Analysis of difference in trends between 194 high-CRP counties and their matching low-CRP counties. Results are first reported for the
ratio of total CRP acreage to county cropland.The analysis is then redone with whole- and partial-farm payment ratios replacing the aggregate
measure. Beta represents the standardized regression coefficient with the intercept constrained to equal zero. ª, *, and ** indicate that the
regression coefficient is different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level of significance, respectively. Adjusted R2 indicates the portion of
variation explained by the regression.
Source: Calculated from the Census of Agriculture, the CRP Contracts file, and the 1980 Census of Population.high, increasing its rental value. Whole-farm enrollments would be less
appealing in such markets, but partial-farm enrollments of marginal land
would still be attractive since CRP enrollment reduces risk. Thus, CRP
enrollment could be determined by demand for farmland by young and
beginning farmers rather than affecting that demand.
When average CRP enrollment in 1991-93 is regressed against trends in the
number of farmers (or beginning farmers) along with the other explanatory
variables, statistically significant negative coefficients are consistently found
for 1982-87 farm trends. For subsequent periods (1987-92 and 1992-97), the
coefficients were positive. This is consistent with the view that the farm
financial crisis of the 1980s encouraged CRP enrollment when the program
became operational in 1986. Once established, heavy CRP enrollments then
helped stabilize farm sector trends from 1987 to 1997.




the direction of causality
goes from CRP participa-
tion to beginning farmer
trends, we use the esti-
mated regression coeffi-
cients to calculate what
would have happened to
the growth rate of young
and short-tenure farmers
in the average low-CRP
county had CRP enroll-
ments been higher.
Between 1991 and 1993,
low-CRP counties had an
average 4.8 percent of
their cropland enrolled in
the CRP: 1.6 percent as
whole-farm enrollments and 3.2 percent as partial-farm enrollments. How
might beginning farmer trends for these counties have differed if they had
CRP enrollments comparable to the high-CRP counties? Figure 3.5 provides
estimates of the growth rates for young and beginning farmers in the
average low-CRP county between 1982 and 1997 if CRP enrollment had
been at the high-CRP mean (26.8 percent of cropland: 11.1 percent in
whole-farm and 15.7 percent in partial-farm enrollments).42
Increasing the percentage of cropland enrolled as partial farms by 12.3
percentage points (to 15.7 percent) would have reduced the decline of young
farmers by 8.5 percent in the average low-CRP county between 1982 and
1997. The impact on short-tenure farmers would have been nearly as great,
resulting in a slower decline between 1982 and 1997. On the other hand,
increasing the percentage of cropland enrolled as whole farms by 9.5
percentage points (to 11.1 percent) would have had the opposite effect on
the rate of change of young and short-tenure farmers. While swings in CRP
42 The measure of cropland used in
this analysis is from the 1982 Census,
so ratios greater than 25 percent are
possible without requiring a waiver of
the county enrollment cap if previous-
ly uncultivated land was brought into
crop production after 1982.
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Figure 3.5
Estimated impacts of high levels 
of CRP enrollment
Note:  Estimates represent the expected change in the
growth rate of beginning farmers between 1982 and 1997
in the typical low-CRP county if the ratio of CRP enrollment
to cropland increased to levels typical of high-CRP counties
(i.e., increasing from 4.8 percent to 26.6 percent). Total CRP 
impacts are not significantly different from 0 at the .10 level.
Percent change
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.














impactusage of this magnitude are unusual, they may represent the experiences of
high-CRP counties.
This analysis suggests that total CRP enrollment is not a major factor
explaining declines in the number of beginning farmers in farm-dependent
communities. Negative consequences associated with whole-farm enroll-
ments are counteracted by the positive consequences associated with partial-
farm enrollments. Absentee ownership of CRP land did not appear to affect
beginning farmer trends.43 Furthermore, relative to the consequences of
technological advances, market trends, and other Federal policies, the
impact of CRP on beginning farmer trends appears to be minor.
Summary and Caveats
Previous attempts to estimate CRP’s socioeconomic impacts have relied on:
(1) deterministic models of the local economy, most often based on
input/output models; (2) surveys of program participants and local govern-
ment officials; and (3) econometric analyses of similar types of programs.
While each of these approaches is useful and can add valuable insight into
the adjustment processes rural counties go through as they accommodate
policy shocks, none can accurately evaluate what happened in response to
changes in CRP enrollment. Input/output models are useful for predicting
the local economic response to policy shocks ex ante, but they do not reflect
actual ex post adjustments. Surveys of knowledgeable observers can provide
a wealth of information about the local adjustment process, but respondents
are seldom in a position to evaluate the simultaneous impacts of all changes
affecting their communities. And econometric analyses of similar programs
can provide hints about what might happen as land is enrolled in the CRP,
but since program characteristics inevitably differ, the applicability of the
results is always open to question. To our knowledge, this is the first
systematic attempt to econometrically model the impact that CRP has had
on rural counties nationwide based on observed data.
By looking at actual changes in socioeconomic indicators within a broad
cross-section of rural counties, we have been able to identify the extent to
which variation in CRP enrollment appears to be associated with several
measures of community well-being. When statistical relationships were
found, they tended to be most significant in the short run, with impacts
dissipating over longer periods of time. Furthermore, our results suggest that
the relationship between CRP enrollment and community well-being varies
depending on community characteristics. For some types of rural counties,
CRP appears to be associated with growth (or slower decline), while CRP
seems to have the opposite effect in other areas.
This study has focused on areas of the country that are most likely to be
affected by shifts in agricultural land uses—rural counties with at least a
modest proportion of the workforce employed in agriculture. To isolate any
potential impacts the CRP has, we further narrowed our attention to counties
in which CRP enrollments or CRP payments were unusually large relative
to the local cropland base or economy. Relying on fairly simple single-equa-
tion models to explain variations in growth trends and the difference in
growth trends between high-CRP counties and matched “control” counties,
43 When regressions were estimated to
determine if the prevalence of absentee
CRP landowners affects beginning
farmer trends, no statistically signifi-
cant relationships were found for
young farmer trends, and only weak,
inconsistent relationships were found
for short-tenure farmer trends over
1982-87.
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there is no convincing evidence that a high ratio of CRP payments to
income has a negative effect, but it may have a weak positive impact in
sparsely populated areas of the country over the long run. A high ratio of
cropland enrolled in the CRP appeared to dampen job growth in counties
likely to have small agricultural centers (isolated rural counties with
moderate population density). But these negative effects were largely
confined to the short run. No statistically significant evidence was found
suggesting that whole-farm enrollments had a differential impact on popula-
tion and employment trends.
It seems clear that participation in the CRP is itself a function of community
well-being in addition to any impact program participation may have on
nearby communities, so causality is difficult to infer. While the logic backing
up the presumption that CRP enrollment had an effect on employment
(whether or not employment prospects had any effect on CRP participation)
is generally accepted in the economic literature, no such consensus exists for
the relationship between CRP enrollment and beginning farmer trends.
We found that whole-farm enrollments are associated with more rapid
decline in the number of beginning farmers while partial-farm enrollments
are associated with slower declines relative to what would have occurred in
CRP’s absence. But since whole- and partial-farm participation are likely to
be strongly related to trends and characteristics of the local farm and
nonfarm economies, the underlying cause of the CRP-beginning farmer rela-
tionship is far from clear. In fact, the causality could easily be that the
number of new and young farmers affects the amount of whole- and partial-
farm enrollment, rather than the reverse. In areas where agricultural and off-
farm work opportunities are good, demand for farmland by young and
beginning farmers could encourage more partial-farm enrollments. In areas
where agricultural prospects are not good, the dearth of beginning farmers
could encourage whole-farm enrollments. To the extent that this is the case,
CRP participation is not the driving force behind beginning farmer trends,
but is merely an outgrowth of those trends. But whether a driving force or
not, our analysis suggests that the net result is that aggregate CRP enroll-
ment is not a major factor explaining declines in the number of beginning
farmers between 1982 and 1997.
Thus, based on our analysis of socioeconomic trends in rural counties before
and after CRP was implemented, it does not appear that high levels of enroll-
ment had a permanent affect on county growth prospects. This does not mean
that no business or community was hurt by the CRP. Indeed, our results
suggest that businesses in small agricultural service centers may have experi-
enced sharp reductions in demand as farmland was retired. As a result, high-
CRP regions of the country may have experienced a disproportionate loss of
local businesses and employment in farm-related industries. And, individual
cities and towns may have faced difficult adjustments as CRP enrollment in
their areas removed large amounts of cropland from production. But rural
economies, even those in undiversified farm-dependent areas, appear to have
been resilient enough to adapt to shifting demands and opportunities. CRP
had few systematic overall effects discernible at the county level, and those
that we found were small, on average, and short lived.
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Implications of Expiring CRP
Contracts
There are a number of ways of estimating the economic impacts of an
ongoing land retirement program, such as the CRP, with secondary data.
One is to examine local economic changes that accompany enrollment of
cropland in CRP. That was the approach taken in the previous section,
where we examined socioeconomic trends in farming communities before
and after the CRP program was put in place. That approach has the benefit
of hindsight but has the disadvantage of focusing on the past when policy
decisions often require an assessment of what is happening now and what is
likely to happen in the future.
A second approach to measuring CRP’s economic impacts is to estimate what
might happen if farmers were hypothetically released from their CRP
contracts. That is, given the current distribution of CRP enrollment, rental
payments, and ground cover, as well as prevailing commodity market condi-
tions, public policies, and government regulations, what might happen if CRP
contracts were suddenly all to expire without any additional enrollments? In
doing so, we are not suggesting that cancellation of CRP contracts is a policy
option to be explored. Nor do we attempt to model what will happen under
the current timetable for the expiration of existing CRP contracts. Rather, our
analysis of a hypothetical immediate expiration of contracts is merely a
convenient way of measuring the economic impact of the program’s continua-
tion, given current conditions.44 In this section, we use social accounting
matrix (SAM) multiplier models to estimate what might happen to several
regional economies with particularly high CRP enrollments should the
program expire. The first question that comes to mind is whether an expira-
tion of the program today would simply cancel the effects of its creation in
1985. If so, then a simulation model is redundant. But, since the CRP has
changed over the years, as have many of the factors that influence land-use
decisions, the short answer is no—the community effects of a hypothetical
expiration of the CRP are not necessarily a mirror image of those associated
with its creation. Then too, rural counties are different than they were 15 years
ago—perhaps in ways that are not easily reversed.
The expiration of CRP could affect rural economies in several distinct ways.
First, land currently enrolled in the CRP could switch out of conservation
uses. Some of this land would be used to produce crops, livestock, and other
agricultural goods. Some of the land leaving the CRP would be developed
for nonagricultural uses, such as housing tracts, shopping malls, or indus-
trial sites, and some would remain in conservation uses. Decisions about
what to do with the land would affect not only demand for local farm inputs
and services, but to the extent that they influence market prices for farm
commodities, they could affect all market participants. Second, the environ-
mental benefits generated by the CRP have been credited with increased
public participation in outdoor activities such as hunting, freshwater fishing,
wildlife viewing, and other forms of outdoor recreation. To the extent that
decisions about the fate of land released from the CRP affect the quality of
44 Our analysis compares an immedi-
ate release of all CRP contracts to a
situation where the program continues
indefinitely at its current level of
enrolled acreage (i.e., the government
will continue enrolling acres by exact-
ly the amount of expiring contracts).
In reality, existing contracts will expire
over time and Congress will decide
whether and at what level to enroll
new acres. Comparing different sce-
narios of CRP continuation is beyond
the scope of this study.
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geographic distribution could change as well. Third, households that
currently receive CRP payments would likely change their consumption
expenditures as these payments cease, particularly if net income generated
by land released from the CRP falls short of CRP rental payments.
To model the economic impact of CRP expiration, it is first necessary to
model the disposition of lands currently enrolled in the CRP. With this
information, changes in agricultural production can be estimated. Further-
more, expected changes in land use can be combined with information on
rural outdoor recreation to estimate potential changes in recreational expen-
ditures. This information can then be used to estimate the economywide
impacts of CRP’s expiration and, by implication, its continuation.
Land-Use Decisions
Normally, when a CRP contract expires, the enrollee can offer to re-enroll if
that is an option, or CRP participation can end. Those whose land is not re-
enrolled may choose to return land to crop production or grazing (either
directly or by renting or selling their land to other farm operators), develop the
land for nonfarm use, or keep their options open by leaving the land unused,
presumably in either managed or unmanaged conservation cover.45 The
factors that will help determine which choice, or set of choices, an individual
enrollee makes include expected returns from farming (or cash renting) the
released land, the cost of converting conservation cover to other uses, demand
for land for nonfarm purposes, and the goals and portfolio needs of the deci-
sionmaker. It is not a foregone conclusion that all the land enrolled in the CRP
will revert to its previous use when it drops out of the program.
To estimate land-use changes that would likely accompany a sudden expira-
tion of CRP contracts, we use an econometric model based on data drawn
from the 1992 and 1997 Natural Resources Inventory (NRI).46 The model
starts with approximately 21,000 NRI observations that were in the CRP in
1992. Between 1992 and 1997, about 2,800 of these observations dropped
out of the CRP as a result of the enrollee’s decision to either terminate a
CRP contract early or to forego the option of extending an expiring contract.
(Since all CRP enrollees had the option of extending expiring contracts for
1 year beyond the original termination date in 1996 and 1997, none of these
parcels was forced out of the program because their 10-year CRP contract
ended.)  Of all land not currently enrolled in the CRP, these formerly
enrolled parcels are expected to most closely resemble land currently
enrolled in the CRP. By observing the uses these former CRP lands were
put to, and modeling the decision process to determine why land was put to
its new use, we can estimate what land uses would be adopted by the
remaining CRP participants should they be dropped from the program.47
Table 4.1 provides information on the use of land in 1997 that had dropped
out of the CRP after 1992. Roughly 63 percent of the 3.6 million acres that
dropped out of the program was subsequently used to grow crops. Another
31 percent was used for pasture or rangeland, and the remaining 6 percent 
45 Even if an enrollee chooses the lat-
ter, he may be able to earn a return
from hunting, fishing, or other recre-
ational activities. As a result, leaving
land idle need not be a complete drain
on the enrollee’s resources.
46 NRI data is collected by USDA’s
Natural Resources Conservation
Service. NRI data collects information
from approximately 800,000 sample
points scattered randomly across the
private lands of the United States.
Each point contains data on land use,
soil type, and other biophysical vari-
ables. Our econometric model depends
on CRP data from the NRI. In describ-
ing the NRI, Fuller (1999) writes
“...administrative data on acres in the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
for the years 1992 and 1997 are used
as controls in the estimation process.”
He also notes that “...a procedure is
used that makes the CRP acres close
for each county, but the total control is
imposed only at the state level.” It is
not clear how these adjustments influ-
ence the sample properties of the NRI
and, by extension, our econometric
estimates.
47 The econometric model predicts
whether a parcel of land in CRP will
switch to either crop production or to a
noncrop land use, after accounting for
the decision to opt out of CRP in the
first place. Lands predicted to switch
to a noncrop land use are allocated to
specific noncrop activities (i.e., pas-
ture, range, forest, and urban uses)
based on actual land-use patterns of
parcels dropping out of the CRP
between 1992 and 1997. For a more
detailed description of the model and
its development, see Lubowski and
Roberts (2003).
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influences the choice of post-CRP land use is the type of cover used when
the land was in the program. CRP land planted to trees is far less likely to
be converted to crop production upon the contract’s expiration than is CRP
land planted in grasses and legumes. But, as was mentioned previously,
other factors likely to influence land-use decisions include the profitability
of available land-use activities, which vary geographically and with market
conditions, and the aspirations of the whomever controls the land, which
vary by individual attributes, such as age, wealth, and tenure. While we do
not have information on the ownership of specific CRP parcels or their prof-
itability, we do have information on each parcel’s erodibility, conservation
cover, and location which can be used to estimate the profitability of alter-
native uses. As described in Appendix B, we use observation-specific data
from the NRI and county data on the profitability of alternative land uses, to
develop a model that estimates the probability that an NRI observation will
switch from CRP to crop production or one of the other major land-use
categories listed in table 4.1.
Previous studies suggest that characteristics of the participant (e.g. retire-
ment status) and of the operation (e.g. size) also influence post-CRP land
use (Skaggs et al., 1994; Johnson et al., 1997; Cooper and Osborn, 1998).
We do not include such data in the model since they are ultimately based on
decisions of the owner or operator. Over time, people and firms will
presumably locate in particular areas based upon profit maximization. Given
our focus on the longer term consequences of CRP expiration, we include
only profit measures and fixed physical characteristics that determine the net
returns to converting that land to alternative uses.
Since those who dropped out of the CRP between 1992 and 1997 did so
voluntarily, we cannot assume their land-use decisions represent the deci-
sions of those who remained in the CRP. The model described in Appendix
B uses statistical techniques to correct biases that could arise due the
nonrepresentativeness of the sample. Nonrepresentativeness arises partly
from changes in enrollment criteria following early CRP signups and partly
from factors particular to enrollees who chose not to remain in CRP. The
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Table 4.1—1997 use of lands that dropped out of the CRP after 1992
CRP contracted Land use in 1997
cover practice1 Units Crops Pasture Range Forest Urban Other2 Total
Grasses & 1,000 acres 2,161.8 771.7 288.4 22.7 5.0 37.4 3,287.0
legumes Percent of all acres 65.8 23.5 8.8 0.7 0.1 1.1 100.0
Percent standard error 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
Trees & 1,000 acres 76.1 37.8 8.8 161.7 2.3 3.5 290.2
wildlife habitat Percent of all acres 26.2 13.0 3.0 55.7 0.8 1.2 100.0
Percent standard error 2.5 1.7 0.8 2.2 0.5 0.4
All cover 1,000 acres 2,237.9 809.5 297.2 184.4 7.3 40.9 3,577.2
Percent of all acres 62.6 22.6 8.3 5.2 0.5 1.1 100.0
Percent standard error 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
1These are general categories reported by the NRI that include the more specific practices contracted for under the CRP.
2Includes rural roads, water bodies, barren lands, and “other” farm and nonfarm lands, as designated by the NRI.
Source: Estimates are from the National Resources Inventory (NRI) based on 2,756 observations that dropped out of the CRP between 1992
and 1997. Percentages in each cell are of total acres dropping out from the specified contracted cover practice. Standard errors are based on
the NRI’s stratified cluster sampling design.
48 Appendix B provides further detail
on the land-use definitions from the
NRI. “Pasture” is land managed for
introduced forage for livestock graz-
ing. “Range” is land under native or
introduced forage suitable for grazing
which, unlike pasture, receives only
limited management.model also uses mechanisms to allow for interactions between explanatory
variables and to account for possible nonlinear relationships in their effects
on land-use decisions. The coefficients generated by this econometric model
are then used to predict what would happen to all land enrolled in the CRP
if the program expired. These predictions are based on CRP contracts as of
November 2002, as well as profitability data computed using 2001 prices
and costs and 5-year lags of yields (as described in Appendix B). The net
result is to assign all current CRP acreage to one of several alternative land
uses: cultivated and uncultivated cropland, pasture, forest, range, and urban
development.
Overall, the model predicts that 51 percent of land enrolled in the CRP
would have returned to crop production within about a year if the entire
program had expired at the end of 2002, but this percentage varies from one
region to the next. Table 4.2 presents our model’s predictions for the United
States and three multicounty regions where CRP enrollment is high (fig.
4.2). Figure 4.1 presents information on the geographic distribution of CRP
land converted to all of the major land uses considered. Land remaining in
forest is concentrated in the Southeast while land converted to urban uses is
concentrated around a few urban centers. The other uses of land are more
geographically dispersed.
Predictions for multicounty regions or smaller units of geography are
subject to a greater degree of uncertainty than are national predictions since
the estimates from the land-use model reflect average patterns of behavior
across the entire country. Because we only have data for land-use choices
between 1992 and 1997, we cannot estimate separate regional models based
on variation in explanatory factors over time. Instead, our estimates must
rely on variation across space over a large geographic area. As a result, if
cropland decisions in some relatively small regions are more or less sensi-
tive than average to changing economic conditions (perhaps due to differ-
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Table 4.2—Predicted share of CRP acres returning to crops, 2002
Region1 Land in CRP Land returning to crops if CRP expires
1,000 acres 1,000 acres Percent
48-State total 33,892 17,346 51
(95-percent confidence (13,670 - 21,425) (40 - 63)
interval)
Northern Plains Crescent 8,327 5,732 69
(95-precent confidence (5,103 - 6,302) (61 - 76)
interval)
Southern Plains Ellipse 8,543 3,816 45
95-percent confidence (2,715 - 4,616) (32 - 54)
interval)
Southwestern Corn Belt2 1,859 1,533 82
(95-percent confidence (695 - 1,770) (37 - 95)
interval)
1Regions are delineated in figure 4.2.
2The confidence interval for the Southwestern Corn Belt is skewed because the underlying dis-
tribution is skewed (binomial with a mean of 82 percent) and the sample size is small (much
smaller than in the other regions), which makes the confidence interval less symmetric.
Source: FSA’s CRP Contracts file as of November, 2002 with predictions of land returning to
crops based on Lubowski and Roberts (2003).49
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Figure 4.1
Disposition of enrolled acreage under hypothetical CRP expiration







CRP enrollments, November 2002
1 dot = 5,000 acresences in the proportion of marginally productive soils), reversion to crop
production could be overestimated or underestimated in these small areas.49
In addition, predictions are based on prices in 2001 and prevailing govern-
ment programs before 2002. Aside from relatively high loan rates for certain
commodities such as soybeans, the production incentives present in 2002
are similar in nature to those present in 1996. Nonetheless, as market prices
change, the amount of CRP land that would return to crops and other agri-
cultural uses will vary.
Previous studies of post-CRP land-use choices—completed before land
began dropping out of the program—generally predict higher percentages of
land released from the CRP going into crop production. Using a linear
programming model, De La Torre Ugarte et al. (1995) estimate that roughly
57 percent of CRP land would return to the production of major commodi-
ties if the program was not extended in 1996. The Soil and Water Conserva-
tion Society conducted national surveys of CRP participants in 1990 and
1993 to determine landowners’ post-CRP land-use intentions (Nowak et al.,
1990; Osborn et al., 1994). The 1990 survey indicated that 53 percent of
acres would return to crop production after their contracts expired if CRP
renewal was not an option. The 1993 survey, based on a larger sample, indi-
cated that 63 percent of CRP acres would return to cropping upon contract
expiration if re-enrollment was not an option, with wide variation depending
on region, expected commodity prices, and CRP cover.50 The estimates
ranged from 58 to 78 percent, respectively, if future commodity prices were
assumed to be 20 percent lower or higher than in 1993.
Our estimate that 51 percent of CRP land would return to crop production
reflects, in part, differences in the assumed level of crop prices. Our econo-
metric estimates may also reflect greater rigidities in land use than were
apparent before CRP contracts started expiring and researchers could
examine actual land-use decisions. Possible explanations for the persistence
of CRP land retirements, at least in the short run, include rigidities in land-
use change due to fixed costs of land-use conversion, which provide incen-
tives to delay land-use decisions until more can be learned about the
profitability of alternative uses.51 In addition, the portfolio needs of CRP
contract holders may obviate the active farming of their CRP land. Over
one-third of CRP enrollees are residential farm operators who allocate most
of their work time to off-farm pursuits. At least some of these participants
may decide to leave their CRP land permanently idle in support of their
chosen lifestyle. Whatever the explanation, these results suggest that there
may be longer term environmental benefits associated with the CRP that
could outlive the program itself.
Land-use decisions are important to rural economies because they have a
direct bearing on farm production levels and prices, purchases of farm-
related goods and services, and recreational spending. 
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49 In particular, one reviewer expressed
concern that our predictions for the
Northern Great Plains overestimated
the reversion to crop production.
50 A series of additional surveys in
States with CRP acres, conducted in
1993, generally found that about 60
percent of CRP acres would return to
crop production if the CRP ended (see
Diebel et al., 1998 for a review).
51 Predictions of post-CRP land use
are calibrated using parcels that opted
out of CRP approximately 1 year prior
to observing their subsequent use. It is
possible some farmers intended to
convert their land back to crops but
had not yet done so. In certain areas,
however, a large proportion of former
CRP land did return to crops in this
timeframe. This suggests enough time
had elapsed for farmers to transition to
their intended land use. 53 This multiplier is derived on a
regional basis, using expenditure data
from the FHWAR.
Recreational Spending
In addition to agricultural production, the distribution of land uses affects
the natural environment. Removing land from the CRP, thereby increasing
crop production, grazing, or putting the land to other uses, is likely to affect
air and water quality, wildlife populations, and the aesthetic qualities of the
rural landscape. These impacts may result in changes in outdoor recreational
trips taken by the public (Feather et al., 1999). Changes in recreational
spending can, in turn, affect rural economies (Beck et al., 1999; Siegel and
Johnson, 1991). To investigate this issue, we consider freshwater- and
wildlife-based recreation. Freshwater-based recreation includes fishing,
swimming, boating, and shore-side activities. Wildlife-based recreation
includes hunting and wildlife viewing.
Given the lack of data directly linking CRP to recreational expenditures, we
generated estimates using two different methods. The first method combines
survey data on recreational trip taking behavior with information on land
uses; in particular, with information on the amount and distribution of CRP
land. The second method combines information on expenditures by hunters
with information on fee income received by farmers for recreational uses of
their land. We use these two methods to estimate low- and high-end impacts
that CRP’s land-use requirements have on recreational expenditures.
As described in Appendix C, the first method (referred to as the “trips-
based” method) uses data from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s 1996
National Survey of Fishing, Hunting and Wildlife-Associated Recreation
(FHWAR) and the U.S. Forest Service’s 2000 National Survey of Recreation
and the Environment (NSRE). A travel cost model is developed that predicts
where people visit, given the characteristics of the set of places they can
visit. One of these characteristics is the geographic distribution of CRP land.
Thus, as this distribution changes under alternative scenarios, including a
“no CRP” scenario, we are able to predict changes in trip-taking behavior. 
The second method (referred to as the “receipts-based” method) looks just
at CRP’s impact on hunting and wildlife viewing. The 2001 Agricultural
Resource Management Survey includes data on the recreational receipts of
about 800 farms with CRP acreage.52 These data were used to estimate per-
CRP-acre recreational receipts for each of the ERS Farm Resource Regions
(see Appendix C).
Both methods require data on recreational expenditures. The trips-based
method uses average per-trip expenditures obtained from the FHWAR and
NSRE surveys. To derive measures of impact, these per-trip expenditures
are multiplied by predicted changes in the number and location of trips due
to changes in CRP. The receipts-based method uses regional estimates of
expenditures derived from the FHWAR survey. Given that the overall
average of recreational expenditures is proportional to recreational receipts
received by farms with CRP land, measures of CRP’s impact are derived by
multiplying CRP acres by per-acre recreational receipts and an access-fee-
to-overall-expenditures multiplier.53
Both methods group expenditures into the following categories: transporta-
tion and wholesale trade, eating and lodging, retail trade, and services.
52 Farmers reported receipts for recre-
ational uses of their land, including
hunting, fishing, horseback riding, and
other activities (Banker et al., 2001).
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Retail trade expenditures include equipment, supplies, and trip sundries,
while service-sector expenditures cover government licenses and permits,
site access fees, and guide services.
With the trips-based method, we find that the extent of CRP enrollment in a
county and the overall erosion rate, which is strongly influenced by CRP,
have statistically significant effects on participation in outdoor recreation.
But the impacts are small, totaling about $7 million nationwide. With the
receipts-based method, we estimate higher impacts, totaling about $290
million nationwide.
Given the estimated impacts of CRP on wildlife viewing and hunting
reported by previous studies and reviewed earlier, the small impacts esti-
mated by the trips-based method are surprising. One possible explanation
for the discrepancy between our earlier estimates of the consumer surplus
associated with wildlife viewing and the recreational travel expenditure
predictions derived by the trips-based method is that expiration of the CRP
would not reduce the total number of trips taken for recreational activities,
but would instead influence where they are taken among the alternative sites
available. This redistribution may affect the typical individual’s enjoyment
of recreational travel, thereby reducing consumer surplus, without affecting
how much is spent on recreational travel. 
The impacts estimated with the receipts-based method more closely agree
with prior research (Bangsund et al., 2002). However the highly aggregated
expenditure data used with this method require use of several simplifying
assumptions, such as assuming a State-specific relationship between recre-
ational receipts and overall recreational expenditures (Thigpen et al.). These
assumptions, while reasonable, could not be tested. Therefore, we use both
methods to provide a range of possible recreational travel expenditure
impacts associated with the CRP. A more accurate measurement of how
CRP affects recreational expenditures may require new sources of data
along with more sophisticated statistical models.
Revenue Impacts Associated With 
Land-Use Changes
The analysis simulating what would happen if all CRP contracts expired in
2002 estimates the probability that each CRP contract would return to crop
production if the program were no longer available. Multiplying these esti-
mates by the acres in each contract and aggregating to the county level
yields predictions for the amount of CRP land in each county that would
return to production. For the purposes of estimating the economic impact of
these changes, we first estimate associated revenue changes for the
following land-use activities: grains, oilseeds, cotton, hay and pasture, and
other crops. To do so, we allocate CRP lands predicted to return to crop
production to specific crops based on the current use of cropland within
each county.54 We allocate other CRP lands to pasture based on actual land-
use patterns of parcels dropping out of the CRP between 1992 and 1997. We
then estimate changes in annual revenues by multiplying our predicted
acreage changes by county-level estimates of expected 2002 revenues per
54 The current crop mix in a county
presumably reflects the current prof-
itability of those crops. NRI parcels
that returned to crop production in
1997 after dropping out of the CRP
typically did not return to the same
crop that was planted before the parcel
was enrolled in the CRP. While the
most profitable crop for each acre of
CRP land exiting the program might
differ from the county average due to
unique land characteristics, the current
crop mix in the county should be a
reasonable proxy for crop allocation
on acres exiting the CRP. 
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average yields for each county, adjusted for the productivity of CRP
acreage, and 2001 commodity prices. County-level revenue estimates for
pasture and hay employed a similar approach (for details, see Lubowski and
Roberts, 2003).
One potential shortcoming of this approach is that it does not allow the
price effects of increased production to feed back into land-use decisions.
That is, since land released from the CRP will increase production, we
would expect commodity prices to drop, lowering expected revenue for all
affected crop farmers and discouraging some farmers from planting a crop.
If this happens, our national estimates of the production and revenue
impacts of CRP expiration will be overstated and our regional estimated
impacts may be over- or understated, depending on interregional shifts in
cultivation. This is slippage in reverse. Over the years, researchers have
argued that the production-control impacts of land retirement and diversion
programs are reduced as rising commodity prices encourage uncultivated
land into production. Slippage rates of 20 to over 50 percent have been
reported, varying greatly by crop, land quality, and geography (see Leathers
and Harrington, 2000; Love and Foster, 1990; and Wu, 2000). Others have
found evidence suggesting that local slippage rates are much lower (Hoag et
al., 1993; Roberts and Bucholtz, 2002). If reverse slippage follows a similar
pattern, CRP land coming into production in one area may cause non-CRP
land to drop out of production in other areas.
To check on the likely size of price effects as CRP land returns to produc-
tion, the analysis was supplemented with an assessment of how the overall
agricultural economy might change if CRP expired, based on the U.S.
Regional Agricultural Sector Model (USMP; see House et al., 1999). As
described in Appendix D, the USMP is a comparative-static market equilib-
rium model. While much more aggregated than the land-use model we esti-
mated econometrically, as an equilibrium model it is able to capture the
dynamic response of the agricultural economy as policies and programs
change. For this analysis, the USMP model was constrained to force CRP
land to return to production to determine the likely price and revenue
impacts if CRP contracts expired.55 The results suggest that as CRP acreage
is released from conservation uses, crop production will increase and crop
prices will fall. There is considerable variation among crops, with corn
showing the greatest response with production increasing by 4 percent and
market prices falling by about 6 percent.56 As producers make further
adjustments in response to these market conditions, one would expect fewer
total acres to be planted, with prices moderating. But our concern is with the
initial shock of eliminating CRP contracts, so we make no attempt to predict
a new longrun equilibrium for farm commodity markets or the broader
economy.
We estimated crop revenue impacts using two alternative scenarios: (1) no
commodity price effects, which is consistent with early input-output
modeling efforts; and (2) allowing prices to decline as predicted by USMP,
but not allowing further slippage in planting intentions. The first case over-
estimates the revenue impact because it does not account for a reduction in
revenue occurring on all cropland stemming from a fall in commodity
55 The USMP model and the econo-
metric model discussed previously are
not strictly comparable and were not
designed to work with each other.
Furthermore, the USMP model only
accounts for about two-thirds of the
land in the CRP, so this simulation
provides only rough estimates of what
would happen if only 51 percent of
CRP land returned to production.
56 The price response for other crops
ranges from close to 0 to about 4 per-
cent. These production and price
responses are similar in magnitude, but
in the opposite direction of, those esti-
mated when the CRP program was just
53
The Conservation Reserve Program: Economic Implications for Rural America / AER-834
Economic Research Service/USDAprices. The second case exaggerates the price response, and therefore under-
estimates the revenue impact, because total acres planted to crops will not
increase one-for-one as CRP acres are returned to production. Together
these two approaches should provide a reasonable range of revenue shocks
associated with the expiration of all CRP contracts. We used the econo-
metric model to estimate the changes in agricultural output and the social
accounting matrix (SAM) model to analyze the effects of these changes on
the linked sectors.
If CRP rental payments end, household expenditures would also be affected.
Data from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey are used to appor-
tion CRP rental payments going to low-, middle-, and high-income house-
holds, using farm operator wealth to measure permanent income.57 The size
of each of these economic shocks is estimated for the United States and for
three multicounty regions likely to be most affected by expiration of the
CRP. For the regional models, we assume that all transfer income is spent
within the region. (CRP rental payments accruing to nonoperator landlords
living outside the region represent expenditure leakages that diminish the
regional impact of the CRP.)
Table 4.3 presents the changes in final demand affecting producers, house-
holds, and factor income flows for the Nation and the three regional
economies used to define our two scenarios. Scenario 1 is called the “tradi-
tional scenario” because it assumes that agricultural price changes do not
affect farm incomes—the traditional approach adopted by previous analyses.
With no agricultural price effects accounted for, post-CRP shifts in land use
generate $3 billion in increased agricultural production nationally. Partially
offsetting this is a net reduction in outdoor recreational expenditures of $7
million (using a trips-based model) and the loss of $1.6 billion in CRP
rental payments. Scenario 2 is called the “augmented scenario” because it
allows for agricultural price changes to also affect farm enterprise incomes.
In this scenario, post-CRP shifts in land use lead to a $7.46-billion reduction
in the value of current agricultural production at the national level in addi-
tion to increasing agricultural production by $3 billion.58 However, we
assume that this reduction in farm enterprise income merely represents a
transfer from the farm sector to the rest of the economy.59 Hence, from a
national perspective, the two effects offset each other.
Nevertheless, since the regional economies we will be examining later in the
section are not closed economies, farm enterprise income losses are not
likely to be offset by other consumer expenditures within the region. We
therefore include the loss of farm revenue stemming from lower prices as
part of the agricultural shock to these regions. We also include in the
augmented scenario estimates a loss of $293 million in rural recreation
expenditures (using the receipts-based model) and a loss of $1.6 billion in
CRP payments to U.S. households.60
57 Changes in household consumption
patterns derive from changes in the per-
ceived level of permanent income
rather than transitory income which,
particularly for farm households, can
fluctuate widely from year to year.
Low-income households with little net
worth did not receive any CRP pay-
ments. This is consistent with informa-
tion on the source of income among
farm households categorized by the
ERS farm household typology (fig.
2.5). Seventy-two percent of CRP funds
accrue to farm households with moder-
ate average incomes: retirement, resi-
dential lifestyle, and low-sales farming
occupation farms. In contrast, 71 per-
cent of total farm program payments
accrue to farm households with high
average incomes: high-sales farming
occupation, large, and very large farms.
58 The $7.46-billion decrease occurs
on land that was in production while
the CRP was in place. Inelastic
demand for food (and our assumption
that all cropland in production stays in
production) means a small change in
price leads to a substantial drop in rev-
enue. The $3-billion dollar increase
comes from land that was in the CRP
but shifts to crop production. There-
fore, farm income for the entire agri-
cultural sector is down approximately
$4 billion. 
59 We are assuming this income trans-
fer stays within the United States. To
be able to quantify the extent to which
a portion of this $7.46 billion in con-
sumer surplus accrues to foreign pur-
chasers of U.S. agricultural products
requires further study.
60 In both scenarios, loss of CRP
rental payments are treated as house-
hold income transfer losses. To treat
them as value-added losses would be
equivalent to assuming that they are
linked to producer decisions at the
margin. In fact the CRP program pay-
ments are decoupled from producer
decisions at the margin.
54
The Conservation Reserve Program: Economic Implications for Rural America / AER-834
Economic Research Service/USDAModeling Economywide Impacts
To estimate CRP’s effects on sector output, value added, household income,
and employment, we use the 1996 Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN)
database61 to develop a set of social accounting matrix (SAM) multiplier
models for the Nation and three multicounty regions that cut across State
boundaries. Unlike input-output models, the SAM framework allows us to
capture precisely all of the endogenous linkages between production, labor
and capital income, and household expenditures. The SAM presents a snap-
shot of the economy at a particular time. The strength of the SAM is its
integration of industrial input-output flows with a set of household, govern-
ment, capital, interregional, and international accounts in order to represent
the complete set of revenue and income flows between production, income,
61 The USDA Forest Service in the
mid-1970s developed IMPLAN for
community impact analysis. The cur-
rent IMPLAN input-output database
and model is maintained and sold by
MIG, Inc. (Minnesota IMPLAN
Group), http://www.IMPLAN.com.
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Table 4.3—Initial shock: estimated revenue impacts of CRP’s hypothetical expiration
Region1
U.S. Northern Southern Southwestern 3-Region
Sector: total Plains Crescent Plains Ellipse Corn Belt total
Millions of 2001 dollars
Agriculture with constant (2001) commodity prices:
Total 3,019.9 748.5 466.0 159.7 1,374.2
Livestock2 72.8 5.1 22.1 5.2 32.4
Cotton 259.9 0 133.5 0 133.5
Grains 864.9 117.0 208.5 39.4 364.9
Hay & pasture 889.0 198.5 60.5 71.6 330.5
Other crops 162.6 10.8 41.5 0 52.3
Oilseeds 770.8 417.1 0 43.4 460.6
Loss of farm enterprise income from falling prices:3
Total income — -169.2 -221.4 -55.2 -445.8
Labor income — -76.6 -90.6 -28.5 -195.7
Capital income — -92.6 -130.8 -26.7 -250.1
Rural recreation—trips-based model:
Total -7.3 5.9 -4.4 -3.9 -2.5
Wholesale trade &
transportation -1.5 0.8 -0.7 -1.2 -1.1
Retail trade -0.9 3.7 -2.3 -1.0 0.3
Eating & lodging -4.6 1.0 -1.1 -1.4 -1.5
Services -0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1
Rural recreation—receipts-based model:
Total -293.2 -104.2 -29.4 -33.8 -167.4
Wholesale trade &
transportation -87.6 -40.5 -10.5 -11.9 -62.8
Retail trade -16.9 -6.7 -1.7 -2.4 -10.8
Eating & lodging -101.1 -42.1 -11.4 -13.5 -66.9
Services -87.6 -14.9 -5.9 -6.0 -26.9
Household CRP funds:4 -1,616.9 -287.8 -287.8 -137.1 -712.8
Middle-income -1,439.0 -256.2 -256.2 -122.0 -634.4
High-income -177.9 -31.7 -31.7 -15.1 -78.4
1The three regions refer to multicounty areas of the country with high levels of CRP enrollment and are delineated in figure 4.2.
2 Livestock estimates are produced by the USMP model.The remaining agricultural revenue shocks were imputed based on the land-use pro-
jections from our econometric model.
3 The national farm revenue loss of $7.46 billion is considered a transfer rather than a shock.
4 Represents the loss of CRP payments with expiration of the program. Middle-income households have annual incomes of $20,000 to $77,000.
High-income households are those with annual incomes over $77,000.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.62 We do not incorporate feedbacks on
land use and output resulting from
changes in prices induced by CRP land
returning to crop production. As a
result of falling prices, some CRP
acres might not enter crop production
and some cropland elsewhere might
exit production. This implies that we
slightly overestimate total crop acreage
and output in the event CRP land
returns to production.
consumption, investment, and trade (see Appendix E for a description of the
SAM framework).
In estimating possible impacts of allowing CRP to expire, we use two
different scenarios that encompass the choice of whether commodity prices
are allowed to adjust or are held constant, and whether recreational travel
expenditure impacts are estimated with the trips-based model or the
receipts-based model. Traditionally, most input-output models have
predicted the economywide impacts of increasing CRP enrollment assuming
prices are fixed and ignoring recreational travel (e.g., Hyberg et al., 1991
and Dodson et al., 1994). To reflect this view, we construct a “traditional”
scenario which holds prices constant and estimates recreational travel using
the trips-based approach. However, because price effects matter within
smaller regional economies and recreational travel might be important to
rural economies, we also present the results of an “augmented” scenario
which allows prices to fall as CRP contracts expire and estimates recre-
ational travel using the receipts-based model. When estimating the national
impacts of allowing CRP land back into production, the only practical
difference between these two scenarios is that the augmented scenario
reflects higher recreational travel expenditures than does the traditional
scenario (because farm commodity price effects don’t affect national land-
use and output estimates).62 But, as we will see, the two approaches can
yield very different results for sub-national regions. Expiration of the CRP
could increase agricultural production by as much as 1.3 percent nationwide
(table 4.4). This increased production would stimulate demand for nonagri-
cultural goods and services. The stimulus is partially offset by the loss of
household expenditures from the $1.6 billion cut in CRP rental payments
and reduced recreational travel expenditures of $7 million to $290 million.
The net result is an increase of $1.3-$2.3 billion (0.01-0.02 percent) in
nonagricultural production. The difference in estimated CRP impacts using
the traditional and augmented scenarios is due entirely to differences in the
size of the recreational travel expenditures associated with CRP’s environ-
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Table 4.4—Two scenarios of short-term national impacts of CRP’s hypothetical expiration
U.S. CRP-related stimulus
Economic measure baseline Traditional scenario Augmented scenario
$ Billion $ Million Percent $ Million Percent
Output: 14,401 5,526 0.038 4,480 0.031
Agricultural 234 3,200 1.368 3,133 1.334
Nonagricultural 14,635 2,326 0.016 1,347 0.009
Value added (factor income): 7,704 2,598 0.034 2,034 0.026
Household income: 7,470 125 0.002 -283 -0.004
Low 1,146 104 0.009 80 0.007
Medium 4,341 -363 -0.008 -612 -0.014
High 1,983 383 0.019 249 0.013
Million Thousand Percent Thousand Percent
Number of jobs: 152.3 181.7 0.119 151.2 0.099
Agricultural 2.9 117.4 4.073 115.1 3.993
Nonagricultural 149.4 64.3 0.043 36.1 0.024
Source: Vogel (2003).Value of output and income are in 2001 dollars. Nonagricultural industries include the manufacturing, construction, utilities,
mining, trade and transport, and service sectors. Employment includes the number of full- and part-time jobs.mental benefits. The higher recreational travel estimate of $290 million in
expenditures that would be foregone if CRP were to expire results in a much
smaller net boost to the nonfarm economy.
Changes in factor or value-added income include changes in wages, propri-
etors’ income, and returns to property assets, and represent changes in gross
domestic product. For the Nation, expiration of all CRP contracts would
induce an increase in factor income of about 0.03 percent. With respect to
employment, expiration of CRP could induce a net increase of 4 percent in
agricultural jobs and a 0.1-percent net increase in the total number of jobs.63
Recreational travel expenditures also affect these estimates; the effect of
CRP’s expiration would be smaller if CRP-induced recreational travel
expenditures are large.
A central result is that changes in household income reflect impacts of both
the loss of CRP transfer income and the gains in factor income associated
with production increases. This reconciles the apparent discrepancy between
the $2-$3 billion in factor income generated in production and much smaller
changes in total household income (table 4.4). Because middle-income
households would experience the largest drop in CRP transfers, their income
would decline collectively by $363-$612 million. In contrast, income of
low-income households would increase by $80-$104 million, while that of
high-income households would increase by $249-$383 million. At the
national level, these changes are smaller than typical quarterly fluctuation
occurring in the economy.
Previous estimates of CRP’s impact on the U.S. economy found generally
similar results using input-output multiplier models based on IMPLAN data.
If CRP enrollment had reached its initial 45-million-acre goal, Hyberg et al.
(1991) estimated that agricultural output would have declined by almost 3
percent and total U.S. output would have declined by 0.17 percent.
Although the size of these impacts is greater than we find, the program is
now smaller than that initially envisioned, so our lower estimates are
expected. As initial CRP contracts were about to start expiring, ERS esti-
mated that allowing the program to lapse would add about 94,000 jobs
nationwide, evenly split between farm and nonfarm jobs (Dodson et al.,
1994). Adding induced effects to the direct and indirect effects of the tradi-
tional input-output multiplier model (used in Dodson et al., 1994) increases
the job estimates of the latter by roughly 100 percent, which makes their
estimate remarkably similar to that of our traditional scenario. Thus, while
the size of the impacts vary depending on the research assumptions
concerning exogenous shocks and the economic conditions, all three studies
report that the nationwide impact of ending the CRP on jobs and income is
likely to be quite small.
Regional Economic Impacts
Although CRP enrollments occur throughout the Nation, their impact on
rural communities varies with program participation, community demo-
graphics, and the structure of the local economy. For example, large
payments to farmers in a sparsely populated, agriculturally dependent
county in the Midwest would be expected to yield more significant county-
63 IMPLAN uses industry survey data
to obtain national and regional statis-
tics on the number of full- and part-
time jobs (MIG, Inc., 1999). According
to IMPLAN, there were 153 million
full- and part-time jobs in the U.S.
According to the Council of Economic
Advisors (2003), the employed civilian
labor force numbered 127 million peo-
ple. Clearly the statistics on the num-
ber of full- and part-time jobs double
count those holding two or more jobs,
so care should be taken when interpret-
ing the employment estimates reported
in this section.
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economically diversified county in the eastern Corn Belt or in the South. To
highlight CRP’s impact on areas of the country most likely to be affected by
the program, we select three multicounty regions for further study. As in the
previous section, we measure CRP’s local importance by the proportion of
local income coming from CRP rental payments.64 In figure 4.2, the black
borders circumscribe 323 counties defining three large contiguous regional
economies most significantly affected by CRP payments. These regions are
defined across 6 States, and include 149 counties in which CRP rental
payments comprise at least 1.5 percent of total personal income.
The Northern Plains Crescent region comprises 132 counties and forms a
crescent extending from the eastern half of Montana to the northern half of
South Dakota and ending along the North Dakota-Minnesota border. With a
rural population density of 4.2 people per square mile, the Northern Plains
Crescent represents one of the least-populated regions in the country. Its
primary crops are wheat, other grains, and oilseeds. Bismarck, Fargo, and
Grand Forks, ND are the region’s urban centers.
As the largest of the three regional economies, the Southern Plains Ellipse
comprises 142 counties that form a north-south ellipse encompassing the
panhandles of Texas and Oklahoma, parts of eastern New Mexico and
Colorado, and the western half of Kansas. In contrast to the Northern Plains
Crescent and Southwestern Corn Belt, raising livestock is the largest agri-
cultural activity in the Southern Plains Ellipse, with grains and cotton
accounting for most of the crop farming. Amarillo and Lubbock, TX are the
only urban centers found in this region, but there are a number of major
metropolitan areas in close proximity.
64 While the previous section was con-
cerned with program impacts in the
1980s and 1990s, here we are con-
cerned with today’s impacts. As a
result, we look at a 3-year average of
the ratio of CRP rental payments to
income during 1998-2000 as a guide
when defining our regions.
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Figure 4.2
CRP payments’ share of personal income, 2000













EllipseAs the smallest of the three regions, the Southwestern Corn Belt comprises
49 counties that straddle the Iowa-Missouri border. The Southwestern Corn
Belt is the most populous of the three regions studied, with a rural popula-
tion density of over 24 people per square mile. The main crops are grains
and oilseeds (primarily corn and soybeans), but livestock is also important,
accounting for 40 percent of agricultural output. While there are no urban
centers in the Southwestern Corn Belt, this region lies just to the south of
Des Moines, IA.
Overall, these three regional economies are far more dependent on agricul-
ture than is the Nation as a whole, both in terms of the value of output and
the number of jobs (table 4.5). Even in the Southwestern Corn Belt (the
most economically diverse of the three regions), agriculture produces one
out of every nine dollars in sales. In contrast, nationally, one out of every 50
dollars in sales is derived from agriculture. Average household income is
somewhat lower in each region than is the national average, but there is
considerable variation among the three regions. The trade exposure measure
reported in table 4.5 attempts to capture each region’s dependence on inter-
regional imports. A low measure implies that most of the goods and services
produced in the region use local inputs. This measure is important since it
partially explains why employment impacts vary from region to region.
In table 4.6, the regional impacts of allowing CRP to expire are presented
for the traditional (i.e., no price effects and minimal recreation impacts)
scenario and the augmented (i.e., price effects and sizeable recreational
impacts) scenario. Earlier, we saw that CRP’s economywide impacts were
sensitive to assumptions about the size of the recreational travel response to
changes in CRP enrollment. The nationwide output and jobs response to
CRP’s expiration was 19 and 17 percent lower, respectively, under the
augmented scenario, which assumed recreational travel expenditures would
decline by $290 million instead of the $7 million decline modeled by the
traditional scenario.
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Table 4.5—Regional and national population, income, and employment levels
Region1
Northern Southern Southwestern U.S.
Variable: Units Plains Crescent Plains Ellipse Corn Belt total
Population Million 1.1 1.6 0.6 265.3
Rural population density Per sq. mile 4.2 7.8 24.4 -
Household income $ per capita 56,690 58,710 52,910 71,660
Total output $ billion 54.7 87.0 27.5 14,635.8
Agriculture Percent 18.3 17.3 10.9 1.6
Number of jobs2 Thousand 730.2 958.3 349.1 152,314.9
Agriculture Percent 11.3 12.8 13.7 1.9
Trade exposure3 Percent 18.1 22.4 26.3 3.5
CRP enrollment Million acres 8.3 8.5 1.9 33.9
1The three regions refer to multicounty areas of the country with high levels of CRP enrollment and are delineated in figure 4.2.
2Full- and part-time jobs.
3The ratio of total imports to total output, expressed as a percentage. In the SAM framework, imports of intermediate goods are part of the
firm’s total costs.
Source: SAM model files generated from the 1996 IMPLAN Database and the CRP contracts file. Statistics for household income and total out-
put are adjusted to 2001 prices.When the two scenarios are used to estimate regional impacts, the discrep-
ancies between their estimated economic impacts are even larger. At the
regional level, not only do recreational travel expenditures play a role, but
we can no longer assume that a decline in farm revenue due to falling prices
is offset by an increase in consumer expenditures within the region. There-
fore, if CRP’s expiration decreases farm commodity prices, the resulting
drop in farm enterprise income tends to reduce the expansionary impact that
increased planting has on a region’s economy. By relaxing the traditional
scenario’s simplifying assumptions, the augmented scenario (presented in
the bottom half of table 4.6) estimates regional output responses that are 30-
60 percent lower than those predicted by the traditional scenario. The CRP’s
impact on jobs is even more sensitive to the price and recreational expendi-
ture assumptions, falling by 43-64 percent once farm prices and recreational
travel expenditures are assumed to decline.
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Table 4.6—Short-term regional impacts of CRP’s hypothetical expiration under two scenarios
Region1
Northern Southern Southwestern
Scenario/sector: Plains Crescent Plains Ellipse Corn Belt
TRADITIONAL $Million Percent $Million Percent $Million Percent
Output: 1,088.9 2.0 549.4 0.6 151.0 0.6
Agricultural2 782.1 7.8 492.8 3.3 166.1 5.6
Nonagricultural 306.8 0.7 56.6 0.1 -15.1 -0.1
Value added (factor income) 502.8 1.9 134.6 0.4 70.2 0.6
Household income: 48.3 0.2 -206.8 -0.5 -94.4 -0.7
Low 38.2 0.5 8.7 0.1 5.4 0.1
Medium -16.0 -0.1 -200.5 -0.9 -91.0 -1.1
High 26.1 0.7 -15.0 -0.3 -8.8 -0.6
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Number of jobs: 26,968 3.7 11,872 1.2 4,127 1.2
Agricultural 17,684 21.4 10,800 8.8 4,890 10.3
Nonagricultural 9,284 1.4 1,072 0.1 -762 -0.3
AUGMENTED $Million Percent $Million Percent $Million Percent
Output: 747.5 1.4 356.8 0.4 61.0 0.2
Agricultural2 772.3 7.7 477.5 3.2 160.5 5.4
Nonagricultural -24.8 -0.1 -120.7 -0.2 -99.5 -0.4
Value added (factor income) 151.3 0.6 -180.9 -0.5 -31.8 -0.3
Household income: -195.4 -0.7 -413.0 -1.1 -167.9 -1.2
Low 10.6 0.2 -14.5 -0.1 -3.8 -0.1
Medium -189.9 -1.1 -340.8 -1.5 -144.2 -1.7
High -16.0 -0.4 -57.8 -1.0 -19.8 -1.3
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Number of jobs: 15,492 2.1 6,838 0.7 1,501 0.4
Agricultural 17,482 21.1 10,484 8.5 4,743 9.9
Nonagricultural -1,991 -0.3 -3,647 -0.4 -3,242 -1.1
1The three regions refer to multicounty areas of the country with high levels of CRP enrollment and are delineated in figure 4.2.
2The size of the agricultural output changes reported here are larger than the revenue shocks reported in table 4.3 because the initial shock
stimulates increased agricultural as well as nonagricultural production.
Source: Vogel (2003).Value of output and income are in 2001 dollars. Nonagricultural industries include the manufacturing, construction, utilities,
mining, trade and transport, and service sectors. Employment includes the number of full- and part-time jobs.Allowing CRP contracts to expire has a large enough impact on recreational
travel and farm revenue in the augmented scenario that the impact on the
nonfarm economy is negative. That is, the program’s continuation has an
expansionary effect on nonfarm output that partially offsets the impact that
retiring environmentally sensitive cropland has on farm production.
By recognizing that expiration of the CRP might have a detrimental affect
on others in addition to CRP participants (by reducing demand for recre-
ational services and reducing farm enterprise income), the augmented
scenario predicts that the income of nearly every household group identified
would fall if all CRP contracts expired. The results of these two scenarios
demonstrate how sensitive economywide and regional projections are to the
price and recreational travel assumptions. We do not present either model as
“the truth” since both encompass simplifying assumptions and ignore
adjustments that farm operators and other economic agents would make
when faced with shifting prices. However, these scenarios do provide a
rough measure of the adjustments the economy might face if CRP contracts
were to expire, and taken together or separately provide insight into the
factors that influence the size of the economic response to a change in CRP
enrollment. 
For the remainder of this section, we compare the results of the augmented
scenario for the three regions we have selected for closer study. This is done
for expositional ease, since the same patterns emerge whether we look at the
traditional or the augmented scenario. Furthermore, the factors that explain
interregional differences in the economic response to changes in CRP
enrollment also explain interregional differences between the relative size of
the response from each scenario.
For the three regions, expiration of the CRP would have different impacts
on industry output and jobs. The Northern Plains Crescent would experience
the most pronounced effects, with agricultural production potentially
increasing by up to 7.7 percent and the number of agricultural jobs increas-
ing by about 21 percent. At the same time, nonagricultural output and jobs
would decrease slightly. In contrast, the Southern Plains Ellipse and the
Southwestern Corn Belt would experience more modest increases in agricul-
tural and steeper declines in nonagricultural production and jobs. The large
discrepancies between the estimated effects of expiration of the CRP on
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors reflect the predicted decline of
household spending out of farm enterprise and transfer income, as well as
the drop in recreational travel expenditures as CRP rental payments end.
With respect to household and value-added income, the picture is also
mixed. As a measure of regional well-being, value-added income is
preferred to household income because it reflects the actual performance of
industrial activities located in these regions. In contrast, the household
income measure includes valued-added income as well as the loss of CRP
transfer and farm enterprise income. Thus, in the Northern Plains Crescent,
value-added income would increase by 0.6 percent while household income
would decrease by 0.7 percent. In contrast, both value-added and household
income would decline in the Southern Plains Ellipse and Southwestern Corn
Belt regions. For households in these regions, the positive stimulus of
increased agricultural production would not be sufficient to offset the nega-
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metropolitan area enhances this
region’s economic isolation. The near-
est metropolitan hub serving the entire
Northern Plains Crescent regional
economy is the Minneapolis-St. Paul
urban area. It lies about 250 miles
southeast of Fargo and 300 miles
south-southeast of Grand Forks.
66 If the Southern Plains Ellipse’trade
exposure was as low as that in the
Northern Plains Crescent, nonfarm 
production would increase 30 percent
more than is projected. And if labor
productivity of $78,800 per worker in
the Southern Plains Ellipse were as low
as that of the Northern Plains Crescent,
nonfarm employment would increase
43 percent more than is projected.
tive effects of the loss of transfer and farm enterprise income. Middle-
income households would be hit the hardest, with their income falling by
1.1 percent in the Northern Plains Crescent and by 1.5 percent or more in
the Southern Plains Ellipse and the Southwestern Corn Belt.
The small output and employment effects on nonagricultural sectors
reported in table 4.6 mask the differing regional forces at work. In each of
these regions, the agricultural response (increased planting but lower
revenue) would generate positive impacts in the farm and nonfarm
economies, while the household expenditure response (loss of CRP
payments and reduced recreational travel expenditures) would generate
negative impacts almost exclusively in the nonfarm economy. Consequently,
the net positive benefits to CRP expiration would be confined to the agricul-
tural sectors alone.
The Northern Plains Crescent’s strong nonfarm response (which shows up
as the smallest overall decline in nonfarm output and jobs in table 4.6) is
explained in a large part by its geographic isolation.65 Having the lowest
trade exposure of the three rural economies is an artifact of its isolation and
low population density. As a consequence, the residents in the Northern
Plains Crescent are more self-reliant with respect to producing goods and
services within the region. Labor productivity in nonfarm production (output
per worker) in the Northern Plains Crescent is $63,200 per worker versus
$88,300 per worker for the United States as a whole. Lower productivity
implies that firms substitute labor for more expensive capital goods
imported from outside the region. Hence, the employment response would
be larger because workers are less productive in terms of value added than
the national average.
The Southern Plains Ellipse response to the expiration of CRP contracts
would differ from that of the Northern Plains Crescent for two reasons.
First, Southern Plains Ellipse producers would convert over half their CRP
enrolled land to rangeland. Since producers do not add direct value to range-
land, the increased livestock production reported in table 4.3 captures any
positive feedback from this conversion. Second, the dominant crops bene-
fiting from CRP expiration in the Southern Plains Ellipse produce less
revenue per acre than the dominant crops in the Northern Plains Crescent.
According to National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) data for
2001, oilseed crops of all types produce the highest revenue per acre in the
Northern Plains Crescent. In the Southern Plains Ellipse, cotton and grains
are the dominant crops, both of which generate lower revenues per acre than
oilseeds in the Northern Plains Crescent.
In the Southern Plains Ellipse, the agricultural response would generate
proportionately smaller demands for nonfarm intermediate goods and serv-
ices and nonfarm employment than in the Northern Plains Crescent because
of the former region’s greater linkages with the national economy and its
higher labor productivity.66
As the smallest of the three regions, the Southwestern Corn Belt is a
completely rural economy with the highest trade exposure, lowest labor
productivity in agriculture, and moderate nonfarm labor productivity. Expi-
ration of the CRP would induce agricultural producers to increase produc-
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western Corn Belt’s high trade exposure means that more nonfarm goods
are imported rather than being regionally produced. Consequently, the
employment spillover effect into the nonfarm labor market induced by the
agricultural response is the smallest of the three regions. 
The impacts on these three regional economies of allowing the CRP to
expire illustrate how their different economic and geographic features would
shape their response to a policy change. The Northern Plains Crescent is the
most agriculturally dependent region, while the Southwestern Corn Belt is
the least. The Southwestern Corn Belt is most reliant on imported goods and
services, while the Northern Plains Crescent is the least. The Southern
Plains Ellipse has the highest labor productivity, while the Northern Plains
Crescent has the lowest. The varied regional responses to expiration of the
CRP highlight the fact that places with very similar CRP enrollments, such
as the Northern Plains Crescent and the Southern Plains Ellipse, can have
very dissimilar responses to changes in program participation.
The regional impacts reported here demonstrate patterns similar to those
found in earlier studies. In a 1994 assessment of the impact that elimination
of CRP would have on several rural economies, job impacts ranged from 0.1
to 1.8 percent and income impacts ranged from 0.3 to 1.4 percent (Dodson
et al., 1994). Pocatello, ID, an area neighboring the Northern Plains Cres-
cent region, had the largest income and employment impacts of the loca-
tions studied. In a study of three counties in Oregon, countywide estimates
of CRP’s impact ranged from $1.2 million to -$3.6 million, depending on
the local economic base (Martin et al., 1988). Other IMPLAN studies also
report considerable variation in local economic impacts within States
(Mortensen et al., 1990; Otto and Smith, 1996; Standaert and Smith, 1989)
and between States (Hines et al., 1991; Hyberg et al., 1991). It is clear from
this research that projected local impacts of CRP enrollment can be sizeable
in some cases, but they are far from uniform and there are often winners and
losers even when the national impact of the program is small.
While most of the land enrolled in the CRP is located in rural America, it
does not necessarily follow that expiration of the CRP would generate only
rural jobs. At least some of the direct, indirect, and induced employment
impacts are felt in urban counties. 
Rural-Urban Impacts
Since both the Northern Plains Crescent and Southern Plains Ellipse include
urban centers, this section looks at the rural-urban distribution of employ-
ment responses by simulating the expiration of the CRP in rural areas using
a rural SAM multiplier model for these two regional economies.
The very low population density in the Northern Plains Crescent, together
with the fact that no major metropolitan areas lie adjacent to it, supports the
use of the hub-and-spoke metaphor to describe the economic landscape of
this region. That is, the urban areas of Bismarck, Fargo, and Grand Forks,
ND represent regional hubs of economic activity with transportation and
infrastructure spokes extending out into the rural hinterlands. As a result, in
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about one out of every five jobs
generated in the post-CRP envi-
ronment is found in the urban
counties (fig. 4.3). Almost 80
percent of these urban jobs are
agricultural.
Two factors explain the size of
the urban impact. First, farmers
in the region’s urban counties
received $13 million per year in
CRP payments from 1998 to
2000 (about 5 percent of the
region’s total CRP payments).
Ending CRP payments induces
farmers in urban counties to
increase their production,
making a significant contribution to stimulating new jobs in these counties.
Second, given the geography of the Northern Plains Crescent, some of the
off-farm jobs created by an expanding agricultural sector in rural counties
are located in the urban counties. Thus, on average, $1 million of additional
agricultural output in rural Northern Plains Crescent counties creates 20
rural jobs and 2.9 urban jobs (including direct, indirect, and induced jobs).
Urban “leakage” of jobs in the nonfarm economy in rural counties is
smaller, with 1.5 urban jobs created for every 20 rural jobs.
The Southern Plains Ellipse has a higher population density and is adjacent
to more major metropolitan hubs relative to the Northern Plains Crescent. A
higher trade exposure means that more intermediate goods are imported into
this region. Consequently, in contrast to the Northern Plains Crescent, the
Southern Plains Ellipse does not experience the spatially imposed self-
reliance on production of goods that could be easily imported.67 Hence, the
leakage of employment effects to urban areas in the Southern Plains Ellipse
is about half that found in the Northern Plains Crescent. About 6 percent of
jobs generated in the Southern Plains Ellipse occur in urban areas. For every
20 agricultural jobs created in rural counties, 1.2 indirect and induced jobs
are generated in urban areas of the Southern Plains Ellipse. For every 20
nonfarm jobs created in rural counties, only 0.5 jobs are generated in the
metro counties.
Summary and Caveats
If all CRP contracts were to immediately expire and there were no further
enrollments, we estimate that roughly 51 percent of the land currently under
contract would return to cultivation within about 1 year. The remainder
would be used as pasture, rangeland, or forest, would be put to nonfarm
uses, or would remain idle. As CRP land is brought back into production,
the supply of agricultural output increases, reducing commodity prices.
However, we estimate that the price effects would be modest—often less
than 1 percent and never greater than 6 percent. Aggregate, nationwide
impacts on recreational spending (as sedimentation and other forms of
67 Essentially, the geographic isolation
of the Northern Plains Crescent
implies that it must produce a higher
level of goods and services relative to
the Southern Plains Ellipse and the
Southwestern Corn Belt because of
lower interregional imports.
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Figure 4.3


















Plains Ellipsepollution increase and wildlife habitat shrinks) vary considerably depending
upon estimation procedures. Using a trips-based approach, recreational
travel impacts are minimal, as travelers choose alternate destinations but do
not reduce overall spending by much. However, a receipts-based approach
to estimating the amount of recreational travel induced by CRP yields much
higher estimates which reduce CRP’s output and employment impacts by
roughly 18 percent.
Increased farming activity increases demand for nonfarm goods and serv-
ices, and both lead to higher demand for consumer goods and services as
the number of jobs and household incomes rise. Counteracting this expan-
sion is the loss of CRP rental payments (which reduces consumer demand
by affected households), a drop in farm revenue, and possible decreases in
CRP-induced recreational spending. The net effect of CRP expiration is
likely to be a small positive impact on the U.S. economy as a whole, with
varying impacts on local economies. With respect to the three regions we
studied, expiration of the CRP creates a net positive economywide impact
for all regions, with output increases ranging from 0.2 percent to 2.0 percent
and the number of jobs increasing by anywhere from 0.4  percent to 3.7
percent. However, households suffer income losses of up to 1.2 percent as
CRP transfer payments cease. Farm revenue could decline by up to $4
billion as increased production drives down farm commodity prices.
In interpreting these results, several caveats are in order. First, most of our
assumptions were geared toward providing a reasonable upper-bound esti-
mate of the economic impact of expiration of the CRP. For example, we
assumed that as CRP land is returned to production, it does not encourage
other marginal land to drop out of production. Second, as with all multiplier
models, our estimated impacts assume the economy will move along a
predictable path. But in areas heavily affected by a change in the status of
CRP enrollment (or any other economic shock), the economy is very likely
to react in unpredictable ways as prices, industrial structure, and preferences
all change. Finally, employment gains in our models are induced changes in
labor demand. Although these simulations project increases and decreases in
labor demand, ex post changes in actual employment levels cannot be
assessed by the SAM framework. The framework treats job gains/losses as
permanent due to a perfectly elastic labor supply response, which overstates
the estimated job gains reported here. Conditions of low unemployment
would put upward pressure on regional wages, forcing firms to compete to
fill their job vacancies. Hence, not all of the new jobs created by expiration
of the CRP would be filled. Conditions of moderately high unemployment
could also be indicators of a high level of disguised underemployment in the
labor market. In this case, fewer workers would be needed to meet the new
labor demands of the post-CRP environment.
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In evaluating the economic implications of high Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) enrollment for surrounding rural communities we have used
two very different approaches. For the first time, econometric models were
used to estimate the statistical importance of various factors, including CRP
enrollment, affecting economic trends immediately before and in the years
after CRP was implemented in 1986. The second approach relies on a series
of social accounting matrix (SAM) multiplier models to simulate the local
economic impacts in regions with high levels of CRP enrollment had CRP
expired in 2002. This extends approaches adopted by other researchers who
attempted to predict CRP’s impact on local economies with input/output
models, such as IMPLAN.
While it may be tempting to compare the employment impacts generated by
these complementary approaches, caution should be used. The two analytical
approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, but each is fundamentally
different.68 The econometric models used in this report try to measure CRP’s
short and longrun impacts within the context of other local, regional, and
global fluctuations that influence a community’s development. In a sense, we
examine how rural counties were faring 5 to 10 years after land was enrolled
in the CRP and economic adjustments had been underway. The simulation
models developed in this report assume these other factors will remain
constant. Given fixed sector-to-sector relationships, as the size of the CRP
changes, industrial sectors, workers, and landowners are expected to change
in predictable ways to accommodate the CRP. As such, simulation models of
the type developed here estimate the potential size of the adjustments that
economies will face rather than the actual outcome of a policy change.
Both approaches are useful, but on their own give an incomplete picture of
CRP’s economic effect on rural America. By modeling industrial and
geographic linkages that determine how national and regional economies
might be affected by CRP’s expiration, we show how large the potential
adjustments might be, how impacts are distributed within the economy, and
how they vary across geographic space. And since much of the previous
empirical work concerning CRP’s economic impacts has been based on
similar types of simulation models, this also demonstrates how sensitive
estimates are to assumptions about the initial policy shock. On the other
hand, the econometric results provide evidence that rural economies can
successfully adjust to the shifts in demand that accompany high levels of
CRP enrollment. Even in areas that appear to be very sensitive to CRP
enrollments, growth trend impacts appear to be transitory.
Both analytic approaches suggest that the economic impacts of CRP enroll-
ment vary widely from one area to the next, but that the program’s aggre-
gate rural economic impacts have been modest. Factors other than CRP
determine longrun population and employment trends in rural America and
in most cases CRP plays a minor role in the economic and social trends
observed in rural counties. Nonetheless, there are significant interactions
between CRP’s influence and these other economic drivers which can make
blanket statements about CRP’s effects misleading in specific cases. 
68 While econometric models attempt
to capture and identify the effects of
multiple statistical relationships, their
weakness is a failure to explicitly
account for the underlying economy-
wide structure. Simulation models
capture the economywide linkages at
one point in time, but they hold these
relationships constant when estimating
the effects of subsequent changes. 
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associated with a net loss of jobs in some rural counties between 1986 and
1992, but this negative relationship did not persist throughout the 1990s. In
particular, farm-related businesses, such as input suppliers and grain eleva-
tors, continued contracting throughout the 1990s, but other business expan-
sions eased the community impact. Our research suggests one likely source
of job growth in areas with high levels of CRP enrollment. CRP’s effects on
wildlife and water quality led to an increase in outdoor recreational expendi-
tures of as much as $300 million per year, adding a significant stimulus to
rural economies.
This report demonstrates that CRP’s employment impacts are a function of
the local economy’s role as a source of goods and services. We find
evidence that rural counties with small agricultural service centers were
likely to be far more sensitive to CRP enrollment than were counties that
lacked such centers. On a different scale, we also found that multicounty
regions that were less reliant on the national economy (and so, served as
their own “service center”) were more sensitive than regions with stronger
interregional ties.
Despite concerns to the contrary, CRP’s population impacts were slight at the
county level, if present at all. When county characteristics are taken into
account, post-1985 population trends in rural counties were largely unaffected
by high levels of CRP enrollment. The CRP did have an effect on the struc-
ture of farm ownership and operation. We found that the relationship between
the level of CRP enrollment and changes in the number of beginning farmers
is sensitive to the way land is enrolled in the program. Whole-farm enrollment
was negatively associated with changes in the number of beginning farmers,
but this was offset by a positive association between beginning farmer trends
and partial-farm enrollment. We found no statistically significant evidence that
CRP participation encourages absentee ownership.
Three cautionary notes should be raised regarding the interpretation of our
estimates. As was discussed earlier in this report, our analyses do not
address small-area impacts of CRP enrollment. Rather, we examine both
countywide growth trends and CRP’s likely effects within multicounty
areas. It seems likely that if CRP enrollment is heavily concentrated within
specific subcounty areas (such as towns and minor civil divisions), the asso-
ciated economic impacts within these smaller areas might be more signifi-
cant than those found for counties and multicounty areas. 
Second, our models, like virtually every other attempt to model the
economic impact of the CRP, do not adequately reflect the value of associ-
ated environmental consequences. As these models currently stand, they are
not equipped to do so. This limitation is largely due to the uncertain spatial
distribution and nonmarket nature of environmental benefits, but it also
derives from the models’ structural focus on jobs and income as measures of
economic health. 
From an economic development perspective, job and income growth tend to
be viewed as signs of economic progress. But it does not necessarily follow
that every policy that leads to new jobs furthers societal goals. CRP was
initiated to provide environmental benefits to surrounding communities and
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tion, and windblown particulates, its expiration could force households,
firms, and governments to increase expenditures to counteract these effects.
Paradoxically, doing so could increase employment and income in an effort
to maintain the previous level of well-being. To the unemployed or under-
employed, job growth holds out the prospect of being able to earn a decent
living. But from an economic development perspective, it is important to
ask whether resources are being put to their best use. As measures of
economic progress, revenue, income, and jobs are incomplete.
For example, we model CRP payments as income transfers. An alternative
view is that CRP enrollees provide nonmarket environmental services for
which they are being paid (Siegel and Johnson, 1991). Then, CRP farmers
who choose to return to crop production when their CRP contract expires
are merely changing jobs (from conservationist to producer) rather than
filling new jobs. Viewed in this way, our approach might overestimate the
number of jobs created if CRP expired.69
Finally, the econometric analyses do not correct for spatial autocorrelation
or attempt to rigorously model the adjustment process. In an effort to match
high-CRP counties with control counties having similar socioeconomic and
agricultural characteristics, matched pairs were often selected from the same
geographic area. This raises the possibility that spillover effects could blur
the distinctions between high-CRP economies and their low-CRP counter-
parts. For example, environmental benefits (and any associated jobs) from
CRP enrollment are likely to be distributed over a large area, making it
more likely that comparisons of high-CRP and adjoining low-CRP counties
show significantly different trends. Then too, as we have seen, high CRP
enrollment may have a particularly large effect on counties that serve as
agricultural service hubs. If these happen to be low-CRP counties adjacent
to high-CRP areas, our analyses may understate the effect of CRP enroll-
ment on job trends. Finally, to the extent that CRP increases farm
commodity prices, the benefits of higher net farm income will accrue to
areas with fewer enrolled acres. Taking the spatial relationship between
high- and low-CRP counties and their neighbors into account could shed
light on the potential seriousness of such problems.
To accommodate local economic adjustments, we assessed the short and
longrun relationship between CRP enrollment levels and socioeconomic
trends. However, no attempt was made to rigorously determine the direction
of causality or to study the lags involved in this adjustment process or the
role of specific industries. Does CRP act as a driver in determining local
socioeconomic trends or does it merely reflect those trends?  If there is a
causal relationship between CRP enrollment and job growth, how fast does
the local economy adjust to having cropland retired from production?  Is the
initial loss in economic vitality focused on farm-related businesses, as one
would expect? Is the longer term recovery (or return to trend) due to
increased recreational activity, as has often been surmised but never explic-
itly demonstrated? These questions are left for future research. 
69 Whole-farm CRP enrollees return-
ing to farming could potentially gener-
ate a minor double-counting of new
jobs created in agriculture. Based on
our earlier estimate of the 142,000
whole-farm CRP enrollees, 51 percent,
or 72,000 farmer operators would like-
ly allow their land to return to crop-
land (based on our earlier estimate).
Since most whole-farm enrollees are
retired and lifestyle farmer operators,
most are likely to rent their farmland
to existing farm operators rather than
operate it themselves. If 80 percent of
whole-farm enrollees rent out their
land, roughly 14,000 whole-farm CRP
enrollees might return to cropland pro-
duction if CRP expired, reducing the
number of jobs created by CRP’s
hypothetical expiration by nearly 8
percent. However, if 100 percent of
whole-farm enrollees rented out their
land instead of farming it themselves,
the double-counting issue raised by
Siegel and Johnson (1991) would not
apply. Only a survey of farm house-
holds in a post-CRP environment
would resolve this issue.
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Modeling Rural County
Socioeconomic Change
We measure population and job growth as the natural log of the ratio of the
number of people (jobs) in each county in 1992 or 2000 relative to 1985.70
In modeling rural growth, a county’s historic pattern of population and
employment change are often key predictors. County changes in population
and employment are included for both the 1970s and the years immediately
preceding the introduction of the CRP (1982-85). In the 1970s, agriculture,
mining, and manufacturing were all relatively prosperous and contributed to
the rural rebound of the period. In contrast, these industries suffered in the
1980s. The inclusion of 1982-85 changes captures some of this decline. As
with the dependent variable, these explanatory variables take the log form.
A series of demographic variables captures the effects of race, ethnicity,
age, educational attainment, and population density on the community
growth process. All were from the 1980 Census of Population, with all but
population density expressed as a percentage of the total. Population density
entered the equations in log form. To measure scenic attractiveness, the
presence of high mountains (0/1 dummy variable), the prominence of
surface water (in log form) and forests (percentage of land area) are
included in analyses of the entire study group. Also included are z-scores of
several climate measures (McGranahan, 1999). For the matched-pair
analysis, these amenity measures were replaced by the “natural amenity
scale” developed by McGranahan to combine all of these factors into one
measure. Table A.1 provides the mean values of the employment, demo-
graphic, and amenity variables considered.
Measures of initial industry structure are ubiquitous in studies of job
growth. Industry structure is measured by the proportion of employed resi-
dents working in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, business services
(finance, insurance, real estate, and other professional services), and recre-
ation (eating places, amusement, and recreation, other than hotels) in 1980.
Somewhat unique rural industrial expansion in the 1980s was from casinos,
prisons, and large meatpacking plants. To take account of the sometimes
dramatic changes accompanying these developments, dummy variables were
included to reflect whether a county had any of these industries in 2000.
Local labor market and locational characteristics could also affect commu-
nity growth. Higher employment rates and higher incomes (in log form)
might encourage migration, but might discourage new employers. The
attractiveness of an area is a function of its access to services and other
amenities, measured by whether the county was adjacent to a metropolitan
area in 1983 (represented as a 0/1 dummy variable). The growth potential of
a county may also depend on the percentage of its residents commuting
outside the county to work. Finally, because the Great Plains has its own
unique characteristics, a dummy variable indicates whether or not the
county was in the Great Plains.
70 We considered modeling net migra-
tion, but intercensal net migration esti-
mates are not available. Furthermore,
the small populations of counties stud-
ied make the reliability of any inter-
censal population estimates suspect.
Independent measures of elderly and
children were included in the popula-
tion change analysis to reflect their
influence on population trends due to
age structure and fertility. 
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variables in addition to employment were included in the analysis. Most of
these are from the 1982 Census of Agriculture. Finally, the ratio of CRP
enrollment to total cropland or the ratio of CRP rental payments to county
household income is included to measure CRP’s local importance. Mean
values of the industry and farm structure variables are presented in table A.2.
Our database includes over 45 measures that have been associated with
population and job change or that reflect local agricultural conditions. While
these explanatory variables should capture the independent effects of many
county characteristics potentially related to population or employment
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Table A.1—Mean values of demographic and employment trends and amenity variables
Study High- Matched
Variable description Unit counties CRP1 counties
Dependent variables
Post-CRP population change:
1985-1992 (short run) Percent -1.5 -9.0 -5.9**
1985-2000 (long run) Percent 5.3 -9.8 -4.1**
Post-CRP employment change:
1985-1992 (short run) Percent 5.6 -3.7 1.4**
1985-2000 (long run) Percent 23.9 7.6 13.4**
Explanatory variables
Pre-CRP population and employment change:
1970-1982 population Percent 11.3 -3.2 3.3**
1982-1985 population2 Percent -0.3 -2.3 -1.3**
1970-1982 employment Percent 17.6 1.6 13.5**
1982-1985 employment2 Percent 2.6 -1.7 0.3**
Demographic characteristics:
Black population, 1980 Percent 7.1 0.6 0.4
Hispanic population, 1980 Percent 4.2 4.4 6.9
Native American population, 1980 Percent 1.5 3.3 1.9
Population under 18, 1980  Percent 29.7 29.8 29.3
Population over 62, 1980 Percent 18.2 19.3 19.7
Under 12 years of school, aged 25-44, 1980 Percent 23.4 17.2 16.5
College grads, aged 25-44, 1980 Percent 14.1 16.9 17.4
Population density, 1980 P/sq mi 24 5 10**
Natural amenity characteristics:
High mountains dummy variable 0/13 7.4 5.6 10.8
Water/total area (x 10) Log -2.1 -6.5 -6.2
Land in forest Percent 26.7 3.7 8.5**
January days with sun (x 10) Z-score4 1.8 5.2 5.4
January temperature (x 10) Z-score -1.9 -8.3 -6.1*
July humidity (x 10) Z-score 2.3 9.7 7.1**
July temperature (x 10) Z-score -2.6 -4.8 -5.0
Natural amenities scale (x 10) Z-score -3.6 -7.2 -6.6
1High-CRP counties have an average CRP rental-payment-to-income ratio for 1991-93 exceeding 2.75 percent. Of the 1,481
study counties, 195 were high-CRP by this definition.
2We include 1982-85 trends separately because rural county growth was slower in this period than during the preceding 12
years.
3Set to one if mountains are present.The data represent the proportion of observations coded “1.”
4Z-scores are the number of standard deviations an observation differs from the mean (across all observations).
Source: BEA Income files, 1980 Census of Population and McGranahan (1999).
* and ** indicate that the difference between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs is significantly greater than 0 at the
0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.change, several socioeconomic measures are highly correlated, with no a
priori reason for selecting one over the other. To avoid statistical problems
from estimating relationships with an over-identified model, in addition to a
standard analysis including all explanatory variables, a backward stepwise
regression procedure is used to narrow the set of explanatory variables.71
For the matched-pair analysis, two versions of the model were estimated
using a subset of explanatory variables. In the first, CRP measures were
excluded from the equation, leaving the constant term to capture CRP’s
impact on the difference in growth trends between high- and low-CRP coun-
ties. We estimated a second set of regressions with the difference in the CRP
measure between matched pairs included as an independent variable, with
the constant constrained to equal zero, to capture the impact that varying
levels of CRP participation had on socioeconomic trends.
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71 In this procedure, the socioeconom-
ic measure with the least statistical
significance is removed and the analy-
sis is repeated until all remaining
measures are statistically significant.
In using this procedure, we exempt the
CRP measures from possible elimina-
tion and exclude other measures not
significant at the 10-percent level. This
approach biases the analysis in favor
of finding a significant relationship
between CRP use and socioeconomic
trends.
Table A.2—Mean values of industrial, labor market, and farm structure variables
Study High- Matched
Variable description Unit counties CRP1 counties
Local economic characteristics:
Agricultural employment, 1980 Percent 16.7 31.7 24.7**
Manufacturing employment, 1980 Percent 17.6 5.7 8.4**
Mining employment, 1980 Percent 2.5 2.2 2.3
Business services employment, 1980 Percent 4.2 3.9 4.2*
Recreation employment, 1980 Percent 4.1 4.1 4.5*
Special development dummy variables2:
Prison county  0/1 2.6 1.0 0.0
Casino county  0/1 0.9 0.0 1.5
Meatpacking plant county 0/1 1.4 0.5 1.0
Labor market and location characteristics:
Civilian employment, age 15-64, 1980 Percent 62.7 64.9 65.6
Working outside the county, 1980 Percent 19.0 10.9 12.9*
Median household income, 1979 $ 12,840 12,620 12,936
Adjacent to a metropolitan area, 1983 0/12 41.3 15.9 22.6
Great Plains county  0/12 27.1 80.0 59.5**
Agricultural characteristics:
Cropland/all land, 1982 Percent 40.5 46.7 45.1
Irrigated farmland, 1982 Percent 4.5 4.3 8.5**
Grain/total sales value, 1982 Percent 29.5 38.4 31.5**
Wheat/total sales, 1982 Percent 8.8 25.2 12.2**
Livestock/total sales, 1982 Percent 56.2 51.5 61.6**
Govt. payments/total income, 1981-83 Percent 1.6 6.0 2.6**
CRP enrollment/cropland, 1991-93 Percent 8.0 21.3 5.1**
CRP payments/income, 1991-93 Percent 1.3 6.7 0.8**
Farm sales/household income, 1980 Percent 0.8 1.9 1.4**
Farms w/ sales over $250,000 in 1982 Percent 4.7 5.3 5.8
Farms w/ sales under $20,000 in 1982 Percent 51.5 35.7 38.9*
Farmers working off-farm 200+ days, 1982 Percent 28.0 17.9 21.0**
* and ** indicate that the difference between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs is significantly greater than 0 at the 0.05 and 0.01 level,
respectively.
1  High-CRP counties have an average CRP rental-payment-to-income ratio for 1991-93 exceeding 2.75 percent. Of the 1,481 study counties,
195 were high-CRP by this definition.
2  The data reported for all 0/1 dummy variables represent the percentage of observations coded “1” rather than the mean for expositional ease.
Source: 1980 Census of Population, 1982 Census of Agriculture, BEA Income file, and CRP Contracts file.In addition to including mining employment in 1980 as an explanatory vari-
able, we also created a separate set of matched pairs that excluded counties
where mining comprised over 5 percent of 1980 employment. Doing so
helped clarify the relationship between community development and CRP,
since variations in mining added a lot of statistical “noise” to the data.
Much of the employment-migration literature recognizes that population and
employment growth rates are endogeous phenomena to be modeled simulta-
neously. The focus of this literature has been on whether employment
growth is stimulated by the in-migration of people drawn to an area by
quality of life considerations. In our analysis, we are not concerned with the
mechanisms through which the CRP program might have affected popula-
tion or employment; we are concerned with overall effects. Recognizing the
inherent simultaneity, we use the same independent measures in both the
employment and population equations. Our analyses are therefore equivalent
to a reduced form equation from a simultaneous equation model.
The benefits of the matched-pair approach are its intuitive appeal, trans-
parency, and the fact that it is less dependent on assumptions regarding
functional forms of structural models or even reduced-form relationships.72
That is, because the matched pairs are relatively “close,” there is less need
for controls; and the use of a linear model to control for potentially convo-
luting factors should give a reasonable approximation of even nonlinear
effects, because the differences in explanatory variables are relatively small.
The quasi-experimental control group approach we adopt builds on analysis
of experimental data in that it attempts to assess the impact of a “treatment”
by developing an appropriate counterfactual. When the treatment is
randomly distributed within the population being studied, the “control”
group is implicitly all observations that haven’t been treated. But when the
treatment is not randomly distributed, selection of a control group indicating
how treated observations would have developed in the absence of treatment
becomes a little more difficult. In such cases, the development of all
nontreated observations may not be the appropriate counterfactual.
Developing an appropriate control group is at the heart of quasi-experi-
mental control group analysis. There are many ways to operationalize the
control group concept – matches can be one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-
to-many; they can be based on nearest neighbor, by an ad hoc comparison
of one or two key characteristics, or by using a statistical measure of simi-
larity, such as a propensity score or the Mahalanobis distance. We have
adopted the matched-pair (one-to-one) technique based on minimizing the
overall Mahalanobis distance used by Isserman and Rephann (1995)
because of its flexibility and its intuitive appeal. By applying a difference-
in-differences analysis to observations that have been matched on the basis
of growth factors, the approach adopted here should highlight CRP’s poten-
tial impacts on economic trends (Blundell and Diaz, 2000).
The most complicated growth model estimated for this report examines the
interaction between population density and CRP enrollment. The model
attempts to explain differences in job growth trends between high-CRP
counties and their matches as a function of differences in a series of
explanatory variables, based on counties where mining accounted for 5
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72 By comparison, recovering the
structural components of a simultane-
ous equations model is much more dif-
ficult and requires much stronger
assumptions. To do so, one needs to be
able to justify both the functional form
and at least two exclusionary restric-
tions: what exogenous variables influ-
ence employment growth but do not
influence population growth (or net
migration), and vice versa. These
“instruments” would also need to be
uncorrelated with unobservable vari-
ables affecting the other equation.percent or less of employment in 1980. This analysis was used to construct
the CRP impacts presented in figure 3.3 in the text. Table A.3 presents the
regression results for the full model explaining job growth (neither CRP nor
its interaction with population density were significant in the population
growth model, so the results are not reported). The backward stepwise
regression results were very similar, although a couple additional control
variables were identified as having a statistically significant impact on job
growth (all the significant variables from both the full and backward step-
wise regressions are in bold in table A.3).
Finally, farm-related enterprises were identified to explore the extent to
which this group of businesses was particularly susceptible to changes in
CRP enrollment. Table A.4 lists the 3- and 4-digit SIC codes for industries
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Table A.3—Interaction between population density and CRP’s impact on job growth
Short-term job growth Long-term job growth
Explanatory variables (1985-1992) (1985-2000)
(low-CRP minus high-CRP value) Unit Beta t-statistic Beta t-statistic
CRP payments to income ratio Percent 0.085 0.735 0.236 1.923a
Population density, 1980 log 0.011 0.069 0.195 1.134
Density x CRP ratio Percent -0.216 -2.169* -0.075 -0.715
Employed in ag, 1980 Percent -0.455 -3.369** -0.161 -1.125
Density x  Percent ag emp. Percent 0.079 0.683 -0.030 -0.243
Population, 1982/1970  log -0.081 -0.716 0.161 1.340
Population, 1985/1982  log 0.108 1.456 0.062 0.794
Employment, 1982/1970 log -0.055 -0.556 -0.216 -2.069*
Employment, 1985/1982  log -0.071 -0.981 -0.076 -0.981
Under 18 years of age, 1980 Percent 0.193 1.378 0.178 1.195
Over 62 years of age, 1980 Percent -0.098 -0.712 0.010 0.069
American Indian, 1980 Percent -0.002 -0.020 0.104 0.999
Black, 1980 Percent -0.181 -2.676** -0.230 -3.212**
Hispanic, 1980 Percent -0.044 -0.419 0.091 0.810
Cropland, 1982 Percent -0.180 -1.545 -0.156 -1.262
Livestock/total sales, 1982  Percent -0.031 -0.450 0.023 0.314
Govt payments/income, 1981-83 Percent 0.005 0.039 -0.122 -0.981
Wheat/total sales, 1982  Percent -0.134 -1.530 -0.069 -0.744
Less than high school, 1980 Percent -0.006 -0.051 -0.130 -1.010
College, 1980 Percent 0.119 1.520 0.044 0.526
Civilian employment rate, 1980 Percent 0.004 0.046 0.059 0.663
Median household income, 1979 Dollars -0.198 -1.899a -0.079 -0.712
Natural amenities index Z-score1 0.036 0.462 -0.039 -0.464
Land in forest Percent 0.066 0.664 0.261 2.482*
Great Plains county 0/12 -0.156 -1.885a -0.139 -1.585
Employed in mining, 1980 Percent -0.199 -2.999** -0.072 -1.021
Employed in recreation, 1980 Percent 0.019 0.256 0.031 0.394
Commuting outside county, 1980 Percent 0.018 0.239 0.062 0.773
Meat packing plant county 0/1 0.052 0.843 0.026 0.398
Casino county 0/1 0.027 0.470 0.069 1.117
Prison county 0/1 -0.052 -0.832 -0.022 -0.332
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.34
a, *, and ** indicate the regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the .10, .05, and .01 level of significance, respectively. Bold indi-
cates variables that were significant at the .10 level or lower in this or the backward stepwise regressions. Beta represents the standardized
regression coefficient. Adjusted R-squared indicates the portion of variation explained by the regression.
1Z-scores are the number of standard deviations an observation differs from the mean (across all observations).
2 Dummy variables with a “0” or a “1” value.
Source: Economic Research Service calculations using data from the 1980 Census of Population, the 1982 Census of Agriculture, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, and the CRP Contracts file. Matched pairs exclude counties with more than 5 percent employed in mining.The constant
term was constrained to equal 0.we defined as being “farm-related.” These include agricultural services,
farm suppliers, and most food processors relating to crops. Since they would
likely be less affected by CRP, farm-related establishments devoted exclu-
sively to livestock, such as meat processors and veterinary services, were
excluded from this definition.
Beginning Farmer Model
In modeling the beginning farmer response to CRP enrollment, CRP’s local
importance was measured as the proportion of county cropland enrolled in
CRP. Using this measure, we selected a group of high-CRP and matching
counties which was different from the one used in the population and
employment analysis. As a result, even though we used many of the same
explanatory variables discussed above, the means of the high-CRP and
matching counties differ slightly from those reported in tables A.1 and A.2.
Nonetheless, for expositional ease they will not be reported.
The full list of explanatory variables considered for the beginning farmer
models includes all of the demographic variables discussed above: the
percent of population Black, Hispanic, Native American, under 18 years of
age, or over 62 years of age. Many of the labor market and economic vari-
ables also enter the basic equation, in one form or another: the log of 1970-
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Table A.4—Agricultural services industries
SIC code1 Description
071 Agricultural services: Soil preparation services
072 Agricultural services: Crop services
076 Agricultural services: Farm labor and management services
1542 Construction: Nonresidential construction, NEC
203  Food products: Canned, frozen, and preserved
fruits, vegetables, etc.
204  Food products: Grain mill products
2061  Food products: Cane sugar, except refining
2062  Food products: Cane sugar refining
2063  Food products: Beet sugar
2074  Food products: Cottonseed oil mills
2075  Food products: Soybean oil mills
2076  Food products: Vegetable oil mills
4212 Transportation: Local trucking, without storage
4221  Transportation: Farm product warehousing and storage
4449 Transportation: Water transportation of freight, NEC
4731  Transportation services: Freight and cargo
5083 Wholesaling: Farm and garden machinery and equipment
5153 Wholesaling: Grain and field beans
5159 Wholesaling: Farm-product raw material, NEC
5191 Wholesaling: Farm supplies
8699 Services: Membership organizations, NEC
1Standard Industrial Classification System 3- or 4-digit industry code.
NEC is “not elsewhere classified.”80 population change; the log of 1980 population density; the percent of
1980 employment in agriculture, business services, manufacturing, mining,
and recreation; percent of the civilian workforce employed in 1980; percent
working outside the county; and median household income in 1979. Of the
agricultural characteristics discussed earlier, the beginning farmer models
included the proportion of sales going to very small farms (under $20,000
sales) and large farms (over $250,000 sales) and the proportion of farm
operators working off-farm over 200 days a year.
Farm-sector variables not discussed earlier include the proportion of crop-
land in acreage reduction programs, the proportion of cropland not planted
or diverted from production, the proportion of farm operators over 65 years
of age, the number of farms in the county (which enters select models in log
form), the proportion of farmland in crops, and the proportion of county
land area devoted to farming. The basic equations also included the percent-
ages of 1982 farm sales coming from specific commodities. For expositional
ease, these data are not reported here. All farm-sector variables are from the
1982 Census of Agriculture. The dependent variables for the results reported
in the text include the ratio of the number of young or short-tenure farm
operators in 1997 relative to their numbers in 1982. These were further
divided into ratios for each 5-year segment between 1982 and 1997. Iden-
tical models were estimated with the change in the share of all farmers that
were young or short-tenure over this period as the dependent variable (not
reported in the text for expositional ease). Descriptive statistics for each of
these variables are reported in table A.5.
With over 35 possible explanatory variables, we used a backward stepwise
regression procedure to narrow the set. Regressions were first estimated
with the aggregate CRP-enrollment-to-cropland ratio. This variable was then
replaced with similar ratios for whole- and for partial-farm acres.
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Table A.5—Mean values of variables unique to the beginning farmer models
Study High- Matched
Variable description Unit counties CRP1 counties
Beginning farmer measures:
Young farmers, 1997/1982 Percent 45.2 45.8 44.7
Short-tenure farmers, 1997/1982 Percent 69.7 74.0 73.4
CRP measures:
CRP acres (1991-93)/cropland, 1982 Percent 8.0 26.8 4.8**
Whole-farm acres/cropland Percent 3.0 11.1 1.6**
Farm and farm operator characteristics:
Diverted acres/cropland, 1982 Percent 1.6 3.1 1.9**
Cropland not planted or diverted, 1982 Percent 29.4 30.3 29.2
Cropland/farmland, 1982 Percent 56.2 47.3 50.6**
Farmland/all county land, 1982 Percent 69.1 75.9 75.2
Number of farms, 1982 Number 720 476 667**
** indicates that the difference between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs is significantly greater than 0 at the 0.01 level.
1High-CRP counties have an average CRP acres-to-cropland ratio for 1991-93 exceeding 20 percent. Of the 1,481 study counties, 194 were
high-CRP by this definition.
Source: 1982-1997 Census of Agriculture and the CRP Contracts file. In addition to the variables listed above, the models also included the pro-
portion of total sales in 1982 from the full range of farm commodities (not reported for expositional ease).Appendix B: 
Predicting Land-Use Changes
This appendix describes the econometric model used to predict land uses of
CRP parcels after contracts expire. Following traditional discrete-choice
studies on land-use change, the model draws on rent theory to simultane-
ously predict parcel-level CRP re-enrollment and post-CRP land use using
county-level profit measures in five broad categories of land use: urban,
range, forest, pasture, and crops. The model is calibrated using observation-
level land-use data from USDA’s Natural Resources Inventory (NRI) and
county-level profit estimates constructed from a variety of sources. The
model estimates the likelihood a parcel enrolled in CRP as of 1992
continues in CRP through 1997, and, if not, the likelihood it returns to crop
production. To predict post-CRP land uses of all parcels enrolled as of
November 2002, we extrapolate from this calibration using more recent data
on profit and land currently enrolled in CRP. The basic structure of the
model is illustrated in Figure B.1.
We condition our estimates on interactions between parcel attributes and
county-level profits and profit changes. Specifically, we include a measure
of parcel erodibility and indicator variables of land cover while under
contract with CRP.73 Including these variables and interactions should
account for some within-county variation in land-use rents as well as varia-
tion in the costs of converting land from the CRP cover to another use. Our
model also includes regional averages of land-use change to proxy for unob-
served land-use determinants correlated across space. Specifically, we
include the shares of CRP parcels in each crop district that opted out of the
program and the shares returning to crop production conditional on drop-
ping out. In this way, we account for some unobserved factors correlated
across space that may affect the rent for crop production relative to other
land-use alternatives.74
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73 The NRI includes many land char-
acteristics. We use only these two
because they are the only variables that
have matching counterparts in our pre-
diction data set: the 2002 CRP contract
file. For in-sample prediction using the
NRI, additional land characteristic
variables have little influence over the
predictions.
74 This approach differs from an
approach common in the literature on
spatial econometrics, which uses a spa-
tially autocorrelated error structure
(e.g., Anselin, 1988). We do not
employ these methods due to the com-
putational burdens of implementing a
spatial error structure in a discrete-
choice framework.
Figure B.1
The structure of the econometric model
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proportionsA Binomial Probit Model
We estimate the likelihood each CRP land parcel is converted back to crop
production using a subset of observations from the NRI enrolled in CRP in
1992 and not enrolled in 1997.75 The NRI is a panel survey conducted at
five-year intervals (1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) that provides information
on land use, land characteristics, and conservation practices for about
800,000 points of non-Federal land in all counties of the contiguous United
States plus Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Each NRI
point represents a different number of acres according to an acreage weight
that is inversely proportional to the sampling intensity for that location and
land use.
We hypothesize that the probability a parcel will be converted to crop
production upon exit from CRP depends on the profits associated with crop-
ping activities compared with noncropping activities, which vary geographi-
cally. The decision also depends on the cover in place while the parcel was
enrolled in CRP. For example, land planted with trees may be more costly to
convert to cropland than land planted with grass. 
We assume the decision to crop a land parcel is tied to a latent variable Y
that is a continuous function of observed profit measures, cover type, and
erodibility, plus a normal distributed error which encapsulates unobserved
factors. The variable Y may be interpreted as the excess profitability of
planting crops as compared to the next most profitable alternative. If Y > 0,
the land is converted to cropland; otherwise, it is not.
Specifically, we assume:
Y = f(X) + e (1)
where X is a vector of explanatory variables and ε a normal-distributed error
uncorrelated with f(X). Thus, if we denote the normal distribution function
by Φ,
Prob (Y > 0) = Φ(f(X)). (2) 
This is a general characterization of a binomial probit. 
After examining several functional forms for f(X), we chose a linear model
that considers all possible second-order interactions between our county-level
rent proxies and parcel-level variables—erodibility and cover.76 We examine
these interactions because lands with different attributes may be more or less
likely to convert to crops for a given set of rent measures, especially because
these measures are based on relatively coarse county-level data (described
below).77 We begin with a model that includes interactions between all
county-level rents and rent changes with both parcel-specific attributes. We
then drop and add terms from this more general model in order to minimize
the Akaike (1974) information criterion (AIC).
75 Observations (points) from the NRI
are used to model what happens to
land that leaves the CRP. To predict
what would happen to all CRP land,
the coefficients from this model are
then applied to parcel data from the
CRP contract file.
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76 A longer technical appendix, avail-
able online, describes this selection
process in greater detail (see
http://www.ers.usda.gov). In this selec-
tion process, we compared the model
described here to a simpler linear
model and a more flexible nonpara-
metric model. 
77 A reviewer suggested that CRP
rental rate is a sufficient estimator for
excess land profitability. We included
the additional predictors described for
several reasons. First, CRP rental rates
(and the county-level profit proxies)
do not encapsulate conversion costs,
which may include fixed components
(for example, cutting down trees).
Furthermore, CRP rental rates do not
necessarily equal the returns to con-
verting land back to crops. Although
CRP rental rates are likely greater than
or equal to the rents associated with
other land-use alternatives at the time
of signup, rents to other land uses
change over time, and the bidding
process is structured in a way that may
allow some farmers to obtain surplus
rents by enrolling in CRP. In addition,
our CRP rental rate estimate, like our
profit estimates, is at the county level,
not parcel specific. For these reasons,
we include proxies for alternative
land-use profits, changes in these prof-
its since initial signup, and specific
land attributes as additional predictors.Let i index the parcel-specific elements of X, which we denote by xi
S; and
let j index our county-level rent measures (and differences), denoted by xj
C.
For this specification, we can define f(X) as:




C +Σi Σj βijxi
Sxj
C. (3)
Our goal is to use the econometric model to predict the likelihood that each
current CRP contract will return to crop production if the program were to
end. Because the observations (from the NRI) that dropped out of CRP
between 1992 and 1997 were not randomly assigned, predictions of this
kind can be biased if we extrapolate our model to current CRP parcels. In
other words, unobserved factors may jointly affect the decision to remove a
parcel from CRP and convert it back to crops if it has exited. 
Decisions to exit CRP and to plant crops if exiting are likely determined
jointly. For example, land relatively more profitable in crop production is
probably more likely to exit and to be converted to crop production. It is
unclear, however, whether or not our model and explanatory variables
capture these joint determinants. If unobserved factors jointly determine the
likelihood a parcel drops out of CRP and the likelihood it returns to crop
production given it is no longer enrolled in the program, there is a sample
selection problem.
We deal with this problem using Heckman’s two-step procedure (Heckman
1978, 1979). Effectively, this procedure jointly models the decision to exit
CRP with the decision to return a parcel not re-enrolled in CRP to cropland
production. In practice, we do this in two steps.78 In the first step we predict
whether or not a parcel with an expiring CRP contract will re-enroll in CRP.
We denote with  the estimated value of a latent variable to which the proba-
bility a CRP parcel drops out of CRP is linked. We then calculate the
predicted “odds ratio” that each parcel will drop out of CRP. That is,
odds ratio =   (4)
where φ( ) is the value of the normal density function at  and Φ( ) is the
probability that a parcel drops out of CRP (the cumulative normal density at
). We use the same structure described above to estimate the first-stage
CRP dropout.79 We then construct the odds ratio and include it as a
predictor in the second-stage estimates—the model described above for
whether land not re-enrolled in CRP returns to cropland production. This
procedure provides consistent estimates in the second stage even when the
error in the first stage is correlated with the error in second stage.
Data
As described above, we use an in-sample data set for our estimation and an
out-of-sample data set to predict post-CRP uses of lands currently enrolled
in the program. The in-sample data set contains observations of CRP re-
enrollment and land-use choices as well as parcel-level observations of
erodibility and CRP cover from the NRI. More recent data on current CRP
acres were obtained from the Farm Service Agency (FSA). The FSA data
$ D
$ D $ D $ D
78 One can also estimate these two
equations simultaneously using full-
information maximum-likelihood. At
present, this approach is infeasible for
projection pursuit regression, a non-
parametric method we used to check
the fit of the simpler parametric mod-
els reported. We used the two-step pro-
cedure for all specifications to provide
a consistent basis for comparison
between candidate models.
79 We do not report estimates of these
first-stage models. These estimates are
available upon request.
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Φcontain information on total county acres in CRP and observations of erodi-
bility and cover practice for each CRP contract. 
The data set used in the first stage includes all NRI observations enrolled in
CRP in 1992 and/or 1997. The data set used in the second stage includes all
lands enrolled in 1992 but not enrolled in 1997. The first-stage sample
includes 21,172 observations and the second-stage subsample includes
2,756 observations. These observations span 1,599 counties in 42 States and
762 counties in 39 States, respectively.
We consider six land use categories, designated by the NRI, that exhaust the
non-Federal land base: crops, pasture, forests, urban, range, and other.80 The
NRI also provides an extensive set of variables on land characteristics
including two we incorporate into our model: erodibility and land cover.
Land cover is classified into two categories: grasses and/or legumes and
trees and/or wildlife practices.81 In 1992, approximately, 85 percent of total
contract acres were in grass/legumes and 15 percent in trees/wildlife. In
total, 19,785 NRI points, representing 34,042,100 acres, were reported in
the CRP in 1992 with 91 percent of acres under grass/legumes and just 9
percent in trees/wildlife cover. Of these 1992 CRP acres, approximately 11
percent were no longer enrolled in CRP by 1997. The estimated mean drop-
out rates for lands in the grasses/legumes was slightly higher than for lands
under trees/wildlife cover, with 11 percent and 9 percent of acres dropping
out from each cover type, respectively. 
Of the land that dropped out of the CRP between 1992 and 1997, about 63
percent returned to crop production. This percentage was sensitive to the
type of cover, with land in trees and wildlife substantially more likely to
continue under forest rather than in crop production or grazing. Although 56
percent of acres in trees/wildlife were covered in forest as of 1997, less than
1 percent of lands in grass/legumes were planted or naturally regenerated
with trees after dropping out of CRP.82
To make predictions regarding post-CRP land use on currently enrolled
acres, we use data obtained from FSA on 589,932 CRP contracts, repre-
senting all 33.3 million acres enrolled as of November, 2002. This data set
contains data on acreage enrolled, county location, erodibility, and CRP
cover practice for every CRP contract.
Besides erodibility and land cover, our key explanatory variables are county-
level profit proxies for five alternative land uses: crops, pasture, forest,
urban, and range. Using county-level data derived from various sources, we
construct measures of revenues less variable costs for each of these five
land-use activities.
We assume landowners and operators base their expectations of future land-
use returns using current levels of prices and, when relevant, the average
value of yields over the previous 5 years. In this way, we smooth over idio-
syncratic weather shocks that affect yields in particular years. We use the
current commodity price because time-series of most commodity prices
show a strong degree of autocorrelation—price shocks are far more
persistent than yield shocks. Data on cash costs as a percentage of revenue
at the State and regional level, respectively, are from the Census of Agricul-
80 Our data on land use is from USDA
National Resources Inventory (NRI).
“Croplands” include row and close-
grown crops, fallow, pasture and hay-
lands in rotation with crops, perma-
nent haylands, vineyards, orchards,
and nurseries. “Pasture” includes land
managed for introduced forage for
livestock grazing. “Range” includes
land under native or introduced forage
suitable for grazing which, unlike pas-
ture, receives only limited manage-
ment. “Forests” are areas at least one
acre in size and 100 feet in width that
are least 10-percent stocked with trees
with the potential to reach 13 feet at
maturity. From an aerial perspective,
this definition equates to a canopy
cover of at least 25 percent. “Urban
lands” include areas in residential,
industrial, commercial, otan areas, as
these are separately identified by the
NRI. 
81 While the NRI distinguishes between
trees and wildlife covers, we group
these two into one category given the
small number of observations. 
82 NRI's forest classification can
include lands with early evidence of
natural forest regeneration.
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from NASS and the Census of Agriculture provided weights for averaging
across individual crops. County-level estimates of total Federal program
payments per acre are from the Census of Agriculture and include receipts
from deficiency payments, support price payments, indemnity programs,
disaster payments, and payments for soil and water conservation projects.
Since we cannot observe the exact year in which a land-use decision is
made between NRI surveys, we use 1996 prices in our econometric estima-
tion of re-enrollment decisions following contract expiration over 1996-
1997. For the out-of sample predictions, we use 2001 prices, the latest year
for which all of our data are available.
Using these levels of prices and yields, we construct measures for each
county in the contiguous United States of the expected per acre annual net
returns that can be expected from the major land-use alternatives. We esti-
mate net returns to continuing in CRP, to returning to crop production, and
to the four major noncrop land uses (pasture, forest, urban, and range). For
our measure of returns to re-enrolling in the CRP, we use county-average
CRP rental rates per acre obtained from FSA’s data on individual contracts.
The estimates for returning to crop production include the net returns from
market sales as well as government farm program payments, excluding
payments for cropland retirement under the CRP and the Wetlands Reserve
Program (WRP), which are jointly reported in the Census of Agriculture.
These land-retirement programs are excluded because we separately model
the decision to reenroll in the CRP. Returns to forests and urban uses are
initially calculated as the net present values of a perpetual stream of timber
harvests and rents from housing development, respectively, and then annual-
ized with an assumed private discount rate of 5 percent.
For all CRP contracts as of November 2002, crop returns (and changes in
returns) are lower than in the total in-sample, with values of $58 ($22) and
$90 ($53), respectively. This reflects the decline in crop prices from 1996 to
2001. Returns to pasture (and changes in returns) are also slightly higher for
the NRI observations that drop out of CRP, compared to the NRI points that
stay in CRP. Total pasture returns (but not changes in returns) are also
higher in the total out- versus in-sample.
Lastly, our explanatory variables include regional averages of land-use
change to proxy for unobserved land-use determinants correlated across
space. Specifically, we include the shares of CRP parcels in each crop
district that opted out of the program and the shares returning to crop
production conditional on dropping out. In this way, we account for some
unobserved factors correlated across space that may affect the rents from
crop production relative to other land-use alternatives.83
County-Level Estimates of Annual Net Returns
Cropland Net Returns: Estimated annual cropland net returns per acre
consist of two components: a weighted average of the net returns per acre
for 21 major crops based on prices, yields, costs, and acres, and total
Federal farm program payments per acre, excluding conservation payments
for cropland retirement. We used State-level marketing-year-average prices
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83 Technically, the regional proportions
on the right-hand side of the regres-
sion are endogenous.  However,
because there are a relatively large
number of observations in most crop
districts, this should not affect regres-
sion estimates. The average number of
NRI CRP points in a crop district is
81. This number ranges from 1 to 742,
with 75 percent of districts having
more than 10 observations.and county-level yields from the National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS) for all crops (barley, all dry edible beans, corn, cotton, flaxseed,
alfalfa hay, other hay, oats, peanuts, potatoes, rye, rice, sorghum, soybeans,
sugarcane, sugar beets, sunflowers, tobacco, winter wheat, durum wheat,
other spring wheat). 
Pasture Net Returns: Annual net returns per acre for pasture were estimated
using pasture yields from the National Cooperative Soil Survey (NCSS),
averaged for each county using NRI soils and acreage data. We multiplied
these yields by the State price for “other hay” from NASS and subtracted
costs per acre for hay and other field crops from the Census of Agriculture.
Range Net Returns: Annual net returns per acre for rangeland were esti-
mated using forage yields from NCSS, weighted with NRI soils and acreage
data and multiplied by State-level per head grazing rates for private lands
from the ERS database on cash rents. Costs for range management are
assumed to be borne by the tenant and thus reflected in the grazing rates.
Forest Net Returns: We estimate annual forestry net returns per acre by
annualizing at a 5- percent interest rate the net present value of a weighted
average of sawtimber revenues from different forest types based on prices,
yields, costs, and acres. State-level stumpage prices were gathered from a
variety of State and Federal agencies and private data reporting services.
Regional merchantable timber yield estimates for different forest types were
obtained from Richard Birdsey of the U.S. Forest Service. Regional
replanting and annual management costs were derived from Moulton and
Richards (1990) and Dubois, et al. (1999). The net present value of an infi-
nite stream of forestry revenues for each forest type was calculated using an
optimal rotation age determined with the Faustmann formula, assuming
forests start at year zero in a newly planted state. County acreage and
sawtimber output data from the U.S. Forest Services’s Forest Inventory and
Analysis (FIA) and Timber Product Output (TPO) surveys provided weights
for averaging across individual forest types and species, respectively. 
Urban Net Returns: Annual urban net returns per acre are estimated as the
median value of a recently developed parcel, less the value of structures,
annualized at a 5-percent interest rate. This measure corresponds to the
average annual rents from an acre of improved bare land and is based on the
value of land for construction of single-family homes, which is the primary
use of developed land at the national scale. Median county-level prices for
single-family homes were constructed from the decennial Census of Popula-
tion and Housing Public Use Microdata Samples and the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) House Price Index. Regional data
on lot sizes and the value of land relative to structures for single-family
homes were obtained from the Characteristics of New Housing Reports (C-
25 series) and the Survey of Construction (SOC) microdata from the Census
Bureau. Further details on the construction of the urban net returns are
provided in Plantinga, et al. (2002).
More complete descriptions and citations of data sources are provided in
Lubowski (2002) and are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table B.1 summarizes the estimates of the two parametric models, equations
3 and 4, both with and without Heckman’s sample-selection correction. The
variable names denote the crop-district-level crop share variable; the parcel-
level measures of erodibility and cover type (grass/legumes and
trees/wildlife); and the county-level CRP rental rates and measures of net
returns to alternative land uses. The best linear model with interactions
(determined by minimization of the AIC) explains 31.6 percent of the
deviance. When we include Heckman’s odds ratio to correct for sample-
selection bias, the fit improves to just 31.7 percent of the deviance. The
model implies that crop profits, cover type, the spatial variable, erosion, and
the CRP rental rate are the most significant explanatory variables explaining
conversion back to crops. The greater crop profits and crop profit growth,
the greater the likelihood a parcel will return to cropland. When interaction
terms are considered, the significance of these variables is most evident via
their interaction with the other variables and with each other. Forest and
pasture profits reduce the likelihood that CRP parcels are converted to crop-
land, but they are not individually statistically significant. Wildlife cover and
especially tree cover reduce the likelihood of conversion to crops compared
with grass or legume covers. These interactions suggest that the effects of
both profits and cover types can be different depending on the erodibility of
the land.
Heckman’s odds ratio is statistically significant in all the models and implies,
conditional on observable characteristics, that parcels that continued in CRP
are less likely than those having dropped out to be converted to crop produc-
tion upon contract termination. This seems consistent with economic intu-
ition that the better the cropland, the greater the enticement to take land out
of CRP and place it back into crop production. This effect, however, is small.
Regardless of whether or not we use the Heckman correction, the average
predicted probability that a parcel will be converted to crop production is
lower for parcels that did not drop out of CRP compared with those that did.
Indeed, the average probabilities are quite similar, which suggests that our
explanatory variables capture most of the differences between parcels that
dropped out of CRP and those that did not. 
The linear model implies that crop rents, cover type, location (the spatial
surface), and the prime farmland indicator are the most statistically signifi-
cant explanatory factors predicting conversion to crop production. The
greater the net returns from cropping and the growth in these returns, the
greater the likelihood that a parcel will revert to crop production upon
exiting CRP. In the larger model with interaction terms, the significance of
the different variables is partially evident through their interaction with the
other variables and with each other. Due to the many interactions in the
larger model, one cannot easily discern marginal effects of each variable
from a casual inspection of coefficients. Insight into the average marginal
effects of the net return variables can be obtained by examining how the
predictions change when adding and subtracting 50 percent to one variable
at a time, holding all other variables static. Results from these simulations
are reported in Table B.2. Increases in crop net returns, including govern-
ment payments, (and decreases in range and urban net returns) modestly
increase the predicted likelihood that the average parcel will convert to
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1986 and 1996, the estimates suggest that a smaller share of exiting CRP
lands would have returned to crop production if net returns had not
increased. Similarly, a larger share would have returned to crop production
if government payments had not decreased during this period. The predicted
likelihood of returning to crops was not sensitive to the simulated changes
in either forest or pasture net returns.
Table B.3 compares the in-sample (NRI parcels that dropped out of CRP)
and out-of-sample (NRI parcels still enrolled in CRP in 1997) predictions.
All models predict that between 61.2 and 61.3 percent of in-sample acres
return to cropland and that between 52.2 and 53.4 percent of out-of-sample
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Table B.1—Summary of parametric probit models
Model
Explanatory variable Simple linear model AIC minimum Heckman two-step
Estimate Standard error Estimate Stamdard error Estimate Standard error
INTERCEPT -1.051 0.120 -0.853 0.244 -1.691 0.3905
CROPSHARE 2.015 0.109 1.977 0.113 2.011 0.1146
ERODIBILITY -0.007 0.002 -0.011 0.006 -0.010 0.0061
URBAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000
RANGE 0.000 0.003 -0.016 0.011 -0.016 0.0110
CROPS 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.0001 0.0019
FOREST -0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.0072
PASTURE -0.0003 0.0030 -0.011 0.004 -0.012 0.0041
∆ URBAN 0.0000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 -0.0001 0.0002
∆ RANGE -0.0002 0.0133 0.035 0.045 0.034 0.0454
∆ CROPS 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.0019
∆ FOREST 0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.011 -0.0004 0.0111
∆ PASTURE -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.003 -0.005 0.0035
RENT 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.0045
COVER-T -0.591 0.141 0.584 0.366 0.390 0.3704
COVER-W -0.393 0.173 0.375 0.393 0.345 0.3932
EI*CROPS -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001
EI*PASTURE 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0002
EI*∆ RANGE 0.0021 0.0010 0.0021 0.0010
EI*∆ FOREST -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0004
URBAN*RENT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RANGE*RENT 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
RANGE*COVER-T -0.0598 0.0255 -0.0572 0.0256
RANGE*COVER-G 0.0271 0.0243 0.0274 0.0244
CROPS*RENT 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
FOREST*COVER-T -0.0300 0.0163 -0.0221 0.0164
FOREST*COVER-G -0.0727 0.0264 -0.0634 0.0264
∆ URBAN*RENT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
∆ RANGE*RENT -0.0018 0.0009 -0.0019 0.0009
∆ CROPS*RENT -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
∆ PASTURE*RENT 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Heckman odds ratio 0.4087 0.1475
Percent deviance 
explained 29.3 31.6 31.7
AIC 2,685.8 2,621.6 2,615.5
Bold indicates statistical significance with 5-percent confidence.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.acres enrolled in CRP in 1997 would have returned to cropland had their
contracts been terminated. 
To make predictions about post-CRP use of land remaining in CRP, we
utilize parameter estimates derived mainly from data on parcels that
dropped out of CRP. Because these parcels are somewhat different from the
parcels that continued in CRP, we must extrapolate.
Table B.4 reports the AIC-selected model’s predictions for the 2002 CRP
contract file, taking into account changes in our profit measures between
1997 and 2002. We made separate predictions for each contract based on the
parcel’s cover and erodibility, and our profit estimates. We then aggregated
these predictions to obtain State-level and nationwide predictions. The table
reports the number of CRP acres enrolled in each State as of November
2002 and the predicted number and share of acres returning to cropland if
the program were to end, ranked by the amount of land in the CRP (column
2). The 95-percent confidence interval for the predicted percentage of each
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Table B.2—Sensitivity of predictions to changes in net returns variables
Predicted acres returning to crop production in 19971
Scenario In-sample (exited CRP) Out-of-sample (in CRP in 1997)
Change in All Grass or Trees or All Grass or Trees or
Variable 1996 level2 parcels legume cover wildlife cover parcels legume cover wildlife cover
Percent
Original results 61 64 26 53 56 31
Crop net returns +50 66 69 29 58 61 35
(CROPS) -50 56 59 22 48 51 27
Pasture net returns +50 60 63 25 52 55 30
(PASTURE) -50 62 65 27 55 57 32
Forest net returns +50 60 63 23 52 55 28
(FOREST) -50 63 66 30 55 58 34
Range net returns +50 58 61 23 52 54 27
(RANGE) -50 64 66 32 56 57 38
Urban net returns +50 56 59 24 50 53 30
(URBAN) -50 65 68 28 56 59 32
1Predictions are estimates from the Heckman two-step model based on the linear model with interactions.
2Predictions based on the indicated percentage change in the 1996 levels of a particular variable (e.g. CROPS) as well as on the corresponding
new values for the 1986-1996 change in this variable (e.g. ∆ CROPS).
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Table B.3—Predicted acreage returning to crop production
In-sample Out-of-sample
Model (dropped out of CRP) (in CRP in 1997)
Percent
Actual (see table 4.1) 62.6 N/A
Simple linear 61.2 52.2
Linear with interactions 61.3 52.5
(AIC minimum)
Heckman two-step 61.2 53.4
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.94
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Table B.4—Predicted share of CRP acres returning to crops upon program expiration, 2002
Predicted share
Predicted land returning to crops
CRP land returning to crops (95-percent confidence
State (acres) (acres) interval)
Iowa  1,857.6 1,631.9 88 (55- 99)
Kentucky  312.5 271.4 87 (53 - 96)
Louisiana  203.9 15.3 8 (1 - 24)
North Dakota  3,331.8 2,616.5 79 (73 - 86)
South Dakota  1,431.1 1,118.8 78 (64 - 86)
Tennessee  246.1 186.4 76 (42 - 91)
Illinois  963.2 709.0 74 (37 - 96)
Missouri  1,542.5 1,091.0 71 (43 - 87)
Nevada  0.2 0.0 7 (3 - 20)
Pennsylvania  118.9 82.3 69 (43 - 87)
Wisconsin  634.2 396.3 62 (54 - 72)
Oregon  455.5 281.4 62 (28 - 87)
New Mexico  593.0 355.9 60 (32 - 82)
South Carolina  217.7 12.4 6 (1- 16)
New Hampshire  0.2 0.0 6 (0 - 58)
Florida  86.7 4.9 6 (0 - 31)
Minnesota  1,695.3 1,004.2 59 (45 - 77)
Wyoming  277.8 159.2 57 (45 - 77)
Indiana  294.0 166.3 57 (19 - 84)
Montana  3,407.4 1,720.5 50 (42 - 66)
New York  59.3 25.8 44 (27 - 64)
Texas 4,031.0 1,749.0 43 (29 - 57)
Ohio  295.2 121.2 41 (24 - 67)
Kansas  2,656.0 1,070.5 40 (35 - 50)
North Carolina  113.3 45.6 40 (16 - 58)
Colorado  2,203.1 880.9 40 (15 - 71)
Idaho  789.4 305.5 39 (15 - 71)
Virginia  56.2 21.7 39 (15 - 64)
Vermont  1.1 0.4 39 (12 - 74)
Mississippi  871.4 334.4 38 (15 - 58)
Maine  24.1 8.5 35 (21 - 64)
Michigan  306.1 101.0 33 (17 - 59)
Georgia  308.6 9.6 3 (0 - 15)
California  144.4 37.9 26 (1 - 61
Nebraska  1,135.9 288.8 25 (10 - 60)
Maryland  66.8 16.1 24 (9 - 67)
Massachusetts  0.1 0.0 2 (0 - 71)
Alabama  482.6 90.8 19 (7  36)
New Jersey  2.3 0.4 19 (5 - 64)
Oklahoma  1,023.9 174.7 17 (12 - 29)
Arkansas  164.8 26.4 16 (3 - 41)
Washington  1,276.6 192.7 15 (3 - 59)
West Virginia  1.6 0.2 13 (1 - 54)
Utah  201.1 19.8 10 (3 - 37)
Connecticut  0.3 0.0 0 (0 - 20)
Delaware  6.9 0.0 0 (0 - 13)
48-State total 33,891.7 17,346.0 51 (40 - 63)
Source: CRP Contracts file as of November, 2002State’s CRP land returning immediately to crops if CRP contracts were to
expire is reported in parentheses.
Nationwide, the model predicts that 51 percent of the land enrolled in CRP
would return to crop production if the program expired at the end of 2002.
This number is slightly less than our 1997 out-of-sample predictions. Most
of this difference stems from the decline in commodity prices between 1997
and 2002. To a lesser extent, this difference stems from differences between
the 1997 NRI sample of CRP parcels and the November 2002 contract file,
which occur due to new CRP signups since 1997 and sampling error in the
NRI.
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the Recreation Models
This report uses two methods to compute the CRP’s impact on outdoor
recreational expenditures. The “trips-based” method uses data on outdoor
recreational trips taken by individuals. The “receipts-based” method uses
information on money paid to farmers for recreational uses of their land.
Both methods also use information on trip-related expenditures, such as
expenditures on food, lodging, and transport.
The Trips-Based Method
The trips-based method uses survey data on the American public’s participa-
tion in outdoor recreation. This data comes from the 2000 National Survey
of Recreation and the Environment (NSRE2000) and the 1996 Fishing,
Hunting, and Wildlife Associated Recreation Survey (FHWAR96). In addi-
tion, land-use data from the 1992 Natural Resources Inventory (NRI) is used
to describe the sites visited by individuals.
Ideally, the actual sites visited by survey respondents, and the physical
attributes of these sites, would be used in an econometric model. However,
for a number of reasons (survey restrictions, difficulty of matching reported
site names with actual sites, and limited biophysical data) we use an indirect
measure of site location. In particular, individuals reported the distance and
direction to visited sites.84 When combined with the respondent’s zip code,
this distance and direction information identifies the subcounty region
visited. In addition, the NSRE2000 and FHWAR96 data provided respon-
dent attributes, such as income and age.
These subcounty regions were the “choices” available to each respondent.
Formed from the intersection of county boundaries, major land resource
area boundaries, and eight-digit hydrological unit code boundaries, these
regions are likely to be relatively homogeneous.
The NRI points falling within each of the subcounty regions are used to
describe the attributes of each of these recreational site choices. Since the
research focused on the impacts of the Conservation Reserve Program, a
reduced-form set of variables was used. That is, instead of attempting to
identify the various attributes that outdoor recreationists actually care about
(such as the number of birds spotted, or the clarity of the stream water),
measures of land use within each region were used as proxies for these
attributes.
To explicitly account for site attributes, a discrete-continuous model was
used to estimate trip-taking behavior.85 The first stage of the model (the
discrete component) is used to predict the probability of visiting different
sites (given that a trip is taken). A multinomial logit model is used, with the
probability of an individual visiting the jth site (out of J total sites):
P(j)= exp{Vj)}  Σmexp{Vm},
84 Respondents reported one of the
eight cardinal directions: North,
Northeast, East, Southeast, South,
Southwest, West and Northwest.
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85 This discrete/continuous model is
similar to the version used in Feather
et al., 1999.Vj=β1*TCj + β2*ln(Mj) + β3*X1j .. +  βk*Xkj
The individual specific set of j=1..J available sites are the subcounties
within 100 miles of a zip code’s centroid. β are parameters to be estimated,
and X1…Xk are site attributes. M is an aggregation correction that controls
for the size of the counties.
The second stage estimates total trips taken by the respondent. A Poisson
count model is used that includes an “inclusive value,” computed using data
and coefficients from the first stage. The probability of an individual making
q total trips:
Prob(Q=q) = exp(-λ) * λq / q!
λ = I*µ + Zθ
I= ln(Σjexp{Vj})
I is the inclusive value, computed using β and site attributes from the first
stage of the model. Z are individual socioeconomic characteristics, and θ
and µ are parameters to be estimated.
The discrete/continuous models were estimated for several different types of
activity (hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, and other water-based recre-
ation). Tables C.1 and C.2 illustrate the results obtained for wildlife viewing
(using data from the FHWAR96 survey).
These results indicate that increasing the percent of CRP (in a subcounty
area) increases the probability of that subcounty being visited. Furthermore,
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Table C.1—First stage (multinomial logit) results for wildlife viewing
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
Distance to site -0.041 -213.5
CRP (percent) 0.527 2.3
Cultivated cropland (percent) -1.02 -16.8
Non-cultivated cropland (percent) -0.311 -1.91
Pasture (percent) -0.10 -1.18
Range (percent) -1.55 -24.8
Forest  (percent) -0.28 -5.7
Urban  (percent) 0.99 17.55
Urbanization index -0.011 -3.3
(0=urban to 9=totally rural)
Number of observations=3,345. Log-likelihood = -93458.7.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA, using NSRE data.
Table C.2—Second stage (Poisson) results for wildlife viewing
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 0.12 0.65
Inclusive value 0.195 9.3
Income -0.0063 -2.1
Male dummy (1 if male) -0.120 -7.0
Years of schooling -0.020 -7.03
Age 0.0093 20.0
Race dummy (1 if  white) 0.094 2.6
Number of observations=3,029. Log likelihood=-21252.7.
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA, using NSRE data.an increase in CRP will increase the inclusive value, which will have a posi-
tive impact on total number of wildlife viewing trips taken.
To compute the CRP’s impact on recreational expenditures, the CRP percent
variable is set to zero, and other land-use variables are adjusted (using the
land-use prediction model described in Appendix B). Then, using the coeffi-
cients from both steps, the predicted number of recreational trips is
computed. The difference between the observed number of trips and the
predicted number of trips is then multiplied by per trip expenditure data
(that was gathered as part of the FHWAR96 and NSRE2000 surveys).86 This
product, after suitable weighting (using sample-to-population weights
included in both surveys) is the “trips-based” estimate of the CRP’s impact
on recreational expenditures. As noted in the text, the net result was quite
small, with a national value of about $7 million.
Although this methodology is grounded in actual observations on recre-
ational trip-taking, along with data on actual land uses, this methodology
suffers from a number of problems. In particular, the use of “subcounties”
as destinations will introduce aggregation bias. Hence, our predicted
impacts are not likely to be robust, and may be highly biased.
The Receipts-Based Method
As an alternative to the empirically based, but possibly biased, trips-based
method, a receipts-based estimate is also constructed. This uses information on
money received by farmers as payment for recreational access to their land.
The following question from the 2000 ARMS survey is used:
“In 2000, what was the total income received by you for recreation,
such as hunting, fishing, petting zoos, horseback riding, on-farm
rodeos, etc.”
Of 10,309 ARMS respondents in 2000, 1,139 had some CRP land. After
applying population weights, this subsample of 1,139 represents:
• About 100 million acres of land, including approximately 33 million
acres of CRP land. 
• Recreational receipts of about $39 million (out of about $750 million
received by all farmers)
Dividing recreational receipts by CRP acres yields approximately $1.20 
per acre.
The next step is to account for expenditures other than for access fees. One
measure can be derived by assuming that the average hunter will spend
money on access fees in fixed proportion to expenditures on all other
hunting-related goods and services. Using the FHWAR96 data, average
expenditures by small game and migratory waterfowl hunters were
computed for several sectors: food and lodging, transportation (public and
private), trade goods (cooking fuel and ammo), and services (lease
payments, guide payments, equipment rentals, boating costs). Sector-
specific expansion factors are computed as the ratio of sector expenditures
86 More precisely, several categories of
per trip expenditures are used, includ-
ing food, transportation, lodging, spe-
cial equipment, and guide services.
Some classes of expenditures, such as
purchases of guns and other equip-
ment, are not included on the assump-
tion that hunters would purchase these
things even if CRP did not exist.
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were $2 million, and expenditures on food and lodging were $5 million,
then the regional “food and lodging expansion factor” would be 2.5. These
data are used to compute sector expenditures on a per county basis, using:87
Sector-expenditures = crp-acres * access_fee_receipts_per_acre *
sector_specific_expansion_factor
Summing sector expenditures for the entire nation and all sectors yields a
value of about $146 million. However, this only accounts for hunting and
does not consider wildlife viewing. To more fully capture the impacts of
CRP, we double this amount, yielding a “wildlife-related” impact of approx-
imately $290 million.
This doubling is based on the following:
• FHWAR96 data indicate that about 75 percent of hunting trips occur on
private lands. Therefore, fees for access to private lands should capture a
component of most hunting trips—or, more precisely, average fees will
capture a component of a representative hunting trip.
• Conversely, about 80 percent of wildlife watching occurs on public
lands. Thus, access fees paid to private landowners are less likely to be
an important component of wildlife-watching trips.
• This does not mean that CRP is unimportant for wildlife watching, since
wildlife viewed on public lands may depend on nearby CRP lands.
• From FHWAR data, about one-quarter of all small-game hunting trips
are for pheasant hunting.88
• According to Feather et al. (1999), the positive impact of the CRP on
pheasant hunting was about one-quarter of CRP’s impact on wildlife
viewing ($80 million versus $347 million).
• Thus, if CRP’s impact on all small-game hunting trips is similar to CRP’s
impact on pheasant hunting, then the expenditures on wildlife viewing
due to the CRP will equal the expenditures on small-game hunting.
There are a number of factors that may bias the receipts-based method. These
include factors that may lead to underestimates or overestimates. Since
water-based recreation impacts are not accounted for, the receipts-based
method underestimates CRP’s impact on recreational spending. Furthermore,
hunters who are given free access to CRP land are not explicitly accounted
for (even though they, too, will be spending money on food, lodging, etc).
On the other hand, the receipts-based method attributes all recreation expen-
ditures to farmers who have any CRP land to their CRP acres, even though
CPR accounts for less than half of their land. This may overestimate CRP’s
importance. Furthermore, all recreational receipts are assumed to be a func-
tion of CRP enrollment even though some activities, such as corn mazes,
may not depend on having land retired from production.89 Finally, activity
substitution is not accounted for—it is assumed that if the CRP were termi-
nated, then all related recreational expenditures (such as for gas and trans-
portation) would cease. Since a substantial percentage of the recreational fees
collected by farmers are probably from local hunters and recreationists, this
assumption probably leads to overstated CRP impacts.
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87 The (average) per acre access fees
and the sector-specific expansion fac-
tors are computed for each of the 10
census regions.
88 Earlier work also suggests that one-
quarter of CRP's small-game benefits
are from pheasant hunting (Ribaudo et
al., 1990).
89 Evidence from a North Dakota sur-
vey of farmers suggests that about
three-fourths of farmer receipts from
recreationists are from hunters (Hodur
et al., 2002).Appendix D:  U.S. Regional
Agricultural Sector Model
As CRP acreage is released from conservation uses, crop production would
increase with subsequent decreases in crop prices. The U.S. Regional Agri-
cultural Sector Model (USMP; see House et al., 1999) simulates potential
adjustments in production and prices to this policy. This model is a multi-
commodity, spatial equilibrium approach of the type described in McCarl
and Spreen (1980). The USMP model has been applied to various issues,
such as the regional effects of trade agreements (Burfisher et al., 1992),
climate change mitigation (Peters et al., 2001), water quality (Ribaudo et al.,
2001), ethanol production (House et al., 1993), wetlands policy (Claassen et
al., 1998), and sustainable agriculture policy (Faeth, 1995).
USMP allocates production practices regionally based on relative differ-
ences in net returns by region. As such, USMP simulations of changes in
farm programs are manifest as a spatial equilibrium across 10 main produc-
tion regions (r) and 45 subregions (u) delineated by erosion class (highly
erodible and non-highly erodible). Commodity price and production levels
are simulated for 44 agricultural commodities and processed products at the
regional level, which are integrated into the flow of final commodity
demand and stock markets. USMP accounts for production of the major
crop (corn, soybeans, sorghum, oats, barley, wheat, cotton, rice, hay, and
silage) and confined livestock (beef, dairy, swine, and poultry) categories
comprising approximately 75 percent of agronomic production and more
than 90 percent of livestock production. 
Production levels, land use, land-use management (e.g. crop mix, rotations,
tillage, and fertilizer practices), and program participation are endogenously
determined spatially according to a constrained optimization approach,
maximizing consumer and producer welfare, L L:
(1) Max L L:
subject to 
(2) (commodity balancing);
(3) (regional input balancing);
(4)  (regional crop balancing);
(5) (regional rotation balancing);
and
(6) (nonnegativity  constraints).
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Z,Y,X ,X ,INP ,INP ,RAC,C cr liv v F ≥ 0Matrix Z represents consumer demand for produced commodities, matrix P,
across markets and regions. Matrices A and B are the intercept and slope
coefficients for product and market demand (superscripted “d”) and supply
(superscripted “S”), respectively. Matrices Xcr and Xliv represent cropping
and livestock activities across regions and management practices. Vectors Y
and Wy represent processing activity levels and net costs of process, respec-
tively. Matrix INP represents variable (subscripted “V”) and fixed
(subscripted “F”) inputs into production of primary and processed goods.
WINP represents cost per unit of fixed inputs. The output parameters per
share of crop, livestock, and processing activities are represented by
matrices ppcr, ppliv, and ppy, respectively. The input-output parameters for
crop and livestock production activities are represented by matrices ppinpcr
and ppinpliv, respectively.
Substitution among the cropping activities is represented using nested
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions (4 and 5). The crop
and rotation balancing equations ensures that the supply of land (Cp,u) in
subregion (u) allocated to a crop (p) is at least as great as the demand for it,
given by the sum of rotational acres (RACb,u) multiplied by the share of
each crop grown in that rotation (sp,b,u) subject to nonlinear CET distribu-
tion (δb,u), shift (αp,u), and substitution (ρp,u) calibration parameters. Simi-
larly, the allocation of land to various tillage practices (t) used in a crop
rotation (b) must be no greater than the amount of land in that rotation, also
subject to CET distribution (δb,t,u), shift (αb,u), and substitution (ρb,u) cali-
bration parameters. The nonlinear CET equations imply that there is a
declining marginal rate of transformation between land used in one crop
rotation and land used to produce the same crop as part of another rotation,
and between one tillage activity in a particular rotation and land used in
other tillage activities used with the same rotation. 
The initial crop production and price data for this analysis are calibrated to
the 2001 agricultural baseline (USDA, 2001). Given the shortrun nature of
the analysis, all land previously enrolled in the CRP is constrained to return
to active crop production, which provides an upper bound on the price and
production adjustments.90 Moreover, because the livestock and poultry
sectors are linked integrally to the crop sectors through the intermediate
feed sector, decreases in crop commodity prices are expected to increase
returns for the livestock sector. This would induce increases in livestock
production and decreases in livestock commodity prices. Therefore, the
impacts of removing the CRP are estimated for both the crop and animal
production sectors.
90 The USMP does not explicitly
include range or pasture lands. Conse-
quently, the total quantity of cropland
enrolled in CRP for 2001 in this model
is approximately 20.6 million acres. If
all of this returns to production, crop
acreage would increase by 18.9 mil-
lion acres with the remaining 1.7 
million acres in a fallow rotation.
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Accounting Matrix (SAM)
Multiplier Framework
For the regional (and national) economies, a social accounting matrix
(SAM) presents a snapshot of a regional (or national) economic equilibrium.
It is the accounting framework in matrix form that underlies the elaborate
circular flow diagrams of economic activity found in basic economics texts.
The strength of the SAM is the integration of the input-output table with a
set of household, government, capital, rest-of-the-U.S. (ROUS), and rest-of-
the-world (ROW) accounts in order to represent the complete set of revenue
and income flows between production, income, consumption, investment,
and trade. 
As a double-entry accounting framework of debits (expenditures) and
credits (receipts), the column sum of expenditures made by each account is
equal to the row sum of its receipts. For the firm accounts (in Figure E.1),
total costs is the column sum of purchases of intermediate goods and serv-
ices from other firms (A), wages paid to labor and profits paid for services
rendered by owners of financial and real property assets (F), indirect busi-
ness taxes (TIB), and purchases of imports (M). Firms’ total costs equal the
row sum of total sales of their output made to other firms (A), households
(C), government (G), investment purchases of capital goods by businesses
and government (I), and exports outside of the region or outside of the
country (E). Total factor income paid by businesses (F) is redistributed to
households (Y), to government as social security payments and taxes on
profits (TF), and to the capital account as business savings in the form of
depreciation and retained corporate profits (SB). For households, the column
sum of total expenditures on consumption goods and services (C), taxes
(TH), and savings (SH) equals the row sum of total income received in the
form of wages and property income (Y), remittances from other enterprises
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Figure E.1
The social accounting matrix
Account: Production Factors Households Other institutions Total
1. Production A C I, G, E Total sales
2. Factors F Factor income








Factor Household outlays, exports 
Total Total costs income expenditures & foreign savings
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.and households (R), and government transfers (GT). For State/local and
Federal governments, the row sum total of tax receipts from all sources
(TIB, TF, and TH) is equal to the column sum total of government expendi-
tures on goods and services, government transfers to households and firms
(GT), transfers among the different levels of government (GG), and any
budget savings (SG). For the capital account, investment purchases (I)
equals the row sum total of savings from all sources (SB, SH, SG, and SF).
Finally, equilibrium in the ROUS and ROW accounts means that the row
sum of imports purchases (M) is equal to the column sum of exports out of
the region (E) plus capital inflows or “foreign savings” (SF).
The SAM framework possesses an extraordinary flexibility enabling us to
tailor the dimensions of the SAM to the problem at hand. Our SAMs focus
on those sectors most affected by CRP enrollment changes: agriculture,
spending on outdoor recreation, and household expenditures out of transfer
income. For our regional SAMs, we aggregate the 478 sectors in the
IMPLAN database into 12 industrial accounts (13 accounts for the national
SAM). These SAMs have five agricultural sectors: livestock, grains,
oilseeds, hay & pasture crops, and other crops. For the Southern Plains,
cotton replaces oilseeds as a sector; for the national SAM, the cotton sector
is added to the set of agricultural sectors. The seven nonagricultural sectors
are agricultural inputs, food processing, industry, wholesale trade and trans-
portation, retail trade, eating and lodging establishments, and services. The
“industry” sector itself is an aggregation of manufacturing, mining, energy,
and utilities sectors. Outdoor recreation expenditures are broken down into
expenditures on eating and lodging, retail trade (e.g., household purchases
of equipment and supplies), and services (e.g., household expenditures on
permits, fees, guide services). 
In our SAMs, we aggregate the nine income classes of households in the
1996 IMPLAN database into three classes. “Low income” or poor house-
holds receive less than $20,000 in income from all sources. This income
cutoff serves as a good aggregate approximation for households living
below the poverty threshold. “Middle income” households receive between
$20,000 and $70,000 in income. “High income” households receive income
greater than $70,000. The purpose for this household disaggregation in our
SAMs is to quantify the different expenditure patterns exhibited by each
household group. Low-income households spend more out of every $1 of
income on consumption goods than do middle- and high-income house-
holds. Thus, income transfers targeted to different household groups will
yield distinct results by household class on consumption, taxes, and savings.
The national model, together with models for each of the three multicounty
areas we study, require four separate SAMs. In addition, in order to deter-
mine the urban-rural distribution of economic impacts within each region,
we also construct rural SAMs for the Northern Plains Crescent and the
Southern Plains Ellipse regions. These rural SAMs exclude the metropolitan
counties located in each region. In this way we can assess the extent to
which direct impacts occurring in these regions’ rural areas also generate
indirect impacts on output and jobs in their urban areas. 
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The SAM also serves as the basic building block for the SAM multiplier
model. We use the SAM multiplier model to assess the direct and indirect
impacts of abolishing CRP funding on the national economy and the three
regional economies. The SAM multiplier model completely captures the
interlinkages among revenue, income, and expenditure flows made by
households and firms. The matrix multiplier obtained from the SAM
captures not only the direct and indirect effects in production but, also
induced effects. In production, direct effects represent the initial impacts of
an outside shock on a particular sector. Indirect effects refer to a particular
sector’s demands for intermediate goods. Induced effects refer to those
demands for goods and services made by households spending their new
income derived producing new output induced by the outside shock. In
addition and even more importantly, the SAM multiplier also captures the
direct and indirect effects associated with exogenous shocks to households.
In figure E.1, the submatrix A contains just the intermediate purchases
among firms that are characterized by input-output multipliers, whereas the
dotted rectangle contains all of the endogenous flows among households,
factors, and firms embedded in the SAM multipliers. At the same time, the
SAM multipliers account for the leakages and injections occurring at their
proper entry points in the circular flow.91
To obtain the SAM multiplier matrix, we begin by transforming the SAM as
a 23x23 matrix of expenditure shares Γ Γ. The elements in each column of Γ Γ
sum to 1. The ith column in Γ Γ represents the percent of account i’s outlays
accruing to each of the other accounts in the SAM. Since the elements of a
1x23 vector of column totals (y) and a 23x1 vector of row totals (x) of the
SAM accounts are equal, we can express the SAM as,
Γ Γ⋅x = y′ (1)
Given our shares matrix Γ Γ, let B be the matrix of the subset of these coeffi-
cients comprising the endogenous accounts contained in the dashed
rectangle in figure E.1: production activities, factors, and households. The
exogenous, government, capital, and the rest-of-the-world accounts are
excluded. We express a condition for an accounting equilibrium as the
vector of total output and income flows (z) that supports the vector sum of
endogenous household and firm demands (B⋅z) plus the vector of row sums
of exogenous demands (w),
z = B⋅z + w  (2)
Note that z is a subset of row totals x for the entire SAM corresponding to
the endogenous accounts defined in B. The vector w is the subset of row
sums of the exogenous demands placed on the endogenous accounts defined
in B; it does not include exogenous flows among the exogenous accounts
themselves. In equilibrium, the SAM multiplier is easily obtained,
z = (I - B)-1⋅w = M⋅w (3)
where M = [mij]. Each sectoral multiplier, mij, represents the induced
income flow to account i for services performed for account j, as a result of
91 For example, social security pay-
ments are treated as taxes on factor
income, not as household income.
Hence, this leakage is subtracted from
the flow of factor income disbursed to
households.  The SAM framework
treats factor income paid outside of the
region as a leakage from factor
income, not household income.
Accounting for these leakages out of
factor income explains why household
income multipliers differ from factor
income multipliers.
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income transferred to) sector j. The jth column vector of multipliers Mj
captures the impacts of an exogenous shock to the jth account on all endoge-
nous accounts in the SAM. The diagonal multiplier mjj measures the direct
impact of the shock to the initial sector j. The other off-diagonal multipliers
mij represent the indirect impacts of the shock affecting the other industries,
the returns to factors, and household incomes by type of household.
Keeping in mind the graph of the circular flow of economic activity found
in basic economics texts, the SAM multiplier model is able to account for
the effects of an exogenous shock at all the different points in the endoge-
nous circular flow, regardless of whether the shock first affects a particular
firm, factor, or household (or set of firms, factor, or households).
Sectoral labor requirements for the production activities in the SAM are
calculated as 
l = L·(MA⋅w) (4)
where l is the Hadamard product of L, the vector of sectoral labor/output
ratios, and (MA·w), the vector of sector outputs supporting equilibrium in
equation (3).92 Elements in L are expressed as the number of jobs required
to produce $1 million worth of output for each production activity in A; MA
is the 13x19 submatrix of interindustry, factor income, and household
expenditure multipliers in M that affect 13 production activities.93, 94
Given the accounting equilibrium in equations (3) and (4), equations (3′)
and (4′) express the endogenous responses to the exogenous shock ∆w: 95
∆z = M⋅∆w  (3′)
∆l = L·(MA⋅∆w) (4′)
Strictly speaking, ∆l represents the induced changes in labor demand.
Although these simulations project increases or decreases in labor demand,
ex post changes in actual employment levels cannot be assessed by this
framework.
The SAM multiplier model in equations (1)-(4′) represents the most general
case of fixed-coefficient, linear multiplier models. It is considered as the
benchmark multiplier model. Extended input-output models (such as Type
II, Type III, and Miyazawa multiplier models) represent partial closures of
multisectoral equilibrium (Pyatt, 2001). These latter models either do not
capture the full impacts, or, depending on the parameters used, produce
approximations that may understate or overstate the impacts (Holland and
Wyeth, 1993).
Finally, the results from our simulations must be interpreted with some
caution. As a member of the family of fixed-coefficient linear multiplier
models, the SAM model assumes that the supply response is perfectly
elastic. This assumption describes an economic environment without
scarcity. That is, there always exist unemployed resources sufficient to meet
the new demands projected by our simulations. Moreover, if there exists an
input supply bottleneck in the regional economy, then the industry is
92 If A = (aij) and B = (bij) are each
mxn matrices, their Hadamard product
is the mxn matrix of elementwise
products A·B = (aijbij).
93 The dimensions of M are 19x19 for
the national SAM and 18x18 for each
of the three regional SAMs.
94 The SAM production multipliers
include induced effects and, therefore,
are larger than Leontief input-output
multipliers.  One can use the Pyatt-
Round decomposition to recover the
input-output multipliers from the SAM
production multipliers (Pyatt and
Round, 1979).
95 The vector ∆ ∆w could easily repre-
sent a matrix in which each column
∆wj represents a single scenario. In
this case, each column of the matrices
∆z and ∆l represents the results of a
single simulation.
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This assumption means that we interpret our output and job estimates repre-
sent at best as upper bounds of a positive endogenous response and lower
bounds of a negative endogenous response.96 In an economywide frame-
work that allows for scarce inputs to flow to their most profitable uses, the
estimates of the impacts of abolishing the CRP would be lower.
Modeling Urban-Rural Differences
We decompose the regional results into impacts on the urban economy
versus the rural economy for the Northern Plains Crescent and the Southern
Ellipse. Given our regional SAM models, we construct “rural” SAM models
that just include the nonmetro counties embedded the regional models and
exclude the metro counties. Then, we analyze the effects of removing the
CRP using these two rural models. The differences in employment and
output between the two models represent the urban impacts of removing the
CRP in these two regional economies. We use the job/output coefficents for
the regional and rural models to construct the job leakage statistics reported
in Figure 4.3 (see Vogel, 2003).
96 Another assumption that prices do
not change in response to an exoge-
nous shock is quite appropriate for the
models of the regional economies,
since prices are determined outside
their borders. The fixed-price assump-
tion does not cause undue harm to
simulations using the national model,
since the size of the CRP shock is less
than 0.01 of 1 percent of aggregate
national income. If the shock were
larger, the policy analyst would antici-
pate larger price changes creating larg-
er effects in output and factor markets
that could not be captured in this
framework.
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